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CHAPTER I 
KNOWLEDGE. INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORKS AND DAVID HUME: 
Introduction To The Problem 
The fundamental questions what is knowledge and how may it be 
known and what is the purpose of human life and how should it be lived--
are at least as ancient as the first recorded philosophy. Through the 
centuries the answers to these questions have formed for each generation 
a part of the mentalite or spirit of the age. There also have been 
cycles of much longer duration which may be characterized by their 
prevailing optimism that reality and the universe may be known -- as 
with the early Greek philosophers and the scientists since Newton or 
by a prevailing pessimism and confusion as each new paradigm of 
knowledge is first eagerly embraced, applied widely and finally found 
inadequate as an all embracing system of explanation, as was the case of 
Aristotle's logic for the Scholastics. 
From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the 
intellectual world suffered one of the pessimistic periods, a crisis of 
confidence about what could be known with certainty as the old paradigms 
of knowledge and ethics declined and before the new scientific one had 
been fully accepted. Both Descartes' and Locke's theories of knowledge 
were meant as answers to the pervasive skepticism that followed from the 
decline in the authority of the church to define truth, the rise of the 
1 
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nominalist theory of knowledge, and a newly developing urge to religious 
and intellectual liberty. But both the Cartesian and Lockean theories 
of knowledge had flaws which Hume's clear critical eye detected to the 
dismay of those who were riding the new crest of optimism that reason 
and science would soon resolve the problem of certainty and answer the 
riddles of the universe. 
The eighteenth century was a time of major change in basic 
assumptions about knowledge and its most insightful philosopher, David 
Hume, shared in many of these. But much of the newly developing 
empirical thought was inconsistent and over-optimistic in its claims. 
Hume's intention was to clear up the inconsistencies and establish a 
solid epistemological base for scientific knowledge. He addressed the 
skeptical crisis of knowledge with a modified, expanded form of 
empiricism which he referred to as true philosophy. His investigation 
into human understanding found that what humans know is based on 
experience in ordinary life operated on by the natural structuring 
mechanism of mind which gives order and meaning to that experience. 
Knowledge based on experience is necessarily mind and time dependent. 
That is, the accumulated store of human knowledge changes through time, 
and how humans interpret their knowledge also changes as time and 
conditions change. New challenges appear and new adaptations or 
syntheses are worked out. Hume proposed a science of man did not 
promise ultimate truths, but at least ''principles as universal as 
possible", given the limits of human understanding. His "mitigated 
skepticism" was a standard of reasonable doubt, a method for limiting 
the scope of inquiry to those questions for which there was evidence to 
support a belief. It was meant to instill a touch of humility into 
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reasoning to ward off the dangers of dogmatic and false reasoning. 
Objectives of This Paper 
The inquirer who begins reading the commentaries on David Hume's 
philosophy is soon struck by the great difference between the older and 
the more recent scholarship and interpretations. Because Hume was only 
half optimistic in an age of inflated expectations that science could 
provide ~11 of the secrets that humans crave, he made his contemporaries 
uncomfortable. The philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
later English Hegelians who formed the ''old Oxford view" portrayed Hume 
as the great skeptic, that "worm in the bud of the Enlightenment"1 who 
tried to prove that knowledge is impossible. Eighteenth and nineteenth 
century thinkers operating under different frames of reference and 
asking other questions missed the subtle depth in his thought. 
In the first half of the twentieth century a few scholars began to 
revise the long established interpretation of Hume's philosophy. 
Inspired by the early seminal works in the 1930s and 1940s, there 
followed a renaissance of Hume scholarship in the second half of the 
century. The number of published studies has increased every decade 
since the 1940s. In the decade of the 1960s there was a rapid 
acceleration with a particularly rich burst of new published material in 
2 1976, the bicentennial of his death. 
The more recent scholarship has not only demonstrated a clearly 
historical approach in his political and economic theories and the The 
History of England but also has noticed that the epistemology of the 
Treatise is laid out in a narrative and dialectical way, demonstrating a 
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developmental approach to learning and knowledge. Hume's long 
unrecognized contribution to the theory of knowledge is that historical 
and dialectical thinking are inherent in an empirical concept of 
knowledge. The implications of such an understanding of knowledge were 
only beginning to be realized inHume's century. When knowledge is 
viewed as the accumulation of facts, and concepts and conclusions are 
derived from the process of accumulation and assimilation, then the the 
proper way of describing knowledge is dialectical and narrative in which 
past information achieves new significance in the light of further 
developments. The empirical philosopher faces a continuous need to 
assimilate fact information into the established frame of reference: if 
the. new facts are dissonent with established opinion, then new syntheses 
are created. In the eighteenth century the theological and prophetic 
way of interpreting human social morality was giving way to the 
empirical approach which regarded the facts of history as the key to 
ethical knowledge. That is why the empirical social philosophers wrote 
histories. 
David Hume was the first of the British philosophical historians. 
Because his epistemology was psychological, historical and complex, and 
because he wrote in an easy and popular style, it was not easy to detect 
the deeper currents of meaning in his writing. Ideas of process, 
synthesis, cultural and intellectual evolution lay as a substructure to 
all of Hume's writing. But because these ideas were still in formation 
in the eighteenth century, the specialized terminology that Kant, Hegel 
and the romantic historians later provided, did not yet exist. Such 
Ideas, therefore, had little command over the prevailing intellectual 
climate. The idea of progress (Hume's term for process and evolution) 
of knowledge and culture was new in the eighteenth century. and Hume's 
interpreters did not understand the part that such ideas played in 
understanding his philosophy. 
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The original impulse for the present investigation was to find and 
understand the real David Hume. Was he the skeptic who thought 
knowledge wasn't possible, as he was represented in the·old view, or the 
Newtonian scientist of man that he hoped to be. During the course of 
the study, it became apparent that there were several ways to read his 
philosophy, and that the predominant interpretation had radically 
changed in this century. The purpose of this paper is (1) to identify 
the main frames of reference which have been used for interpreting Hume, 
to explain why the older Newtonian and Lockean phenomenalist 
interpretation had such a strong hold for so long, and to outline the 
development of the modern, more Kantian interpretation; (2) to trace the 
history of the persistent human questions concerning what is real 
knowledge and how it may be known, and to find Home's place in the 
continuous evolution of answers to those questions; (3) to demonstrate 
the development of the newer interpretation in which the paradigm for 
knowledge is neither extreme phenomenalism nor extreme idealism, but a 
more expanded form of empiricism that synthesizes both and takes history 
as its paradigm; (4) to find confirmation in Hume's philosophy of 
knowledge, his social and political philosophy, and his History of 
England that an historical and dialectical approach is a way to find 
greater meaning in these writings than was possible under the old 
phenomenalist interpretive framework. 
The first issue will be discussed in the remainder of Chapter I. 
The second is the subject of Chapter II, The Problem of Knowledge. 
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The third is considered in Chapter Ill, History and Empirical Science. 
Chapters IV, V, and VI seek to confirm that an historical paradigm for 
knowledge can be found throughout Hume•s epistemological, social and 
political philosophy. The conclusion proposes that the paradigm of 
science is at present in a more mature, less optimistic and less rigidly 
reductionist phase, which may be why Hume•s historical empiricism is 
receiving more scholarly attention than ever. It also suggests for 
historians that the attempt to pattern history after the now somewhat 
shaky models of mathematics and physics may not be the most productive. 
History, or the narrative order of human experience, objectified as much 
as possible in the subjective mind of the historian, is itself an 
irreducible paradigm for knowledge in the social sciences. 
Problems Of Interpretation 
There are several difficulties in reading Hume that may explain the 
length of time it has taken to understand the deep interpretive 
structures that underlie his writing. One set of reasons may be 
generally categorized as problems with the form of his writing. There 
is, for example, no one place to turn to for his complete, systematic 
textbook on the science of man. The Treatise was his first attempt. 
Written as a young man, he later regretted its immaturity and its 
difficulty of style. 3 It had three divisions, Book I, "Of the 
Understanding"; Book II, "Of the Passions"; and Book Ill, "Of Morals." 
Two projected books on politics and criticism were intended to complete 
the structure. 4 But the first three books met with so little success 
that the last two were never written in treatise form. The Treatise was 
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meant to give an empirical explanation that was psychological and 
historical to the question of how humans know, and to use that base 
concept of knowledge to construct an empirical social science and 
ethics. It was so misinterpreted that he later recast it in two shorter 
versions, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals. 
These were only a little more successful, so he turned to the essay 
form to advance his political and economic theories, couched in 
discussions of the issues of his day. This literary approach, while it 
converted his philosophy to easier reading, also made it harder to 
detect the significance that only repeated readings and comparison with 
the philosophical works began to reveal. Thus his theoretical principles 
and methods were to be found explicitly stated only in the introductory 
paragraphs of the essays, and in the appendices of the History, as well 
as scattered throughout as aphorisms. Otherwise his principles lay as a 
substructure, there but not obvious. Those who have done this laborious 
search have found an evident continuity of theory behind the Treatise, 
Essays and the History. But such comparative exegesis has mostly taken 
place in this century. Before that, most scholarly interpretation took 
his political and economic theory, with its grounding in history, to be 
unrelated to his epistemology which was widely believed to maintain that 
knowledge wasn't possible in any case. 
Economic success was one reason to turn to essay writing, but 
selling his ideas to a wider readership was even more important. 
Popularly read literary forms fit Hume's concept of a philosophy that in 
order to have any intelligible meaning to human beings, would have to 
get away from the purely theoretical "speculations of the closet" and 
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out into the world of common life. Conversation and the free exchange 
of ideas among people, rather than formal logic, were the means of 
refining and correcting his science. Hume, himself, explained in "Of 
Essay Writing" that he proposed to be an ambassador between the worlds 
of learning and the "conversational world" of literate readers. 5 The 
eighteenth century was, after all, a time of great essayists whose works 
were read and discussed in polite society. If one wished to promote a 
revolution in thinking, the essay and history were the media to use. 
Duncan Forbes, who wrote a recent and thorough analysis of Hume•s 
politics, said that contemplating all of Hume's writing was like gazing 
at a "dazzling mosaic" of hundreds of points of light on a glittering 
sea. The effect is baffling unless one stands well back and achieves a 
philosophical distance in order to see the repeated patterns. 6 
Nearly a century earlier, Selby-Bigge7 noticed the same mosaic 
effect and was the first to mention in the introduction to his 1893 
edition of the Enquiries that there was a problem about interpreting 
Hume's texts. Selby-Bigge observed that Hume said so many things in so 
many different contexts that it is possible to "find all philosophies in 
Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all." 8 
Selby-Bigge was right that there were some inconsistencies to be found 
in the entire range of Hume's writing, (although his general concepts 
remain very consistent). Still there is another insight to be found in 
Selby-Bigge's statement, though it is not what he had in mind. Setting 
one concept against another and then trying to find a synthesis is 
precisely how Hume did philosophy. Such a procedure may be faulty from 
a logical-analytical viewpoint, but not from a dialectical one. Hume 
found paradoxes at the core of the great problems of knowledge, morals, 
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and politics. Philosophic knowledge versus common sense, cosmos versus 
chaos in causal explanations (i.e. determinism vs. free will or 
randomness) self versus other, liberty versus authority. Each way of 
thinking on these issues had some truth in it. Hume's intention was to 
find moderate, "both/and" 9 solutions that created a synthesis between 
opposites. On political issues, the moral philosopher should attempt to 
stand apart from the common clamor of polarized political debate. 
Viewing the issues with a scientific detachment revealed that there was 
some truth in both sides of the debate, and encouraged humility and 
moderation in judgments. 
A second type of difficulty in understanding the fuller significance 
of Hume's philosophy was the frame of reference of his interpreters. 
Locke's philosophy had such a strong hold on the mind of the eighteenth 
century, that the most obvious thing that Hume's readers could see was 
that he had shown some of Locke's theories were untenable. Within the 
limits of their frame of reference they could not see that Hume expanded 
Locke's theory of knowledge into a more consistent and inclusive 
definition of empiricism. 
The questions that are asked influence what is observed. The 
questions being asked in Hume's day were still concerned with how to 
obtain certain and absolute knowledge, and that very much affected what 
interpreters saw in Hume. Throughout his lifetime and for at least a 
century afterward, his philosophy was not fully understood because most 
tried to read it from a phenomenalist perspective derived from Locke. In 
the twentieth century, new interpretive frameworks, particularly those 
with a more Kantian interpretation of knowledge provided fruitful new 
ways to see more of Hume's meaning. 
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Conceptual Frameworks 
Because the range of Hume's thought is so wide and his conceptual 
framework sometimes (depending on where one is reading) more implicit 
than explicit, interpretation is especially difficult for the reader
 who 
has covered only a little of Hume and hasn't discovered the more sub
tle 
underlying theory. It is useful to have some kind of interpretive mo
del 
or conceptual "handle" for getting a hold on the subject. 
Historically, the most persistent frame of reference for 
interpreting Hume has been that of phenomenalism which developed in 
British philosophy out of Locke. 10 It is a fora of radical empiricis
m 
that interprets all human knowledge as derived from unconnected sens
ory 
events sometimes referred to as atoms of phenomena. Phenomenalism 
developed out of Locke's image of the mind at birth as blank paper a
nd 
from his physiological explanation for sensory perception as the "m
otion 
of particles of matter coming from them [bodies at a distance} and 
striking on our organs. " 11 Though Locke' s Essay Concerning Human 
Understandingsuggested several sources of knowledge including the 
reflection of the mind on its own ideas and intuitively, rationally 
deduced moral principles, these seemed to be inconsistent with his 
physiological sensory explan~tion. It was the latter to which 
subsequent British philosophers paid most attention and which they 
refined into an increasingly physiological, mechanical and phenomena
l 
concept of knowledge that has persistently characterized British 
empirical philosophy. It is this phenomenalist interpretation -- f
or 
which Locke and Hume traditionally have been symbols -- that in the 
last 
twenty-five years has undergone significant revision. But it remain
s in 
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all the older discussions of Hume, so that the modern reader is likely 
to run into it often. 
After the mid-point of the nineteenth century British philosophy was 
increasingly influenced by Hegelian thought. The Absolute Idealists, 
whose thought dominated British universities until the 1920's, opposed 
empirical philosophy altogether. They were interested in the wholeness 
of ultimate truth in which there are no divisions into fragmentary bits 
of empirical phenomena. 12 They had no use for the Lockean system, and 
considered Hume as the last of its degenerate line. Oxford professor 
T.H. Green edited an edition of Hume's Treatise (London, 1874) in which 
he wrote a lengthy introduction interpreting it as solely a Lockean 
phenomenalist document that ended in total scepticism. This viewpoint 
is often referred to as the ''old Oxford view" that peipetuated the Reid 
and Beattie's Scottish School interpretation which emphasised his 
skeptical epistemology to the exclusion of all else. 13 
By the 1920's Absolute Idealism began to decline and British 
philosophy reverted once again to its empirical roots in Locke and 
Hume. Linguistic analysis developed as a means of examining the 
overinflated Hegelian language of the Idealists for its meaning. G.E. 
Moore and Bertrand Russell, suspecting that imprecise language led to 
fuzzy thinking, began to work out a means to bring a scientific rigor to 
. 14 
philosophic language. 
Russell and Wittgenstein devised a logical atomism that proposed 
that reality consists of atomic facts (phenomena) and that language 
consists only of atomic and molecular propositions, combining 
traditiorial phenomenalism with modern developments in logic. Russell 
devised the syntax of a logically perfect language which he supposed was 
12 
the essence of the language we really use. It was soon noticed, however, 
that the statements which logical atomists made did not conform to the 
. f h i 1 . 15 r1gor o t e r own og1c. 
Contemporary with the later part of Russell's work, the Logical 
Positivists developed as a group with an organized creed. The Logical 
Positivists of the Vienna Circle officially recognized Hume as a founder 
of their philosophy in their 1929 manifesto. They were the first to see 
Hume not as a destructive skeptic, but as a constructive philosopher. 
Yet they made the same assumptions as did their predecessors that Hume 
was to be read as a phenomenalist. 16 
Their creed was appealingly simple and they got much attention for 
their efforts to establish criteria for scientific and mathematical 
proofs. Their test for meaning in science was the Verification 
Principle. But on exactly how this principle was to be defined, they 
were never able to agree. Generally, they thought that the meaning of 
scientific statements was to be found directly in the facts of sense 
experience without an interpreting mind or prior hypothesis. This kind 
of statement eliminated the possibility of meaning for anything 
involving metaphysics, morals or aesthetics. There were other 
complications. Is sensory experience the only kind of experience? Does 
verification depend only on present experience? If so, as some claimed, 
history would be eliminated as a category of knowledge. And finally, if 
verification of atoms of sensory phenomena depended only on private 
experience, how can there be any public discussion of science/ 
knowledge? The concept ended in linguistic solipsism. It eventually 
became obvious that the logic of language could only refer to language; 
17 
there was no way to connect it to the world of experienced fact. It 
is the same problem with other attempts to reduce experience to logical 
constructs whether Aristotelian logic, Cartesian mathematical reasoning 
or modern computer models; the experienced flow of particular events 
(phenomena) does not necessarily conform to a universal logical 
framework. 
Both Absolute Idealism and Logical Positivism were extremist 
epistemological positions. The one construed the world as purely idea, 
the construct of the active ordering principles of mind, the other as 
purely material phenomena imprinting meaning directly on a passive 
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mind. It gradually became apparent to scholars that Hume had worked out 
a moderating position between these two extremes. Kant is usually given 
the honor for constructing the bridge between empiricism and idealism, 
but it is now understood that he built on a foundation laid by Hume. 
Most of modern interpretation is based on this new understanding of 
Hume. 18 
Gradually throughout this century, the old phenomenalist frame of 
reference has given way to two new interpretive frameworks. These are 
naturalism and empiricism, which are interconnected aspects of Hume's 
attempt to found psychology and ethics on scientific principles, and 
will be discussed in turn. Norman Kemp Smith, professor of logic and 
metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh, pioneered the modern 
naturalistic interpretation in an article, "The Naturalism of Hume" in 
the journal Hind of 1905. 19 His career-long study of the Treatise 
culminated in a highly influential book, The Philosophy of David Hume 
published in 1941. It was the first important attempt to find Hume's 
real and unique philosophy beyond the first Lockean and skeptical 
passages which were long assumed to be all there was. He concluded that 
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Hume•s real intention was to write a new moral philosophy, influenced by 
Francis Hutcheson•s theory of a natural moral sense, and that Book I, 
(Of the Understanding) refuting the Cartesian and modifying the Lockean 
theories of knowledge was meant to prepare the way for Books II and III 
(Of the Passions and Of Morals). These contained Hume•s variations on 
Hutcheson•s system of natural moral knowledge in which basic beliefs are 
20 located in the passions. 
To Kemp Smith, what is central to Hume•s theory of knowledge is the 
reversal of the roles given to reason and passion. Our basic beliefs of 
a real external world, of cause, of the existence of our selves and 
other selves are not founded in reason but in the nature of our minds; 
they are natural beliefs. Nature is ultimate cause and a priori in 
Hume•s philosophy. 21 Why do people believe in cause? Because it is a 
natural instinct. Why do people experience virtuous acts as 
pleasurable? Because they have a natural moral sense. 
When one begins to read Hume for his references to nature, there are 
numerous confirmations: 
Nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity ~~s 
determined us to judge as well as breathe and feel. 
All these operations [judgment as to matters of fact, 
appreciation of beauty, estimation of an action as good or bad] 
are a species of natural instinct, which no reasoning process 
of the thoufgt and understanding is able either to produce or 
to prevent. 
By 1976, the year of several Hume conferences and many publications 
on the occasion of the bicentennial of Huae•s death, the Kemp Smith 
naturalism thesis was acknowledged to be the prevailing and the correct 
interpretation. 24 The most thorough new look at naturalism in Hume•s 
political philosophy, had appeared the year earlier, Duncan Forbes• 
Hume's Philosophical Politics. 25 Forbes reread the social and political 
theory in the perspective of the Enlightenment's interest in natural 
law. The Cambridge Platonists (Ralph Cudsworth, Samuel Clark, and the 
Earl of Shaftesbury) of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
searched for a natural foundation on which to base non-authoritarian 
laws and morality, in opposition to Hobbes' pessimistic view of human 
selfishness that justified authoritarian control. The Platonists 
assumed such a grounding was obtainable by reasoning based on formal 
logic. When Hume disproved a rational basis for moral reasoning it was 
widely supposed that he had, therefore, demolished natural law theory. 
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Forbes argued that rather than destroy natural law, Hume had changed 
its theoretical foundation from theological and rational to secular and 
empirical. Rational natural law theorists postulated an a priori God-
governed rational body of truth and derived from this a system of human 
duties, that which ought to be. Hume reasoned the opposite way. In 
order to derive what ought to be, one observes what is, a posteriori 
from human behavior. People are born into families, and act under 
social, sexual and self-interested motives that are based in nature and 
passion, not reason. Hume bracketed off a religious ultimate cause as 
unknowable and unnecessary from the economy of explanation principle. 
But he retained a strong social basis for his moral theory which 
differentiated it from the "selfish system" of Hobbes and the 
utilitarians. The essential feature of the natural law theory of 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland and Hutchenson, which they held in common 
with Hume, was the social nature of human beings, and the social 
derivation of institutions to meet human needs. Hume synthesised 
natural law and an empirical approach to arrive at a naturalistic 
explanation for human nature and society based on the facts of human 
experience. Forbes describes Hume and Adam Smith as adding empirical 
depth to natural law and were thus its legacies rather than its 
26 destroyers. 
The second modern conceptual handle for grasping Hume is empirical 
theory, which is the methodology for studying humanity considered as 
natural beings. That Hume meant to establish a science should seem 
obvious given the subtitle of the Treatise, Being an Attempt to 
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. But 
this also went unnoticed until Hume was revived by Kemp Smith and the 
Logical Positivists early in this century. Mary Shaw Kuypers' Studies 
in the Eighteenth Century Background of Hume's Empiricism, first 
published in 1930, mentions that in several new works, especially Kemp 
Smith's, there has been a "new and valuable orientation, and, in 
general, Hume's empiricism has come to see• more important than his 
27 phenomenalisa." 
Reading the few pages of introduction to the Treatise makes clear 
his intention to establish a system of science on experiential 
(empirical) ground. 
In pretending the~efore to explain the principles of human 
nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, 
built on a foundation almost entirely new. . . And as the 
science of man is the only solid foundation for the other 
sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this 28 
science itself must be laid on experience and observation. 
Hume assumed an orderly cosmos of the mind whose general laws of 
operation could be established by a Newtonian reduction. 
But it is at least worth while to try if the science of man 
will not admit of the same accuracy which several parts of 
natural philosophy are found susceptible of. There seems to be 
all the reason in the world to imagine that it may be carried 
to the greatest degree of exactness. If in examining several 
phenomena we find that they resolve themselves into one common 
16 
p~inciple, and can trace this p~inciple into another, we shall 
at last arrive at those few simple principles on which all the 
~est depend. And though we can neve~ a~~ive at the ultimate 
principles, it 2~s a satisfaction to go as far as our faculties 
will allow us. 
We have confined ouselves in this whole reasoning to the 
relation of cause and effect, as discovered in the motions and 
operations of matter. But the same reasoning extends to the 
operations of the mind. 30 
But Hume•s empiricism, as it has slowly come to be unde~stood, is 
not the same as the more extremely reductionist British variety. The 
strict empiricism of the Positivists accepted only present sense data, 
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allowing no past nor construct of mind actively to impute meaning to the 
data. Part of the difficulty that scholars in this tradition have had 
in understanding Hume•s objective of describing how we know or why we 
believe in cause and effect in psychological terMs is that it is too 
imprecise for the taste of a strictly reductionist and materialist 
empirical theory. John Passmore in Hume's Intentions expresses this 
attitude when he accuses Hume of reso~ting to "a t~ick of the mind" in 
explaining why we believe in cause. 31 
Yet the British empiricists were scornful because Hume posed them a 
quandary which, according to Bertrand Russell, their purely 
phenomenalist theory has not yet been able to answer. Hume•s legacy to 
Kant and the subsequent course of empirical theory was the understanding 
that in order to explain how we know, we must search for deeper roots 
than either of the two prevailing systems (the mathematical/logical or 
the sensory-phenomena-only form of empirical explanation). 32 
Ernst Cassirer, whose analysis of the eighteenth century 
development of the theory of empi~icism was written froM a German and 
Kantian perspective, proposed that Hume was not to be seen as the dead 
end of the Bacon to Berkeley chain. Rather, his empiricism was to be 
seen as a new beginning, one that developed in linear progression 
through Newton and the Dutch scientists Huygens and S'Gravesande to the 
inevitable conclusion, that the phenomenal and mathematical conception 
of knowledge (the British model) comes to rest on a foundation of 
psychological certainty. 33 This anchoring in the psychology of the 
structuring mind is the historical preparation necessary for the German 
developments in philosophy of science, which switched the 
interpretation of mind from the passive receptor of sense data to the 
active creator of meaning for those data. 34 
18 
Both Hume and Kant proposed solutions to the problem of knowledge 
inherent in the extreme versions of phenomenalist empirical theory. The 
Hume to Kant connection has long been known through the often repeated 
statement of Kant's that, "I honestly confess that my recollection of 
David Hume•s teaching was the very thing which many years ago first 
interrupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investigations in the field 
of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."35 Both of them 
believed in the reality of a physical world which our senses represent 
to us, and that the inferences drawn from that experience result from 
the structuring nature of our minds. Hume, however, while he 
foreshadowed Kant, remained in the British tradition of maintaining a 
firm basis in experience. Kant pushed further in the direction of the 
transcendent mind, actively creating meaning. His conception of 
empiricism which he called critical philosophy became the great rival to 
the British, phenomenalist philosophy of science. 36 
A Kantian perspective has been a very fruitful one for understanding 
those parts of Hume that seem so perplexing to those reading from a 
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strictly phenomenalist viewpoint. Perhaps this explains the observation 
made by Hume's bibliographer that prior to 1925 Hume studies in the 
English speaking world lay in "suspended animation" while in the non-
English speaking world over 100 works were published, primarily in 
37 Germany. 
Hume's influence in German thought is clear in the work of Edmund 
Husser! who intended a comprehensive philosophy of science he called 
phenomenology. Husserl, Hume and Kant were clearly parallel in 
attempting to explain objective reality in terms of subjective 
experience. Husserl, however, was critical of aspects of both of his 
precursors, though he thought that Hume had a better critical facility 
38 than Kant. He disliked Hume's emphasis on sensory data, but liked his 
structuring consciousness in which the object is represented to it as 
real through the medium of consciousness.39 Generally, phenomenology is 
a system of criticism which examines the phenomena of experience as they 
are experienced in the process and activity of consciousness. Object 
and subject are not separated but understood to be aspects of the whole 
process. The methodology is that of philosophically stepping back and 
critically examining the process of consciousness as it imputes meaning 
to experienced phenomena. 40 The Hume reader can see at once that this 
was Hume's way of approaching the questions he considered. 
The phenomenological frame of reference for interpreting Hume's 
texts has had a part in their current re-evaluation. Donald Livingston 
has observed that rereading Hume in the light of phenomenology's method 
of examining the contents of consciousness to discover how we construct 
meanings, revealed new insights. Previously Hume had been read mostly 
from the British analytical tradition in which only the Lockean and 
phenomenalist pa~ts made sense and all the rest seemed mushy and 
confusing or even contradictory. Read in the new way, the Treatise may 
be seen not as systematic analysis, but as a dialectical, that is, 
developmental search through Hume's own mind, in which new meanings are 
found as the search unfolds, and new information is added. Livingston 
continues that although he does not mean to take up the task of 
interpreting Hume as a phenomenologist would, he wishes to note that in 
the early twentieth century, Husserl and his followers had a deeper 
unde~standing of Hume than their English contemporaries. 41 
Livingston as well as other modern interpreters, going all the way 
back to Kemp Smith, however, do have a phenomenological point of view. 
If they were not directly influenced by that philosophical movement, 
they at least appreciated the same aspects of Hume that the 
phenomenologists did, that is, his psychology of knowledge and his 
introspective method. 
A German philosophical perspective undoubtedly also lies behind the 
modern app~eciation for the historicism that underlies not only Hume's 
politics and history but the epistemology as well. As Livingston has 
pointed out, with ample documentation, that the Treatise, is not an 
analytical document, but one that proceeds in a narrative, dialectical 
way as Hume grapples with contradictory issues to arrive at new 
understandings. Narrative, time ordered thinking is central to all of 
Hume's writing from the Treatise to the History as the rest of this 
paper will attempt to demonstrate. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND DAVID HUME 
From their earliest recorded stories human beings have shown a 
conscious awareness that they are unique among the animals for their 
ability to possess knowledge and to think creatively about it. Yet the 
most persistent and elusive problem has been an understanding of the 
exact nature and limits of human knowledge. Ernst Cassirer wrote in the 
introduction to his book, The Problem of Knowledge: 
Even in myth and religion all that is distinctive of man is 
associated with the miracle of knowledge. This miracle reveals 
the nature of man and his likeness to God, yet in it man also 
realizes in the deepest and most painful way, the very 
limitations of his own nature. Knowledge assures him of his 
divine origin, yet through it he at once sees himself cut off 
and banished, as it were, from the original ground of all 
things. He is condemned to a long laborious way of search and 
research, from which there is no final escape. In the very 
consciousness that there is a knowledge and a truth is the 
awareness at the same ttme that the possession of absolute 
truth is denied to man. 
The mystery of human knowledge, which underlay ancient mythology and 
religion, became the subject of conscious study by the ancient Greek 
philosophers. Their particular ability was to make the mysteries of the 
universe the subjects for reason and thought, and to see reality in 
terms of rational order. Supreme among the Greek philosophers for their 
influence on the development of western thought were two geniuses, Plato 
(427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who taught and wrote in an 
1 . t• 2 over ap1ng 1me span. 
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These two were often thought to be exemplars of two very opposite 
systems, two different ways to understand knowledge, the mystical-
intuitive and the empirical. Yet they were not entirely opposite. 
Aristotle was a student of Plato's and they shared a number of common 
assumptions though Aristotles's drifted away from his teacher's mathe-
matical and ideal rationalism toward the biological and observational. 
For both cognition was not material but spiritual, the highest form of 
human activity. They opposed Democritus' purely materialistic, 
atomistic explanation of the world, and opposed skepticism with the 
belief in a timeless truth that the universe is real, knowable, 
possesses a design and fulfills a purpose. Reality is truth and beauty, 
and the good life is the proper goal of human activity. 3 
It was their differences, however, that held the attention of 
subsequent philosophers. Plato was an idealist for whom the form or 
universal idea of an object was held to be more real than the particular 
object of the senses. His paradigm of knowledge was mathematics. 
universal and abstract logical relationships. He appealed to those who 
would explain ultimate reality in terms of soul, mind, idea or God --
thus his appeal in Chrjstian theology. His theory of knowledge was 
based on soul, entirely separate from and superior to the body, which 
intuits the forms. It was the knowing part, the essence of the person, 
containing various aspects, sensory, self-assertive and rational which 
was the highest of all. The soul/mind was godlike, eternal and 
intuitively able to know the universal Forms or concepts to which the 
fleeUng sensory perceptions belonged. The sensory world of chang:ing 
and confusing appearances was held to be merely a shadowy reflection of 
universal and eternal reality which was the idea or the Form. The 
Platonic social scientist measured life and institutions in terms of 
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ideal types: just republics, philosopher kings, and heavenly cities. 
Aristotle'H paradigm of knowledge was biology and the common 
experience and ordinary consciousness of human beings. To him the human 
power to know truth and reality was strongest when based on sensory 
impressions and observation of life, and weakest when considering 
ultimate truth. 4 Aristotle concerned himself more with the concrete and 
particular. whereas Plato preferred the abstract and universal. 
Aristotle's study of biology forced him to consider the changing and 
unique individual cases in nature, while at the same time remembering 
that there similarities as well as differences, continuities as well as 
changes. In his ethics he described existing Greek city states and 
evaluated human action by internal, human standards. 5 
Aristotle's theory of knowledge differed from Plato's on the theory 
of Forms. Whereas for Plato reality was exclusively in the supra-
sensible idea or form, for Aristotle the thing perceived was just as 
real as cognition of its form. Soul and body, perceiver and thing 
perceived, were for him not separate but were different aspects of the 
same reality. He was particularly interested in explaining the 
relationship of soul to body, the mental to the physical process. 
Aristotle's solution was to describe all being which may be perceived by 
the senses as having dual aspects, matter and form. Matter was the 
unknowable substratum, the external object. Form was the function of 
that matter, actual or potential that could be perceived by the senses. 
Form was the knowable essence which the mind abstracted from the sensory 
information it received about the external object. Body and soul, 
therefore, were the matter and form which were inextricably bound 
together in the individual person as an interactive process. Objects 
had, as part of their being, the potentiality of being perceived by the 
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soul. Knowledge was the reciprocal relationship between the knower and 
the known, the object and the subject. Aristotle assumed what most 
other people assume: that the world that is represented to us by our 
6 
senses is the real world. His was a philosophy of common sense. 
Both Plato and Aristotle asked the most basic questions that have 
intrigued thinkers before and since: what is the nature of knowledge and 
what are its ultimate grounds, how does the cognitive process work. 
where do our ideas come from, how is body related to mind. and what is 
~h f h ] . ' 7 L e purpose o uman _ 1te. Each was exemplar of one of two theories of 
knowledge, the rational/intuitive and the empirical. Neither arrived at 
a conclusion that was able conclusively to demolish the other. Instead, 
they asked the questions and suggested the arguments that philosophers 
in the ensuing centuries have found so fruitful for further elabora-
tion. Each theory has had its confirmed advocates, so that Coleridge 
could remark that everyone was from birth either a Platonist or an 
Aristotelian. The fact is, however, that human beings are capable of 
both kinds of knowledge. As Bertrand Russell observed in the opening 
lines of his essay on "Mysticism and Logic" some philosophecs have 
depended exclusJvely on one source, others on the other, but the best of 
philosophy has attempted to harmonize the two. 8 
Aristotle's genius in descr·lbing how humans acquire knowledge has 
lain as a foundation to all Western and Arabic systems of psychology 
since he wrote. 9 He identified but did not resolve the issues comprising 
the ''problem of knowledge". From then on the debate centered on whether 
cognition is a fully passive, sensory receptive function internal to the 
individual organism or whether it is a fully active, concept cceating 
agent which is either internal or comes into the mind from an external 
source. Medieval philosophers were particulacly interested in the issue 
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of whether the agent or active intellect was external or internal to the 
individual human mind. Before Aquinas, most followed the Neoplatonic 
and Christian doctrine of Plotinus and Augustine that the agent intel-
lect entered the individual by divine illumination from a single exter-
nal source, the supreme mind of God. In this group were included the 
earlier Arab philosophers Alfaraby and Avicenna whose commentaries on 
Aristotle were blended with the Neoplatonlc concept of divine illumina-
tion. Avicenna was an important transmitter of Aristotle into Europe 
via Moslem Spain whose two great medieval intellects, Averro~s and 
Maimonides, each peeled away some of the Neoplatonic elements of their 
predecessors. They presented a more purely naturalistic Aristotle, 
maintaining that the intellect is capable of passive intelligence only, 
the higher rational functions belonging exclusively to the external 
. ll 10 agent 1nte ect. 
Until the twelfth century, Western European scholars were isolated 
from the knowledge of the main body of Aristotle, except the logic, and 
from the scholarship of the Arab world. Their theories of knowledge 
were ultimately based in Platonic idealism via Plotinus, Paul and 
Augustine. Mind-body dualism, prejudice against bodily animal nature in 
human beings, God as the sole ground of reality, and the otherworldly, 
immortal soul were the leitmotifs of medieval Christian psychology. The 
rediscovery of Aristotle's books of nature, psychology and ethics 
introduced a new store of ideas to Western Europe and slowly a renewed 
11 
interest in nature and scientific observation began to develop. 
The immediate effect was to stimulate stormy controversy among 
theologians seeking to construct a philosophy that could synthesize the 
contradictions in the two ways of knowledge. Aristotle's refound books 
of logic were easily assimilated with those that were already known and 
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used. The books of natural philosophy were more problematic and 
assimilated more slowly. ScholastJc philosophers from the late twelfth 
century onward were occupied with the attempt to reconcile nature with 
the theology of the church. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) produced the most 
complete synthesis, a moderate realism that comprised a mean between the 
extremes of idealism and nominalism, based on the priitciples of cause, 
reason and order that were shared by both Plato and Aristotle. 12 
Aquinas's theory of knowledge is essentially Aristotle's with some 
Neoplatonic elements. The mind is at birth a tabula rasa which has not 
only the ability to receive sensory impressions but to abstract from the 
fleeting and individual impression its essence or enduring concept. The 
agent intellect becomes an internal feature of the individual mind 
rather than an illumination from the outside. However, Aquinas, like 
the Neoplatonists, holds immaterial being and thought to be a higher, 
more perfect reality. God remains the source of Being, the original 
cause of the order of nature in which the created individual is a 
participant, Being and cognition (body/mjnd) are functions of human 
participation in the created order. 13 
Human beings are not capable of direct knowledge of ultimate truth 
or God. Human knowledge is bound by its experience in the natural 
world; "The mind can perceive nothing that has not previously been 
perceived by the senses." Therefore, "God is known by His works not in 
Himself". 14 The effect was to recognize the full dignity and power of 
human cognition which is capable of the knowledge that the natural world 
around us is real, just as we naturally and unreflectively assume it to 
be. There is no double truth of a separate reality (as in Locke's 
doctrine of primary and secondary qualities), nor is the world a mere 
shadow of that otherworldly reality. Scientific knowledge has the same 
/ 
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claim to truth as abstract knowledge because the observable creation 
f . t . d 1 . h . 1 f d 15 re tee s tne or er y ana unc ang1ng aws o Go . 
For conservative theologians any thought of God bound by determined 
and unchanging laws was too naturalistic and deterministic to tolerate. 
It was dangerous to the revealed religion as interpreted by church 
authority. They set their minds against it and condemned any philosophy 
that tried to synthesize nature and religion or propose an empirical 
theory of knowledge. In 1277, three years after Aquinas's death, the 
Pope condemned a list of beliefs and philosophers compiled by the 
conservative faculty of Paris. The list included Aristotle, Avicenna, 
Averroes and Aquinas and others whose theories tended to naturalism. 
The result was to make synthesis impossible and eventually to split the 
theological explanation of reality from the philosophical. 16 
Conservative theology of the schools clung to the philosophia 
perennis, that ideal goal of a unified, total body of truth which 
approached knowledge from the metaphysical and rational point of view. 
As an ideal it was susceptible to criticism because of its exclusive 
e;n:·1;asis on metaphysics and logic as the way to knowledge. It excluded 
human experience in the world, leading to u chasm between thought and 
life. Cut off from life, thought lost its vitality and witherect. 17 
Meanwhile, in England intellectual life was developing aJong 
different lines at Oxford, the one university that could rival Paris for 
its scholarship. From 1100 onward Oxford was more receptive to the 
Greeks and their Arabic commentators, and therefore developed special 
strength in mathematics and science whereas Paris specialized in 
metaphysics and theology. Robert Gr.osseteste (1168-1253) was the first 
master of Oxford to have access to the complete body of Aristotle's 
works, having translated the Ethics himself. 18 His lasting influence on 
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his school was an interest in science which produced a succession of 
scholars who advanced the empirical way of knowledge: Roger Bacon (1219-
1292), Duns Scotus (1266--1308) and William of Ockham (1290-1349). 19 
Building on the work of the Aristotelians before him, William of Ockham 
advanced a theory of knowledge that pushed empiricism to its farthest 
extreme, by denyjng any possibility of metaphysical knowledge. All that 
we may know is the individual phenomena of sensory data. There is no 
proof that there exists such a thing as an essence or a universal con 
cept outside the mind of the individual knower. "Nothing", he wr·ote. 
"can be known in itself naturally save by intuitional knowledge." 20 
"Intuitional" in his usage meant sensory percepti.oll. The sensory 
information about an individual thing, such as a rose, impresses on the 
mind a mental sign which is then given the name which one's language 
gives to that category of mental image. Being, as such, that is 
ultimate reality,' we cannot know, we only know the signs, or names. 
Hence the name of the theory, Nominalism. 
Nominalism's effect on thought was revolutionary and although Ockham 
himself was excommunicated and lived the rest of his life under the 
protection of the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria, his theories spread rapidly 
in the schools. 21 The ease and rapidity which which nominalism, the via 
mode rna, spread attested to the vulnerability of the phi losophia 
perennis, and to a climate of opinion unconvinced by the old and ready 
for the new. Nominalist philosophy did serious damage to scholastic 
knowledge, based as it was on rational deductions from metaphysical prin-
ciples, that is, from God downward to particular phenomena. Modern 
philosophy approached knowledge from the other way, regarded cognit.ion 
as internal and human, and then discovered that human knowledge could 
not leap the chasm to ultimate truth. If all that humans may know is 
32 
their own subjective perception, then how may it be ascertained whether 
there is an outer world of objects that causes our sensations or whether 
belief in an outer world is purely the product of the agent or structur-
ing mind? When the agent intellect was regarded as an external illumin-
ation, then an individual's perception of an external world was validat-
ed by the external agent, usually defined as God. Once agent intel iect 
came to be regarded as an internal process, the validation of the 
external world became a problem. This constellation of issues revol-
ving around the wish for certain proof came to be called the problem of 
knowledge. Reason, as the nominalists defined it, could neither provide 
proof of the being of the external world, nor of theology's basic 
tenets: God, immortality or Christian ethics. The way was open to 
either nonbelief or belief based on authority (for the orthodox) or 
faith and scripture (for the dissenters). 22 
Nominalism weakened the concept of a single body of knowledge based 
on a unified logical structure. The unity of philosophy (an ideal that 
had never been fully realized) was splintered and a time of ferme1at with 
competing and conflicting theories followed. From then on philosophy 
developed along plural and evolutionary lines. 23 Except for the Church. 
which, by refusing to accept any sort of synthesis with natural 
philosophy, and by insisting on outdated theories such as earth centered 
universe, increasingly made itself irrelevant to the intellectual 
world. Papal authority was already in decline from several broad 
trends: the rise of national monarchies, the rise of a wealthy and 
independent-minded commercial class and the increase of learning. 
Schism, wealth and corruption further eroded the Church's moral 
authority. Fearing that change would weaken its authority to proclaim 
truth, it clung to changeless orthodoxy, stagnated and grew corrupt. 
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Reformers soon appeared who based their appeal to people on faith and 
scripture alone. While the authority of the Church declined 
politically, spiritually and intellectually, the authority of science as 
a means of describing reality increased, reinforced by its practical 
utility to people's lives. 
Knowledge was in crisis. What could human beings be said to know 
with certainty? What is Truth? From the fourteenth century to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth, all that had been taken for granted as human 
knowledge fell under skeptical scrutiny. The crisis was first felt by 
late medieval theologians and philosbphers but through the Reformation 
became so general as to touch everyone and affect all forms of 
knowledge. Both Protestant and Counter Reformation scholars used 
skeptical arguments to undermine the theoretical foundations of the 
other, to the end that both sides doubted themselves out of any 
foundation for knowledge at all. 
After the Council of Trent the pressure for reform led the Church to 
adopt a new strategy. A "new machine of war" they called it, but it 
was, in fact, a revival of Greco-Roman skeplicism. It was intended to 
prove how impossible it would be for Protestants to discover truth in 
their Biblical and linguistic study. Hervet, the secretary to the 
Cardinal of Lorraine, retranslated Sextus Empiricus and used the 
introduction to assert that Protestant claims were hopelessly subjective 
and could never be proven. Various Jesuit scholars, including teachers 
at LaFleche during Descartes' stay, pushed nominalist and skeptical 
arguments to the point of denying that humans, expecially Calvinists. 
could know anything at all. Therefore, they concluded, the authority of 
the Church should be accepted as infallible. 23 
The Protestants were quick to turn the~ "new machine of war" back on 
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the Catholics. The knowledge of popes, councils. and church fathers 
was, they pointed out, subject to the same limitations of human 
. 24 knowledge. By the end of a century of debate, every authority and 
opinion about life, religious, scientific, moral and political was 
seriously challenged. If all we can know is our own subjectivity and 
the human comedy around us, how is it possible to fix a firm foundation 
for any claim to knowledge? 
Total skepticism, as Home \vrote a century later, is insupportable. 
Nature won't permit it. In the face of darkest doubt. people will 
continue to strive for knowledge as a sort of tropism, the organism 
reaching toward the light. Thus philosophers persistently pursued a 
solution to the problem of knowledge. One solution was proposed by 
Descartes (1596-1650), the first modern philosopher to be influenced by 
science and Copernican astronomy and to try to establish a firm 
foundation for both scientific and rational knowledge. He determined to 
doubt his senses and reason on every point until he reached a fixed 
point about which he could feel certain, that of consciousness of his 
own existence. In rds conclusion, Cogito ergo sum, he based certainty 
of his own being on his own subjective perception, that 1s Nominalist 
epistemology. His proof of the existence of the external world, 
however, was scholastic. It posited the existence of God as an 
undeniable first principlei then logically deduced the structure of 
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objective reality. Descartes described a physics that was 
observational and mechanical, but his ideal of knowledge put more 
emphasis on the mathematical interpretation of nature -- so that he. 
became the symbol for the rational, deductive approach to knowledge. 
Descartes' blend of science and rationalism was an inconsistent 
synthesis. It contained a methodological dualism which resulted in a 
split concept of reality, log1c which was convincing to the mtnd. and 
sensory phenomena which was convincing to the body. but it had the 
effect of stimulating redevelopment of two old lines of thought into 
their modern forms, the empirical/inductive and the rational/ 
. d . 26 ae uct1ve. His philosophy of science, however, emphasized the ideal 
of timeless universals in mathematics and deductive logic rather than 
the observational and historical methods of empiricism -- though in 
practice, he developed his optics experimentally with the mathematical 
27 proofs added afterward. In continental Europe, Descartes' deductive 
rationalism was immensely influential, fitting easily into its long 
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tradition of logic and metaphysics. Just as Lock's successors emphasised 
the material phenomenalism in his diverse thought, so did Descartes' 
followers emphasised the rational idealism in his dual system. The 
Germans especially, through Leibniz and Kant to Hegel, developed 
increasingly in the direction of an extreme idealism that posited the 
world entirely as a construct of mind. 
The English, however, building on their intellectual tradition of 
Ockham and Bacon, developed the empirical solution in the simultaneous 
publications of Locke and Newton in 1687. Locke's theory of knowledge 
was concerned wtth making the Cartesian logical ideal of knowledge 
congruent with the observational fact concepts of his scientific 
colleagues in the Royal Society and with religious doctrine, all of 
which he expected to work in harmony to reveal the universal laws of 
nature and morality. 28 This was consistent with the ideas of other 
seventeenth century philosophers who took it for granted that reason, 
whether deductive or inductive (the two were often undifferentiated) was 
the means of certain knowledge capable of yielding ultimate truths and 
thus proofs of God. The Royal Society's Charter of 1663 declared the 
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aim of pevealing the pPovidential glory of God by studying the works of 
creation. It was this assumption, that natural science could prove the 
supernatural which Hume criticised in the following century to the 
29 distress of nearly everyone. 
Locke intended in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding to 
record, using the plain historical method of Bacon, a natural history of 
cognition as a means of putting to rest the controversies of philosophy 
and religion. He rejected the innate ideas of the Cambridge Platonists 
and described the mind at birth as blank paper and as an empty cupboard 
to be filled with the imprints of experience. 30 In some passages he 
says clearly that the senses are the sources of ideas, "All simple ideas 
we have are confined (as I have shown) to those we receive from 
corporeal objects by sensation and from the operations of our own minds 
as the objects of reflection." 31 In other passages knowledge is defined 
as the intuitivly certain archetypes of logical relationships but which 
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are not innate. Moral truths particularly are founded on God's Laws 
which are self-evident to reason, like mathematics, but are also the 
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same as the sensory experience of pleasure and pa1n. 
Locke's Essay was a soundboard for the new ideas of knowledge then 
in vogue. In it he tried them out, clarified them, applied the test of 
experience to them, accepted some, and rejected others. Though it 
contained many useful insights, he did not manage to make logical 
knowledge consistent with observational knowledge. That aspect of 
Locke's theo~y of knowledge to which subsequent British philosophers 
paid the most attention was the sensory and empirical, already a 
persistent tendency among them. 34 Locke's tabula rasa theory of 
knowledge and Newton's inductive method of inquiry and their 
implications that knowledge is based on the sensory experience of 
37 
external phenomena rapidly won the field as the theory and method of 
science, fitting as it does with the human intuition that what we 
experience is what is real. The impact of Locke and Newton on the 
following century was enormous. They, more than any others, defined the 
issues and established the vocabulary of science with which the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment worked. 35 
Scholars of the Royal Society, such as Locke, Grotius and 
Chillingworth, used the empirical test of experience to work out a 
standard of ''reasonable doubt" that could be used to evaluate evidence 
in science, legal transactions and in the writing of history. Evidence 
could be regarded as acceptable if there was no practical or reasonable 
cause for doubt as opposed to metaphysical doubt. 36 
These developments gave cjghteenth century enlightened thinkers the 
expectation that they now had possession of the intellectual tools 
needed to put superstition and ignorance behind them, and to explain the 
true nature of things, to achieve ultimate knowledge. Just at this 
point when true enlightenment seemed close at hand, the century's 
greatest philosopher and most discerning critic, David Hume, was born in 
Edinburgh, April 26 (old style) 1711. 
His father, Joseph Home, was related to the Earl of Home and owned 
an estate in Berwickshire, though he practiced law in Edinburgh. His 
mother, Katherine Falconer, was daughter of a lawyer who was president 
of the College of Justice. 37 Soon after David's birth his father died, 
and his mother moved the family, two sons and a daughter, to their 
country estate, Ninewells. They returned to the city when it was time 
for the boys to go to the university. David matriculated in 1723 at age 
12, studied a curriculum that was mostly classical languages and left 
university after two years before taking a degree, all of which was 
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. 1 f' • t. 38 typ1ca or t11e 1me. Since David was a second son, he could expect 
only a small income from his father's inheritance, and so was encouraged 
to go into the family profession, law. He studied law privately between 
the years of 1726 to 1729 which provided him with a good grounding in 
legal theory. He also discovered that he disliked law books and 
f d d h . . d. 1 . d h. l . 39 pre erre to spen IS time rea 1ng 1terature an p 1 osopny. 
By 1729, he had resolved to give up the idea of a law career but was 
faced with the dilemma of how to reconcile his scholarly and literary 
ambition with the need to earn a living. This conflict, added to his 
constant study and reflection as well as overzealous application of 
character bui I ding austerities recommended by the St'oics soon broke his 
health enough to bring on physical and mental symptoms. Then followed 
three or four years of a depression and "identity crisis''. Gradually 
his studies began to suggest a system of thinking so exciting to him 
that he gave up law and determined to pursue philosophy though such a 
1 . f ld . ' 1 1. . h. t . 40 1 e wou necessitate very truga . 1v1ng on 1s meager pa r1mony. 
Hume, described this stressful period in his life in an anonymous 
letter [that was probably never sent] to an unknown physician. It was 
revealing to later scholars because it pinpointed this time period as 
that in which his new approach to philosophy first occurred to him. "At 
last, when I was about 18 years of age, there seem'd to be opened up to 
me a new scene of thought." 41 He had the exhilarating experience of 
breaking away from the old paradigms and discovering a new way of 
thinking about philosophy, though as usual it was not entirely new, 
being his own synthesis of burgeoning empirical theory. His intensive 
study of classical and modern philosophy had convinced him that most 
moral philosophy had the defect of being entirely hypothetical, 
"everyone consulted his fancy in erecting schemes of virtue and of 
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happiness without regarding human nature, upon which every moral 
conclusion must depend. This, therefore I resolved to make my principal 
study, and the source from which I would derive every truth in criticism 
as well as morality. "42 He proposed to base his phllosophy not on 
fanciful schemes that ought to be, but on what is in fact observable in 
human nature (psychology) and experience (history). He determined, .in 
short, to make the study of humans and knowledge about their natural and 
ethical world into an empirical science. 
Hume was not the first to attempt an empirical approach to moral 
philosophy. In the opening pages of A Treatise of' Human Nature he 
credited those philosophers who influenced him most" ... my Lord Bacon 
and some late philosophers in England (fn. Mr Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, 
Or. Mandeville, Or. Butler, etc.) who have begun to put the science of 
man on a new footing ... "43 These philosophers were developing an 
empirical outlook at a time when such a viewpoint was in its infancy, 
not fully defined and not consistently applied. Hume's difference was 
the rigor of his reasoning and consistency of his application of 
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empirical method to the science of human nature. 
In 1734, young Davhi Hume, his head filled wlth these issues and I 
still not knowing how to make his way in the world, went off to Bristol 
to take a job at a sugar-importing firm. The activity seemed to have 
helped him make up his mind, for only a few months later he had moved on 
to France to write. After a year at Rheims, he settled down at La 
Fleche to write his Treatise. It is wonderfully symbolic that he chose 
Descartes' old school to write his critique of rationalism, but that is 
apparently not why he chose it. His express reasons were that it was 
cheap and the Jesuit college had a good library. 45 There he stayed 
until 1737, when at the age if twenty-six, he returned to London to find 
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a publisher. The Treatise was published in two parts in 17~19 and 1740. 
In the Treatise, Hume who wanted to establish as true a sd ence of 
human nature as we are capable of, had first to 'deal with the problem of 
knowledge. How can we know objectJvely that what we think subjeclively 
is true? This was the problem which Descartes and Locke had addressed 
with results that did not resolve the inconsistentcy that seemed to 
leave a gulf between the rational mind and the material, sensory body. 
Both opposed the logic of the scholastics as having too little relation 
ship to the world of experienced fact, and both attempted to define a 
scientific rationalism which would unite observational knowledge and 
logic into one system. Their success was incomplete though they stimulat-
ed the ideas of generations who followed, including Hume, who set about 
trying to resolve the difficulty that the modern philosophy posed. 
The first difficulty Hume addressed was the Cartesian assmnption 
that demonstrative reason could give any information about the world of 
observation and experience. He stated emphatically that it could not. 
Rational systems have the intuitive appeal of truth, and are more 
intellectually satisfying because of their apparent timeless 
universality, but a priori statements are so out of the reach of human 
knowledge or experience that there is no way to determine their truth. 
If one wrestleR long with metaphysical questions one is faced with the 
choice of dogmatic certainty, the way of the sects, or skeptical 
uncertainty, the problem of philosophers. Skeptical uncertainty, Hume 
pointed out, is built into a philosophy that separates its truth from 
ordinary life as experienced. Pure reason alone cannot supply the wished-
f t . t 46 or cer a:Ln· y. 
Locke's exploration of human understanding likewise contained some 
problematic aspects. The feature of his Essay whJch attracted the most 
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attention and which became most characteristic of empiricism was the 
sensory nature of knowledge. The individual is a blank tablet at birth 
and knowledge consists only of what sensory experience writes on that 
page. The implication of this image (which others, but not Locke drew) 
was that atoms of sensory phenomena are privately experienced in a mind 
which passively receives the impressions. These atoms of phenomena, or 
sensations, subjectively experienced, are the building blocks of our 
knowledge of an externa1 world of real objects which are presumed to be 
the source of those phenomena, hence the theory's name, phenomenalism 
(or sometimes sensationalism). Locke assumed the pher1omena proved an 
external reality outside of the subjective perception of it. Berkeley 
saw that the subjective percepUon did not constitute proof of externaJ 
reality so he gave up external reality in favor of the subjective 
perception which has its illumination in the mind of God. 
The modern philosophy of knowledge, as defined by Descartes and 
especially Locke was essentially the medieval nominalist one. All that 
individuals could know was their own subjective perception of sensory 
phenomena. The empiricism that developed out of Locke weakened the 
aspect of cognition which Aristotle called the agent intellect that 
actively interpreted the sensory data to form abstract concepts. They 
assumed that the generalized concept, such as identity or cause was a 
property of the data rather than a property of the mind that perceived 
the data. 
The weakness of the pure phenomenalist position is revealed when it 
has trouble explaining two kinds of connection. One is called identity 
and is the mental connection our mind makes between a phenomenon 
experienced now and again later and which in our minds assumes an 
identity as one and the same continuously existing object. This 
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connecting principle is why we believe that there are objects that cause 
our perception of them. The second is the necessary or causal 
connection by which one phenomenon seems to cause a second. The problem 
for phenomenalism is to explain how minds that are presumed to be only 
passive collectors of individual bits of sensory data are able actively 
to connect and structure that data into concepts such as continuous 
identity and causal connection. The theory excludes an agent intellect 
at the same time that it requires one to make explanations. 
Locke'S solution was to propose a system of primary and secondary 
qualities, a restatement of mind/body, subject/object dualism inl1erent 
iri Descartes. Locke held that there was a real, primary world of 
continuously exjsting objects, but that human minds were not capable of 
perceiving the primary being of these objects, but only their secondary 
qualities. These are the qualities that our senses are capable of 
perceiving, color, taste etc. 
The problem for the early philosophers of the new science was how to 
bridge the theoretical gap between object and subject, primary and sec-
ondary qualities. Everyone engaged in science, including Hume, assumed 
that our subjective perceptions are caused by real objects. Descartes 
and Locke simply assumed that identity and the causal connection between 
6bject and the sensing of it was self-evident, guaranteed by God, and 
bl b H d . d th t. ' b. l. t 47 prova e y reason. ume 1sprove e assump 10n ot prova 1 1 y. 
Using impeccable logic Hume pointed to the flaws in the knowledge 
claims of rationalism and empiricism alike. Formal reasoning (deductive 
logic) has no application to matters of fact. A logical proof is a 
closed analytical (to use Kant's term) system and does not have any 
necessary relationship to experienced events (facts). Formal reasoning 
cannot be used to verify that cornerstone of knowledge claims, necessary 
L!3 
connection, i.e. that a cause necessarily produces an effect. 
Neither can observation and induclioJt, the method of science, prove 
either external reality or the causal connection. The observer can 
experience individual events but can only infer their cause based 011 the 
experience of repeatedly seeing event A followed by event B. If there 
were only these means of proving knowledge claims people would be 
reduced to total skepticism, which is precisely what philosophers had 
been wrestling with since the coming of the via moderna. Thus far, Hume 
disagreed with Locke; but he did not draw the conclusion that therefore 
there is no external reality as a basis for causal inferences. On the 
contrary. he takes it for granted that there is. It is one of our 
natural, common sense beljefs. 
Tis in vain to ask. whetller there be body or not? That is a 
point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. 
The subject of inquiry 1fi what causes induce us to believe in 
the existence of body." 
In Book I of the Treatise, Hume probed his own cognitive processes 
searching for an objective standard against which knowledge claims could 
be verified. He discovered that it was not easy to observe the 
processes of one's own thinking. The most basic assumptions of our 
conscious thought -- identity (the idea that there is a continuously 
existing world of external objects), cause-effect, space, time and self--
are not not easily accessible to our own observation or reasoning. As he 
put it in the introduction, " ... we can give no reason for our most 
general and most refined principles beside our experience of their 
reality." 49 Furthermore, he discovered that too much introspection can 
lead sound thinking astray into fantasy and "chimera" or into a 
depression such as he had suffered in his youth while wrestling with the 
problem of knowledge. 
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Home's solution is found in Part IV, (and the corresponding Section 
XII in the Inquir~, which Livingston has correctly identified as one of 
the keys to understanding Home's way of doing philosophy. 50 He began 
with the question of the individual perception of phenomena and whether 
people actually see (by sensory means) the continued existence of 
objects and their cause-effect relationships. He set it up in a 
dialectical fashion as two opposite propositions from which he generated 
a synthesjs, the true philosophy. For Burne the true philosophy is 
achieved when the thinker has laid out the problem in a developmental, 
dialectical way, adding new knowledge as it is acquired, critically 
checking for internal contradictions. and then discovering the standard 
of coherence which may be used for making future judgments. 
In considering this subject we may observe a gradation of 
three opinions, that rise above each other, according as the 
persons, who form them, acquire new degrees of reason and know-
ledge. These opinions are that of the v~lgar, that of a false 
philosophy, and that of the true; where we shall find upon 
enquiry, that the true philosophy approaches nearer to the seu~ 
timents of the vulgar, than to those of a mistaken knowledge. 0 -
The first is the vulgar, unreflective assumption of the ordinary 
person that the world that we experience in our everyday lives is the 
real world, and that events have causes. The other is the modern, 
phenomenalist, philosophical perspective that regards human knowledge as 
solely a product of sensory impressions. Medieval nominalism or its 
modern form, phenomenalism, represents a first stage in philosophical 
consciousness which understands that what we unreflectively assume to be 
real is in fact only the representations of the senses and may or may 
not be truly real. The senses sometimes do deceive. But this 
philosophy has the defect of being unable to prove that there is 
anything out there that causes those received sensory perceptions. The 
modern philosophy cannot defend itself against the objections of the 
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skeptics. Locke's theory of primary and secondary qualities attempts to 
solve the problem but Hume reveals its inconsistency. He ca_Lis it a 
doctrine of double existence and points out that if humans can only know 
the sensory secondary qualities, how could the existence of supra-
sensory primary qualities be known. There is no Archemedian point 
outside our own subjective perception from which we can prove the 
. . t. l. th t ' ' h . . 52 OOJeC 1ve rea 1ty or e connec eaness ot t ose 1mpress1ons. 
Hume calls this the false philosophy because it rejects the common 
assumption that we live in a real world in favor of the philosophical 
one that we only think we live in ~ real world, we actually know only 
individual bits of sensory phenomena. While the second system rejects 
the first, it also presupposes it. The subjectivism of the modern 
philosophy makes objective proof impossible. Yet this is so counter to 
' human intuition and experience that even the philosopher who can find no 
proof for our common sense beliefs while in study, nevertheless reverts 
to the assumption that there is an external world upon stepp.ing out into 
ordinary daily life. 53 "Philosophy would render us enUrely Pyrrhonian, 
were not nature too strong for it." 54 
Hume synthesizes the two into what he calls the true philosophy. It 
is a third stage of philosophical consciousness which one attains after 
having wrestled with the doubts inherent to the second stage. Only then 
does the philosopher understand that the problem of knowledge is really 
a pseudo problem of second stage thinking which no longer has the power 
to confound once one has achieved true philosophy. Common sense 
assumption of reality in fact has a validity that transcends mere sense 
impressions. People assume the truth of their senses because it is in 
the nature of their minds to do so. It is internal to our minds to 
structure impressions, to connect one impression to another to give us 
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the ideas of identity, continuity and cause. The philosopher should 
continue to examine meanings from a slightly detached position, while 
understanding that complete detachment from the authenticity of our 
ordinary life is impossible. This is what he meant when he wrote in the 
statement quoted above that the "true philosophy approaches nearer to 
the sentiments of the vulgar than to those of mistaken knowledge." 
Hume's true philosophy, like Aristotle's, is a philosophy that assumes 
the validity of our common sense assumption of a real, external world. 
In the Treatise Hume vividly described his own problems wjth 
skeptical doubt and melancholy in passages that his critics loved to 
55 quote. But he finally resolved the conflict and came to a new 
understanding, a synthesis: 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable 
of dispelling these clouds (of doubt), nature herself suffices 
to that purpose and cures me of this philosophical melancholy 
and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate 
all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon. I 
.:>6 -
converse, and am merry with my friends ... 
The great subverter of Pyrrhonjsm or the excessi.ve 
principles of skepticism, is action, and employment, and the 
occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and 
triumph in the schools, where it is indeed difficult. if not 
impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the 
shade, and by the presence of the real objects which actuate 
our passions and sentiments are put in opposition to the more 
powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke and 
leave the most 5~etermined skeptic in the same condition as 
other mortals. 
Total skepticism is impossible, it is inconsistent with life as we 
experience it. No good comes of extreme skepticism, no benefit to the 
mind or to society. If the pyrrhonism prevailed, all communication and 
action would cease, the necessities of nature would be unmet and death 
would follow. Not that there is any danger that this would ever happen. 
"~ature is always too strong for pr.incj_ple. " 58 Natural insUnct propels 
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humanity to life. action and belief in the ~eality of the world. 
Human beings do know; they believe in the reality and cont:inued 
existence of objects, of ou~selves, space, time and in cause and 
effect. They use inferences based on these beliefs every waking minute 
to meet the needs of existence. These most basic beliefs are deeply 
rooted, instinctive l1abits of inference, that are made withoul conscious 
effort. This is why Hume called cause-effect inferences an operation of 
the passions rather than of reason; and why he wrote that Mr. Locke was 
t th t h . t . d 59 wrong to sate a t ere are no 1nna e 1 eas. 
A skeptical attitude, however, has its uses. The limited skepticism 
' -
of the scientist Hurne calls mitigated skepticism. It is a useful tool 
for examining our beliefs to sort the true from the erroneous. People 
have a tendency to be dogmatic. A little ''tincture of Phyrrhonism" acts 
as a remedy for this defect by encouraging modesty and humility about 
the limits to human understanding, a willingness to examine the other 
sides of issues, and to examine one's own attitudes with a view to 
60 discovering inconsistencies and eradicating error. 
Another benefit of mitigated skepticism is to teach seekers of 
knowledge to limit their inquiries to those best adapted to human 
understanding. Human imagination delights in the sublime, but the true 
philosopher disregards that which is metaphysical and concentrates on 
what humans have some hope of understanding, that is the world of common 
life and experience. A scientific explanation must be one which 
everybody (or nearly everybody) can agree upon. Therefore it must limit 
its parameters to the public world of observability and testability, 
those which will be convincing the the majority of people. Beliefs may 
be held outside those parameters, but they are more private and 
subjective. They are not subject to proofs, but are matters of faith. 
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Knowledge which is beyond the limits of a scientific explanation may 
well be valid, but it is not suitable subject matter for scientific 
method. Sublime knowledge is better left to poets, priests and 
politicians. Far from being dismayed that ultimate knowledge cannot be 
attained, true philosophers will be satisfied to carry the search as far 
as possible because, not only is the activity immediately pleasurable, 
but also there is the satisfaction knowing that their reasonings are 
firmly grounded in every day experience. "Philosophical decisions are 
6l 
nothing but the reflections of common life, methodised and corrected." 
Philosophical humility is what Hume means by mitigated skepticism. 
It is the careful judgment of the scientist. who checks and recheck~ 
data before making conclusions and tries not to carry them further than 
the evidence permits. Knowledge of ultimate things is a form of hubris 
in which the true philosopher does not indulge. 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their 
ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by hum~n 
reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, 
whether they arise immediately from the object, are prouuc'd by the 
creative power of the mind, or are derive'd from the author of our 
being. Nor is such a question any way material to our purpose. We 
may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether 
they be true or false; whethefi2they represent nature justly, or be 
mere illusions of the senses. 
Burne's philosophy of knowledge is a synthes:is that moderates the two 
extremes of the vulgar and the philosophical outlook. As with other 
paradoxes, each seems true at least part of the time. They are held in 
dialectic tension, the synthesis or which is to accept some moderated or 
mitigated form of each. 
From this I am led to think, that the speculative principles 
of our nature ought to go hand in hand with the practical ones; 
and for my own part, when the former are so far pushed, as to 
leave the latter quite out of sight, J3 am always apt to suspect 
that we have transgressed our limits. 
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The significance of such a both/and solution to the problem of 
knowledge, especially in the years before Hegel brought the concept of 
dialectic forcefully to the attention of the world, was not really 
understood. James Beattie and Thomas Reid of the Scottish Common Sense 
school of philosophy were the first to interpret Hume as a phenomenalist 
of the Lockean type who, after reducing the theory to absurdity, was 
then unable to replace it with any positive philosophy. 64 
The Scottish School rose in direct response to Home's critique of 
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reason. Thomas Reid was a serious philosopher who respected Hunte's 
critique but was anxious to resolve the dissonance it created with the 
belief that Christian dogma and ultimate Truth were identical. It was 
on this point that the Scots most differed with Hume. James Beattie. a 
professor at Aberdeen, was the vulgar popularizer of the school. and 
produced in 1770 An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of' Truth.: in 
Opposition to Sophestry and Skepticism. In it he quoted all of Home's 
skeptical passages out of context, then failed to notice his positive 
solution to the problem of skepticism. Beattje's phjlosophic reasoning 
characterized Home's work as ''Those unnatural productions, the vile 
effusion of a hard and stupid heart that mistakes Jts own restlessness 
for the activity of genious .. ,66 Beattie's book was popularly 
successful and was reissued in eleven editions in ten years, contrasted 
with Home's Treatise, which hadn't sold out its first edition in twenty 
67 years. 
Beattie's Essay was so popular that it prompted George III to 
comment to the Archbishop of Canterbury that Mr. Beattie had ''cut Mr. 
Hume up by the roots." Sir Joshua Reynolds memorialized the victory by 
painting "The Triumph of Truth'' featuring the angel of Truth tossing 
three demons into the pit, one Hume, one Voltaire and one unidentified, 
while Beattie looked on, decked out in his doctoral robes, with his 
68 
Essay on 'truth under his arm. 
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Reid and the Scottish school demonstrate the truth of the assertion 
that the questions that are asked influences what is seen. They were 
preoccupied with the problem of knowledge, wishing to establish with 
certainty that the individually perceived phenomena arise from a God-
guaranteed outer reality. They were committed to empirical method but 
wished to use it to prove a Christian final cause, or ultimate 
l 't 69 rea 1 y. Because they were especially concerned with ultimate proofs, 
they paid closest attention to those sections of the Treatise which 
began with Locke's phenomena but then denied them the ability to prove 
ultimate reality. They believed that what common sense beJ:ieves is 
true, must be true by virtue of God's guarantee. Hume said that what 
common sense says is true is true because the nature of human minds; "We 
can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles 
beside our experience of their reality. "70 
Burne spoke of a natural propensity to believe in an external 
"ultimate" real world. but did not go so far as to say that what we 
believe to be true must be provably true. 
There is "a kind of pre-established harmony between the course 
of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the 
powers and forces by which the former is governed be wholly 
unknown to us ... this operation of the mind by which we infer 
like effects from like causes, is so essential to the 
subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it· 
could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason. 
. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to 
secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or 
mechan~cal 7tendency which may be infallible in its 
operation. 
He made a distinction between psychological certainty and episte-· 
mological certainty. While this analogy to nature did not add to the 
proofs of religion, Hume wrote, "I have at least the satisfaction to 
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think it takes nothing from them." 72 
Hume described a psychological basis for certainty in a felt 
determination of the mind based in instinct and nature; but he did not 
confuse psychological certainty with the epistemological certainty for 
which the Scottish philosophers wished. They wanted proof that what 
they believed to be true must be true. In essence, both Hume and Reid 
were not so far apart. Both based their systems on empirical evidence 
and common sense, but Hume stopped short of the ultimate religious 
1 . 73 cone USlOnS. This was the reason for the Scottish philosophers' cries 
of skeptic. The Reid and Beattie interpretation expressed the dominarit 
criticism of Hume's philosophy that persisted throughout the nineteenth 
d . h t t. t' 74 century an 1nto t e wen 1e n. 
Hume's twentieth century interpreters, looking backward over the 
course of epistemological development since his time, have the advantage 
of seeing what the Scots could not. They see that the important 
successor to Hume was Kant whose analysis of pure reason and practical 
reason drew a similar, but much more highly developed synthesis in favor 
of the a priori structuring principles of mind. Kant's transcendental 
synthesis added to Hegel's philosophy of history, are important 
historical preparations for the modern intellectual frame of reference. 
The idea of dialectical development and historical process has now 
become so much part of the modern mind that scholars now are finally 
able to see that such processes form the substructure of Hume 1 s 
philosophy. Hume's social and political theory contains many examples 
of syntheses, both/and solutions, which traced through history, become 
increasingly sophisticated. Some of these will be considered in 
subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORY AND EMPIRICAL SCIENCE 
I believe this is the historical age 
and this the historical nation . 
. the study of history confirms 
the reasoning of true philosophy ... 1 
David Hume 
The modern mind, said Carl Becker in his influential lectures of 
1932 (just short of the Treatise's two hundredth anniversary), no longer 
looks for a logical pattern in the world. Instead, fact is primary, or 
rather the flow of facts, seen in a historical, developmental way. 
What is peculiar to the modern mind is the disposition and 
determination to regard ideas and concepts, the truth of things 
as well as the things themselves as changing entities, the 
character and significance of which at any given time can be 
fully grasped only by regarding them as points in an endless 2 
process of differentiation, of unfolding, of waste and repair. 
Modern thinkers are historically minded in that they no longer ask 
what something is in its essence, rather they measure it and ask how it 
developed. 
Becker was describing the revolution in thinking that separated the 
medieval world view, or climate of opinion as he called it, from the 
modern. The revolution had its roots in the seventeenth century, was 
greatly accelerated in the eighteenth and thereafter rapidly developed 
into a triumph for empirical and historical thinking. It was this new 
way of thinking, this paradigm of knowledge, to which David Hume devoted 
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his life 1 s work. The new paradigm was the work of many minds. but it 
was Hume who hastened its coming by revealing the logical flaws in the 
philosophes "naive faith in Reason" [both inductive and deductive], 
"that Heavenly City of the eighteenth century philosophers". 3 
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The empirical intellectual style, presaged by Aristotle, the 
Medieval Nominalists and Bacon, was defined by Newton and Locke in the 
seventeenth century, and reached the popular consciousnesss in the 
eighteenth, proselytized and popularized by the philosophes. The new 
climate of opinion turned away from the old, metaphysical, deductive 
logic and substituted the new rules of logic, inductive analysis, 
formulated by the English pantheon. Newton 1 s rules of reasoning did not 
begin with the general principle and deduce the particulars, it worked 
the opposite way; it called for collecting a body of particular facts 
and then generalizing a covering law to explain the particulars which 
might then be experimentally tested. The Newtonian system of inductive 
analysis, as Ernst Cassirer put it, "in a century and a half conquered 
all reality. "4 It was eagerly applied to other fields in the natural 
sciences and to the moral or social sciences as well, as Newton himself 
had suggested. 
Empirical method gave philosophers a new tool of knowledge far more 
versatile than the medieval theological and rational ideal of the 
philosophia perennis, which strove to make a complete and logical system 
out of already revealed truth. The new method made it possible to reach 
out and grasp knowledge actively; to make knowledge where none existed 
before. It was the idea of limitless potential in the expansion of 
knowledge that so exhilarated the eighteenth century thinkers. Added to 
the real material improvements in eighteenth century life, the ferment 
of idea that Newtonian philosophy created made the sense of progress in 
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knowledge and in everyday life mutually reinforcing. The way of science 
was the way of progress, a limitless potential that produced optimistic 
hopes not only for a better life, but also that the ultimate mysteries 
of the universe would be revealed. 
The conquest of empirical philosophy over the natural world was 
easily accomplished since the feeling of certainty produced by 
scientific explanations was virtually undeniable. The moral world, the 
world of human action and society, was more problematic. Scientific law 
in the moral world was harder to generalize and produced less certainty 
of belief. But difficulties aside, it was inevitable that with a 
fascinating tool like empirical method, moral philosophers would make 
the attempt. 
The most important of these early attempts was David Hume's A 
Treatise Of Human Nature, which exposed the weaknesses of both rational 
and empirical logic and proposed a "new science of man" based on human 
psychology and history. Hume's declared intention in his Treatisewas 
summed up in its subtitle: Being an Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. The science of man 
which he proposed would furthermore be the basis for all other sciences, 
since all human knowledge, even mathematics, natural science and 
religion "lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their 
powers and facilities."5 
Hume's inquiries into human nature and understanding were attempts 
to fix a foundation of certainty in human knowledge. He concluded that 
the roots of human knowledge about our physical and social worlds were 
not found in reason of the formal analytical sort but in informal 
reasoning, what Hume called moral reasoning. Human reasoning is 
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inferential, cause-effect learning based on experiences and it is the 
source of what people believe to be true knowledge. Hume's analysis of 
the cause-effect relationship has never been successfully challenged. 
To analyze why he believed in causal connection Hume searched his 
own mind. He concluded that when he had many experiences of seeing two 
events in close conjunction he assumed that they were connected, that 
the first caused the second. The eye sees no connection but the mind 
automatically infers that there is one. If people experience the close 
conjunction often enough they develop the habit of expecting all future 
cases will be the same. The close connection between the two occurrence 
feels like determined necessity. Human belief in a causal connection 
between two events is the result of their consta~t conjunction in 
sequence of time combined with an inference of connection made by the 
deep structuring mechanisms of the mind. Because this customary and 
naturally instinctive habit of inference takes place unconsciously, Hume 
calls it an operation of the passions rather than reason. 6 
If people had never seen repetitive patterns in nature, or in the 
behavior of others, they would never have gotten the idea of necessary 
connection or cause. But because they have seen the constant and regular 
conjunctions of events in both the natural and the social worlds, their 
minds are habituated to infer that the appearance of one thing will be 
followed by the appearance of the other, that is a cause will be 
followed by an effect. This is the source of the idea of necessary 
connection, an idea that has always existed in the minds of humans (and 
even animals) in all times and places. "It is from past experience that 
we draw all inferences concerning the future." 7 
All inferences from experience, therefore, are the effects 
of custom, not reasoning. . .Custom then is the great guide of 
human life. It is that principle alone which renders our 
experience useful to us and makes us expect, for the future, a 
similar train of events with those which have appeared in the 
past. Without the influence of custom we should be entirely 
ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately 
present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to 
adjust means to ends or to employ our natural powers in the 
production of any effect. There would be an end at8once of all 
action as well as of the chief part of speculation. 
In the early formative period for the empirical outlook, the 
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relationship between history as accumulated observational data and the 
new scientific theory of knowledge was very close. Francis Bacon's 
formulation of empirical method called for the compiling of the 
histories and tabulation of phenomena, from which hypotheses could later 
be induced. Locke called this form of scientific method in which 
hypothesis comes last, historical plain method. Writings of early 
members of the Royal Society reflected the belief that the first 
9 priority for science was to compile histories of phenomena. 
The victory of empirical philosophy over the field of knowlege was 
the immediate cause of the efflorescence of historical thinking and 
history writing. The eighteenth century was the age of great histories 
that were written by philosophers - Voltaire, Hume, Gibbon and Robertson 
- as well as specialized inquiries into law and economics that were 
historical in nature, written by Montesquieu and Adam Smith. 
It was no coincidence that the empirical moral philosophers wrote 
histories. If the data of science are to be found in particular facts 
from which causal laws are inferred, the data of moral science are the 
facts of human experience: and history is the record of that 
experience. For the eighteenth century, history became the 
methodological model for the task of placing the moral sciences onto a 
foundation of experiential fact. 10 
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In his essay, "Of the Study of History" Hume made explicit the idea 
that history supplies the data of experience from which knowledge is 
created. 
History is not only a valuable part of knowledge, but opens 
the door to many other parts, and affords materials to most of 
the sciences. And indeed, if we consider the shortness of 
human life, and our limited knowledge, even of what passes in 
our own time, we must be sensible that we should be forever 
children in understanding, were it not for this invention, 
which exte~ds our experience to all past ages, and to the most 
distant nations ... A man acquainted with history may, in 
some respect 11be said to have lived from the beginning of the 
world .... 
Fundamental to both empirical science and history is the fact that 
they are integral to human experience in the world. History is a trait 
of all subject areas; it is a means of inquiry, a means of understanding 
any particular thing in the world. "Everything that is is historical in 
character and has an existence that can be measured in time ... 
12 [History is] synonymous with knowledge as a whole." 
Science and history are related in their deepest linguistic 
structures. "History" derives from a Greek root meaning learning or 
knowing by inquiry. "Science" comes from the Latin word for knowledge 
and "empirical" from the word for experienced. Empirical science is, 
therefore, experienced knowledge derived from a process of inquiry that 
is historical in nature. The Oxford Dictionary•s fifth definition of 
history embodies Aristotle•s meaning of the word; "a systematic account 
13 (without reference to time) of a set of natural phenomena." That is, 
history in this sense is a scientific explanation, a natural history. 
Even though the dictionary and Aristotle exclude reference to time in 
natural history, time is nevertheless built into the meaning of a causal 
inference, an inference based, as Hume said, on an invariant sequence of 
experienced events and the memory of the accumulation of these events. 
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The theory of empirical science contains the same ideal goal as that 
of rational and metaphysical science. The laws obtained should be 
universal and timeless in application; that is, they should be true 
anytime, anywhere under the same conditions. Where these conditions are 
met, effects may be confidently predicted. This ideal goal has always 
been a problem to moral philosophers of the past as well as to social 
scientists of the present. Conditions in different times and places vary 
widely as does human behavior in different cultural contexts. The 
complexity of the variables in the social sciences creates difficulties 
for making general laws that fit the criteria for universality of time 
and place. The methodological problem of making studies of human beings 
into a Newtonian science of man was the central theme of all of Hume's 
writing. But for reasons which will be described elsewhere, much of the 
subtle depth of his thought went misunderstood and misinterpreted until 
the twentieth century's renewed interest in reading his philosophy for 
its previously overlooked substructure of dialectical synthesis and 
historicism. 
In the last half of the twentieth century David Hume's reputation as 
the philosopher of empiricism is stronger than it has ever been. It is 
a little odd that few remember that in the eighteenth and ninteenth 
centuries his reputation and his fortune were made on his essays and his 
multivolume History of England. For nearly a century it was preeminent, 
appearing in 175 posthumous editions in England and America, 14 until 
1849 when Macaulay's history began to offer serious competition. 15 
Throughout the last century, the common opinion was that the History 
of Englandwas entirely unrelated to Hume's philosophy, a sort of 
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midlife career change. Typical of this view was T.H. Grose. who along 
with T.H. Green issued a new edition of Hume's philosophical works in 
1898, and whose introduction reflects the "Oxford view" of the Absolute 
Idealists who interpreted Hume as having come to a dead end jn 
skepticism, the last of the bankrupt tradition of Lockean 
phenomenalism. Grose wrote in his "History of the Editions" that he was 
struck by the suddenness with which Hume abandoned philosophy. He 
proposed as explanation that Hume, once he had brought his skeptical 
philosophy as far as it could go, either had to quit or construct 
something positive in its place. For this ''Hume certainly lacked the 
disposition, and pr-obably the abi.lity .. "16 Anyway, he noted that 
political essays and history sold better so he turned to these. 
By the mid-twentieth century scholars who were writing with a 
friendlier attitude toward Hume's philosophy nevertheless regarded the 
History as unrelated to the philosophy. For example, H. R. Trevor-Roper 
wrote that Hume was the greatest British philosopher and the first of 
the British philosophical historians, yet he had become a historian 
"almost by accident." In 1752 he was elected to the post of Librarian 
of the Advocates' Librar·y in Edinburgh ". and there, sitting among 
those 30,000 volumes, he suddenly saw his opportunity." 17 
That Hume suddenly abandoned philosophy for the more profitable 
writing of history, or that he was suddenly inspired while sitting among 
the volumes, is unconvincing to anyone who has read much of Hume's 
philosophy. References to and examples from history are sprinkled 
throughout his writing. Even in Book I of the Treatise, the most purely 
philosophic of his works. there is a section on how it is possible to 
believe a fact of ancient history, such as that Julius Caesar once 
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existed, when the original impression of him is long since faded away; 
that is, why do we believe an historical document. 18 The Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding contains even more historical topics 
including: the association of ideas in composing historical and poetic 
narrative, the chapter "Of Liberty and Necessity" on cause in the social 
sciences, the chapter "Of Miracles", a consideration of the criteria for 
historical evidence. In fact, the Inquiry, which is usually taken to be 
Hume's epistemology, can just as well be read as his philosophy of 
history. His understanding of knowledge takes history as its paradigm. 
Furthermore, his biographer, E.C. Mossner, noted that he had been 
making chronologies and writing drafts for a history of England as early 
as 1745. 19 In a letter of 1747 to his cousin Henry Home, 20 he mentioned 
his interest in "historical projects" and his intention ''in my riper 
years, of composing some history". 21 The writing of history did not 
represent an abandonment of philosophy for Hume; history composed the 
raw material,the very matrix, of his philosophy of knowledge. 
Failure to recognize the significance of historical thinking to 
empirical philosophy in general and the relationship of Burne's history 
to his philosophy in particular had several sources. One was the common 
perception that the History was little better than a Tory party 
pamphlet. Another was the persistent misinterpretation of his 
epistemology as the reductio ad absurdum of Cartesian rationalism and 
Lockean phenomenalism and thus left with nothing but skepticism. This 
opinion reflected the pervasive strength of the Lockean paradigm on 
scholarly minds that blinded their eyes to the synthesis Hume was trying 
to make. It took the competition of its philosophical antithesis, the 
German idealist-historicist paradigm to bring another way of looking at 
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reality into awareness. Thus it was not until this century, with Newton 
and Locke•s strength over the interpretation of scientific knowledge a 
little diminished and Kant•s enhanced, that readers were able to see 
that there was more to Hume•s description of knowing than simple Lockean 
phenomenalism. And finally the ninteenth century romantic-historicist•s 
assertions that Hume (and others of the eighteenth century) were not 
historically minded was uncritically accepted by subsequent historiog-
raphers. Eduard Fueter, Geschichte der Neueren Historiographie, (1911); 
J. B. Black, The Art Of History,(l926); J. W. Thompson, A History of 
Historical Writing, (1942); and R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, 
(1946), represented Hume and his History as lacking a historical 
" conception. The frequency with which this and other stock criticisms of 
Hume•s Historyhave appeared suggests that these authorities tended to 
copy each other. Recent scholarship, based on a more careful reading of 
the sources, regards the assessments of the earlier historiographers• as 
inaccurate. 22 
The historicist philosophers of the nineteenth century were wrong in 
accusing the eighteeenth century historians of a lack of historical 
mindedness. The Enlightenment historians "forged the weapons" of 
historicity and the concept of historical culture that the Romantic 
historians later wielded. 23 Hume was interested in analysing 
what was common to human nature and what varied because of differences 
in culture or time, a theme found in parts of the Inquiry, in the 
Essays, and all through The History of England. 
The empirical way of knowing, especially in the social world of 
human action, has an element of process built into it. The mind 
accumulates facts, makes inferences from them, assimilates them, 
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compares and contrasts them with old facts and conclusions. It is a 
process that implies growth and evolution, in the total amount of fact 
and in the increasing complexity of the inferences made from them. 
Home's idea, quoted earlier, that history is the overall accumulation of 
the collected wisdom of human experience, without which humanity would 
be ''forever children in understanding" speaks to the evolutionary aspect 
of fact knowledge. 
The concept of historical thinking, inherent in empirical thinking, 
was finding its first expression in the eighteenth century philosopher-
historians, most particularly Hume. The earlier practitioners of 
historical thinking about culture were not entirely conscious of this 
process. At least they did not proclaim and label it as Hegel did when 
in the following century historical thinking became a fully self-
conscious method, and a terminology was attached to it. 24 But the 
structure of dialectic and evolutionary process was in fact there 
underlying Home's politics and history. The terminology was different 
from Hegel's: Hume spoke of progress (in knowledge, manufacturing, the 
art of government, etc.) and also of the gradual revolutions in society 
by which he meant what came later to be called evolution. Hume as well 
as Vico may be viewed as the early prototypes of the philosophy of 
l . t 25 11s ory. 
In the twentieth century, the Idealist philosophy, and its "old 
Oxford view'' of Hume began to decline and empiricism became ascendent 
again in the form of logical positivism. But the logical positivists 
who admired Hume made the same mistake as the Idealists who decried him 
by considerjng him solely as a disciple of Locke. They, too, looked 
only at his epistemology, disregarded his moral philosophy, and never 
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noticed the history. But they made the study of Hume respectable again 
and slowly new works with new interpretations began to emerge. 
Ernest Campbell Mossner is one of several, who, beginning in the 
1930's, pointed the way towards re-examining and reinterpreting Hume's 
philosophy, thereby creating the base for the flurry of scholarly 
activity of the last 25 years. When Mossner set about to rehabilitate 
Hume's reputation as a philosophical historian, his title suggests the 
low regard in which his subject was held, "An Apology for David Hume, 
Historian." Hume the philosopher and Hume the historian cannot be 
separated, he asserted. Mossner combed not only the philosophy but the 
whole History for all the statements about meaning and methodology of 
history and presented them in a systematic analysis that recapitulated 
the main points of Hume's entire philosophy. History was to Hume's 
science of man, "the great mistress of wisdom" which taught by example 
the principles of human action and morality. 26 
By the bicentenial conferences in 1976, it was possible for one of 
the contributers and Hume historiographer, C.N. Stockton, to say that it 
was no longer necessary to defend the assertion that the History is 
integral to Hume's philosophy, not an aberration. It was the logical 
culmination of his science of man: because it was empirical, was 
necessarily historical in method. The history of human experience was 
both the source of his general principles, and the means of 
verification. 27 
Donald Livingston's recent book Hume's Philosophy of Common Life is 
the most insightful and thorough investigation of the element of time in 
Hume's empiricism. Livingston emphasized that Hume's theory of 
knowledge makes a distinction between formal reasoning (logic) and 
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moral reasoning (how humans reason in their ordinary, daily lives). The 
first form of reasoning is expressed in theoretical language, and is non-
temporal, universal and law-like. Those aspects of thinking which are 
theoretical and tenseless include sensory, logical, mathematical, 
scientific, ethical, aesthetic and religious concepts. Western 
philosophy has long regarded timelessness to be necessary for 
universality, that is for scientific laws. Nevertheless, all of reality 
cannot be reduced to tenseless, logical concepts. 28 The way humans 
reason in the common sense world is based on learning by accumulated 
experience, the present interpreted in light of experience in the past. 
Hume's moral or informal, common sense reasoning is historical; it is 
temporal, narrative, and about people. 29 
Hume's paradigm for the science of man is to avoid the metaphysical 
and thoretical and instead to concentrate on ordinary life and its 
experiential, moral reasoning. The ideas and language of common life 
may have some theoretical aspect, but their most important aspect is as 
story. Human ideas are story (past) laden. They can form abstract, 
timeless ideas, but those will always have as part of their meaning some 
of the narrarive content from the memory. 30 Individuals and 
institutions have memory of the past built into their present. That 
traditions and past experience are normative to the present is the main 
axiom behind Hume's theory of human reasoning, his political science and 
the history of the English constitution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SCIENCE OF MAN 
And as the science of man is the only 
solid foundation for the other sciences 
so the only solid foundation we can 
give to this science itself must be1 
laid on experience and observation. 
Hume•s objective in the Treatise of Human Nature and all his 
subsequent writings was to establish the study of human beings as an 
empirical science, the science of man. His scope was wide; he wished to 
investigate everything about human beings, how they reason about their 
natural and ethical worlds, why they form social institutions and the 
history of their progress. All of these topics fell under the general 
heading of moral philosophy in eighteenth century terminology. Today 
they have been divided into academic categories: psychology, sociology, 
philosophy of science, ethics, politics, economics and history. In his 
day, some of these areas did not have differentiated names or 
methodologies. Of the eighteenth century•s pioneer social scientists, 
Hume was the most critically consistent and the least dogmatic. Even 
though some of his efforts were immature and rudimentary, it can be 
demonstrated that each of these fields can trace some of its development 
in modern form one way or another back to Hume. 
Hume•s scientific objective was perfectly representative of the 
attitude of Enlightenment thinkers who wished to shift the basis for 
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explanations of knowledge from theological and metaphysical categories 
to secular and observational ones. Empirical theory, which Newton had 
used so successfully to explain the order of the heavens, was the new 
wonder-methodology with which social philosophers hoped to bring order 
to the study of humanity and the improvement of life on earth. Exactly 
how this new tool should be wielded was the problem around which they 
worked their programs. Their main paradigms or frames of reference were 
psychology, biology, and history. Hume's empirical science of man, 
while it was fully characteristic of the enlightenment objectives, was 
also purer, more systematically reasoned in its application; its 
conclusions less preformed and its implications that science may not 
have all the answers more fearlessly accepted. 
David Hume wrote at a time when the adaptation of empirical theory 
to moral philosophy was in its infancy. His attempt to define the scope 
and methods for social science reflects a nascent recognition that the 
features of naturalistic, evolutionary, dialectical and historical 
thinking are inherent to an empirical way of thinking. His science of 
man sought to explain human cognition in terms of nature (psychology) 
and experience (history). It sought to explain the causal inference in 
the fact world (more problematic because facts are so variable) in terms 
of probability and a learning psychology of assimilation and adaptation 
to new or contradictory information (a dialectical approach). And it 
sought to explain culture, ethics and social institutions in the 
empirical and evolutionary terms of a natural history of the human mind, 
as it has worked through the process of coping with the primary duality 
of self and other (which is the core of the issue of individual and 
community interest). Each of these topics will be considered at greater 
length in this chapter. 
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Natural History And Eighteenth Century Social Science 
The sciences of biology and anthropology were products of the 
epistemological shift to the empirical form of explanation. Living 
creatures came to be regarded as natural beings, and the study of them 
became acceptable. The increased activity in the investigation of 
living things soon uncovered evidences of earlier forms in the fossil 
records, and relationships between species. These suggested to early 
biologists such as Buffon that living nature had a history. Buffon's 
life work was his minute recording of virtually the whole of living 
nature, a thirty-six volume work entitled Histoire Naturelle published 
between the years 1749 and 1788. His carefully documented natural 
history of species contained the concepts of process and evolution. 
With Buffon and empirical biology the role of history in scientific 
explanation was made explicit. The way was prepared for an explanatory 
system based on developmental biology rather than the scholastic and 
Cartesian logic of mathematics. Henceforth natural science as Cassirer 
put it "no longer seeks to derive and explain becoming from being, but 
being from becoming." That is, to understand a phenomenon, it is 
necessary to inquire into its developmental history. 2 
Natural history applied to societies, creating the sciences of 
sociology and cultural anthopology, also had eighteenth century origins 
from the same empirical orientation. In this case, the general 
empirical ferment fed on new experiences. Exploration and trade 
expanded horizons. Scholars were stimulated to develop a new conceptual 
ramework to incorporate all the diversity of human cultures of which 
Europe was increasingly becoming aware. The program for the early 
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sociologists was to discover what of human behavior could be explained 
by nature and what by culture. There was also the question of how much 
could be explained by any cause, and how much was the irrational 
exercise of human free will. It was an orientation of thought more than 
a defined school, but there were distinct characteristics, chiefly an 
empirical and developmental approach to the study of human society. 
' 
The history of culture was a study of the progressive development of 
human intelligence through the medium of language. Human intelligence 
facilitated by language was an interactive process between physical. 
mental and cultural factors. The early theorists of cultural 
anthropology were Montesquieu (1689-1755) 0 Voltaire (1694-1778) o and 
Hume (1711-1776). They each defined a methodology for studying culture 
and history that was empirical. Each thought of human beings as a 
product of their culture and human culture as a product of human 
consciousne~s. environment and history. For them human sociability was 
an original ~ondition. Nowhere were there beings who were absolutely 
savage; even primitive peoples have a culture. 
Montesqui.eu' s Consid&rations sur les causes de la grandeur des 
Romains et de leur decadence (1734) and De l'espirit des lois (1748) 
defined a social science which used historical, cultural and 
anthropological facts (rather than deductively derived natural laws) to 
find the empirical laws of politics and society. Intellectual causes 
(mentalit~ or the climate of opinion) could infuence the course of 
history as well as physical causes. 3 Voltaire's Le siecle de Louis XIV 
(1751) included social and cultural information about the seventeenth 
century as well as political and military. The Essai sur les moeurs 
(1756) made explicit his philosophy of cultural history. To make 
a science out of the flux of history and the variety of culture, it is 
necessary to find a fixed point which must be human nature. If human 
nature is fixed but customs are different, then it follows that custom 
has an influence greater than nature in forming knowledge and the 
intellectual spirit of the times. 4 
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Hume's theory of cultural variation was much the same and published 
earlier in his essays "Of National Characters" and "A Dialogue". Hume 
thought that basic emotions, cognition (cause, identity, time, etc.) and 
the need for social living remained unchanged everywhere, but the form 
of expression chould change in different times, places and 
circumstances. Sociablilty, sympathy, imitation, custom, habit and 
utility were general principles that Hume's social science abstracted 
from many and varied particulars of human experience in the world. 
When Hume's first Stuart volume of the History of England was 
published in 1754 it contained much cultural and economic detail which 
he described as essential to make the political events intelligible. 5 
The "revolution in manners"6 and the spirit of the age were included 
among the complex causes of the events that finally drove the Stuarts 
from the throne. The similarity of Hume's and Voltaire's concepts of 
the intellectual component in historical causation suggested to some 
critics that Hume had borrowed his ideas from Voltaire. Hume's response 
was that flattering as the comparison was, his history was already 
largely composed by the time Voltaire's was published. 7 Furthermore, 
the major themes of Hume's social and political philosophy had already 
been detailed in Book III of the Treatise published in 1740. 
Though Montesquieu, Voltaire and Hume each published their major 
works at roughly the same time, the decades of the 1740's through 50's, 
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they did not seem to have strongly influenced each other in their 
initial development. Even Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) working in 
relative isolation in Naples, developed a social and historical 
philosophy similar to the others in its broad points. That their 
anthropological and historical viewpoints were similar was a function of 
the shortcomings inherent in the intellectual climate. They were each 
reacting against Scholasticism and its more recent variant, Cartesian 
rationalism which defined certain knowledge so narrowly that only 
mathematics fit the criterion; experiential knowledge was no knowledge 
at all. It is not suprising then that critical minds arose to point out 
that such a system was untenable, denied as Hume said, by history, human 
reason and experience. 
Hume's theory of knowledge contained several implications latent in 
an empirical approach. If the fact world of nature, sensory and 
experiential, is accepted as knowledge, then certain kinds of ideas will 
follow because they are embedded in an empirical outlook. Fact 
knowledge, like human nature, is full of variety and contradictions. 
Because of its variability, fact knowledge belongs to a different 
category of certainty; it must rely on probabilities. Generalized 
statements induced from facts, especially in the human sciences, will, 
therefore, have to synthesise dualities. Human nature is a unity, 
composed of opposites: the spiritually sublime, rational mind and the 
mundane, selfish, passion-driven body, partly antisocial and partly 
prosocial. Knowledge, as human nature constitutes it, is also 
developmental; it assimilates new fact information and adapts to it by 
altering behavior and/or the conceptual and institutional framework. It 
is capable of refinements; it can adjust means to ends and develop new 
ways to explain experience. It is historical and evolutionary. 
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Historicism and evolution, the hallmarks of natural history based on 
biology, were implicit in the work of the eighteenth century empiricist 
social philosophers. Both concepts became fully explicit in the 
following century. Darwin•s evolution burst upon the popular 
consciousness as though it had not been foreshadowed since the previous 
century. Nor did the romantic historians of the ninteenth century 
understand where they had come from. They accused their predecessors of 
being unhistorically minded and that assessment stuck until long into 
this century. But the accusation was untrue as both Cassirer and Peter 
Gay affirm. 8 The ninteenth century•s idea of historical cultures was a 
direct result of the intellectual ground prepared in the eighteenth. 
Hume•s empirical science of man was just such a natural science on 
the biological model. It was perhaps the best example of the eighteenth 
century•s evolution towards a fully developmental approach to social 
science. He had the eighteenth century•s desire to find the general 
laws of human psychology, sociology and history, but the detachment and 
realism to admit the difficulties that human complexity posed for making 
social science a fully deterministic and predictive science. Hume•s 
social philosophy, Cassirer concluded, was as unlike the general trend 
of the philosophes as his epistemology was. His methodological 
orientation to fact made him resistent to the hasty generalization. 9 As 
much as he wished to establish a science, he avoided all-inclusive 
theories that would reduce all of experience to a few laws by ignoring 
or reasoning away inconvenient stray facts. His scientific detachment 
made him free to follow his inquiry wherever it led and fearless in 
expressing unpopular conclusions. It also saved him from the dogmatism 
and crusading optimism sometimes present in the French philosophes. As 
Petec Gay concluded in the last page of Tbe Enligbtenment, an 
Intecpretation, "Hume was at the same time the most isolated and the 
most representative of the philosophes: he was simply the purest, most 
modern speciman of that little flock. ,lO 
Empirical Reasoning 
78 
It is from past experience that we ffaw 
all inferences concerning the future.· 
Hume began his discussion of how people reason with the observation 
that the "other scientific method'', the rational logic, where the 
abstract principle is given and axioms are derived, is too perfect and 
too inflexible to explain how people actually think, how they form their 
beliefs about what is real.. Logic may be more perfect in itself, but it 
is not suitable for the study of facts including the fact of imperfect 
human nature. To try leads to the illusion that true and perfect 
k l d . . h . . bl d. . 12 now e ge ex1sts 1n some ot er 1naccess1 e 1mens1on. True thinking 
must accept the human way of knowing as authentic and stop the hopeless 
search for seperate philosophical reality. 
Hume examined his own thinking process and constructed from it a 
broader concept of human rationality which he called moral reasoning. 
Commentators have variously described his approach as informal logic, a 
,system of natural beliefs, or common sense. Moral reasoning or common 
sense made use of the wisdom of past experience; it was empirical, 
inferential, and based on probability. 
The eighteenth century development of an empirical point of vi.ew 
made apparent the need for a logic that could allow for those stray 
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events for which the general laws seemed not to apply. Logic needed to 
include probability reasoning, particularly in the social sciences which 
were Hume•s main interest. Empirical reasoning based on matters of fact 
requires a different sort of logic than the old deductive logic that 
proceeds from a priori first principles. Facts do not always fit neatly 
to the framework of theory. Probability is based on a type of analogy 
that supposes that cause in observed cases will also be the same in 
unobserved cases all the time, some of the time or only a few times. 
When the analogy is perfect, we infer perfect certainty of effect from 
cause. When the analogy is less perfect, we assign a probability 
13 proportional to the degree of resemblance. 
Some events are found, in all cour~tries and all ages, to 
have been constantly conjoined together; others are found to 
have been more variable ... so that in our reasonings 
concerning matter of fact there are all imaginable degrees of 
assurance .. 14A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to 
the evidence. . 
Hume, like Newton, assumed an orderly universe, not only of physical 
events, but also human-psychological events. Causal inferences about 
human action, he said, are made in the same way as about events in the 
natural world. People feel just as certain of their belief in cause 
when talking of human motives, volitions and actions. Throughout daily 
life, people use conclusions based on the assumption that there is a 
general uniformity in human nature. They commonly make causal 
conclusions on the actions of others by comparing them to their own 
experience and knowledge of our own motives, temper or situation. They 
expect that these same factors have an influence on others just as on 
themselves. If a traveler from a distant country reported that the 
people who lived there were perfectly selfless and public spirited, 
others would be as disinclined to believe it as if the reporter claimed 
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that dragons and centaurs lived there. People likewise proportion their 
belief in ancient historical accounts by comparing them with what they 
know of human nature. They expect to see others act in the character 
they have observed from them in the past, and they expect them to act in 
routine ways, e.g. that the laborer will go to work, the artisan will 
find buyers for his wares, and the magistrate will preserve public 
order. 
Exceptions, Hume warned, must be expected. Manners are different in 
different times and places. The sexes behave differently. Even the 
same person thinks and behaves differently at different stages in life. 
The fact of variation is instructive; it shows the force of education 
and custom in molding character. But even in the face of diversity, 
still people expect a general regularity in human actions. When there 
are exceptions they look for causes by carefully examining the 
mitigating circumstances, e.g. the usually cheerful person, suddenly 
peevish, has a toothache. 15 
People assume that the author of a history affirms facts, such as 
the death of Caesar, which they too would affirm, especially in the 
light of corroborating testimony. They do not assume that others, as a 
rule, are conspiring to deceive them. Moral reasoning assumes a 
uniformity of human action and motivation, an assumption which is based 
on a lifetime of experience, and from introspective knowledge of one•s 
own motivations. 
The same kind of reasoning runs thro• politics, war, 
commerce, oeconomy, and indeed mixes itself so entirely in 
human life, that 'tis impossible to act or subsist a moment 
without having recourse to it ... Whoever reasons after this 
manner, does ipso facto believe t~~ actions of the will to 
arise from necessity [cause] ... 
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The idea of cause-effect in both the physical and social worlds is 
not the only idea common to all humans, but so are others such as the 
persistence of physical objects, time, identity of a self, the passional 
basis of reasoning and judgments of virtue and vice. Hume's general 
principles of the mental world resemble Locke's theory of ideas, but 
with an expanded definition of perceptions. Perceptions arise not only 
from external sensation, but also internally from the passions, and the 
structuring principles of mind. Thoughts and ideas are copies of past 
impressions, and thus weaker. They are preserved in memory and recalled 
and reflected on, or are transformed and compounded by the structuring 
rules of association. These are (1) resemblance, (2) contiguity in time 
or place, and (3) cause and effect. Other structuring rules are 
compounds of the basic three. 17 These Hume thought of as analogous to 
18 Newton's laws of motion. 
Because thought and ideas are copies of immediate sensation they are 
weaker than the originals. Memories or imagined events can almost seem 
real, but never so real as to confuse any but a disordered mind. 
Immediate sensation is always stronger than thought. Ideas, especially 
abstract ones are very faint and easy to misread. That is why 
philosophical terms that are far removed from experience are so 
confusing or even contradictory and consequently not to be trusted. 19 
Hume presented his theory of ideas in Book I, Part I of the Treatise 
which was long interpreted to be the most important part because it most 
resembled the phenomenalism of Locke. But that view led to a failure 
to understand properly the remaining 600 pages. Hume's concept of 
human reasoning evolved as his analysis progressed through books II and 
III to include the psychological inner dimension and social outer 
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context which form the matrix in which minds impute meaning to the 
h f . 20 s. K s . hI k 1 . h . p enomena o exper1ence. 1nce emp m1t s wor ear y 1n t 1s 
century the predominant interpretation has become that it is the 
passional and social bases of human reasoning that are the keys to 
21 
understanding Hume. 
Moral reasoning includes not only the way people form our 
conclusions about their natural world (physical science) but also the 
complex world of social interaction. Reasoning in the moral world of 
human action is more variable, depending on the particular social and 
intellectual environment of the individual knower, and also on 
individual experience. Informal reasoning unlike geometric reasoning is 
not timeless or absolute. It always takes place in emotional as well 
as historical and social contexts, and is more like legal reasoning in 
the citing of analogies and precedents than the solving of a geometry 
problem. The conception of reality in the social world, therefore is an 
evolving relationship between human minds operating with informal 
inferential rules and the natural and social world those minds occupy. 
The knowledge produced by this form of reasoning is cumulative and 
developmental. How people think about their social world changes as 
their social, economic and political environment changes, though these 
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changes may happen very slowly. This is the kind of thinking that 
underlies what Hume called the spirit of the age and has variously been 
called the Zeitgeist, the climate of opinion, or mentalite. Historical, 
dialectical thinking is the framework of analysis in the moral world. 
Donald Livingston refers to Hume's concept of moral (empirical) 
reasoning as "past entailing"; an understanding of what is entails an 
understanding of what has gone before. Some statements about the 
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present make no sense unless certain other statements about the past are 
true. For example. he is: a father or a priest or a senator. are past-
entailed statements. They cannot be understood only as present-tense 
statements without additional conceptual information added from memory. 
The moral (empirical) reasoning process is like collecting a file of 
story-laden ideas from which we may abstract (generalize) tenseless 
(timeless-universal) ideas, i.e. scientific laws. But these ideas will 
always have as a part of their meaning, some of the narrative content 
from our memory. What people reasnning about their social world will 
believe is real and true will always be affected by habits and customs 
of inference derived in past experience. Individuals and their social 
institutions have memory of the past built into their present. In 
Home's moral theory, tradition and custom will always be normative to 
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our thinking about the present. 
Determinism and Social Science 
Necessity is regular and certain. . 24 
Human conduct is irregular and uncerta1n. 
The key to establishing a science is the ability to identify a 
regular order in experience. This has been more problematic in the 
world of human action than in the physical world. Human and cultural 
variability, and the complexity of the interactions between human minds 
and their physical and socl.al environments, makes the generalizing of 
universal laws far more complicated. Free will (chance or randomness) 
seems to have as much influence over events as cause (or necessity to 
use Home's term). 
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Enlightenment social philosophers were optimistic that a science of 
man was possible; it was to be the basis for a perfected social system 
of the future. Their attempts to demonstrate the feasibility of social 
science led them to emphasize the uniformities of human nature in all 
times and places, an emphasis that the romantic-idealist philosophers 
after them found too rigidly rational and deterministic and lacking in 
an understanding of historical uniqueness, irrationality, and process. 
Hume was in the Enlightenment tradition that expected that a science 
of man was possible. It was the issue to which he devoted his career. 
But on the question of how fully deterministic such a science could be 
he was less optimistic, more qualified in his certainty than his fellow 
philosophes. He was the bridge, the middle way between the 
Enlightenment's search for the scientific principles of society and the 
romantic movement's repudiation of determinism and its exaltation in 
free will and untamed nature. While Hume was sure that there were 
general causes of human behavior, he also repeatedly warned that a 
causal principle could be carried too far. Perfect uniformity does not 
exist in nature. It is a frequent failing of philosophers, he thought, 
to try to stretch too few general principles to fit the vast variety of 
nature. 25 
When a philosopher has once laid hold of a favourite 
principle, which perhaps accounts for many natural effects, he 
extends the same principle over the whole creation, and reduces 
to it every ph nomenon [sic], though by the most violent and 
absurd reasoning. Our own mind being narrow and contracted, we 
cannot extend our conception to the variety and extent of 
nature; but imagine, that she is as much b~~nded in her 
operations, as we are in our speculations. 
Human action is neither totally chaotic, nor totally determined; it 
is a little of both. " Both freedom and the expectation of a general 
regularity are, in fact, essential to human moral action. The extent 
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and limits of each he discussed in ''Of Liberty and Necessity" sections 
in both the Treatise 27 and the Inquiry28 and scattered throughout the 
Essays. In these sections, he asserted that there were general and 
uniform laws to be found in human nature just as in the motions of the 
planets. But in human nature one can expect only a "degree of 
uniformity" which then requires a greater number of general principles 
to cover all the cases. 29 Some characteristics are common to all 
humanity and some are peculiar to particular persons and/or in 
particular cultures, but even in diversity there are general principles 
to be inferred. If there were no uniformities in human behavior there 
could be no learning from experience, no action contemplated with a 
result in mind, no plans laid in expectation that the future would be 
like the past. Without uniformities people could not generalize or form 
analogies from one particular event to others like it, they could not 
infer that one event caused another which would then render science and 
action impossible. 30 
The history of humankind, on the other hand, makes finding 
uniformities difficult. It is filled with amazing changes in the 
manners, customs and opinions. How is the social scientist to find 
which characteristics and events result from general causes and which 
from unique situations or chance? Hume identified several areas where 
one could find constant and uniform characteristics of human nature. He 
observed that in the civil history of wars, negotiations and politics, 
there was a much greater similarity between one age and another than 
there is in the history of learning and science. 31 From this he 
inferred that human passions: interest and ambition, friendship and 
enmity, gratitude and revenge exerted a constant influence in human 
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affairs. These passions are the prime movers of life, the source of all 
human action. Their influence is strong compared with opinion and 
knowledge which are easily varied by education and example. 32 
The other uniformities, besides the passions, are the most basic 
elements of ordinary life, the ones so taken for given that they are not 
mentioned in books of history. That is, that the sexes are attracted, 
mate, form families, raise children, live in groups, and concern 
themselves with material surviva1. 33 (cf. Braudel's long term and the 
contemporary concept of social history) Also common to all people is 
the making of causal inferences about the world of their experiences and 
learning thereby, to expect a degree of regularity in the course of 
life. If there were no regularities, there would be no benefit from 
experience. Another universal fact about people is their sociability. 
Whereas Locke's theory seemed to presuppose individuals free to make 
their own contractual arrangements, Hume, from the opening pages of the 
Treatise considered people as "united in society and dependent on each 
other." 34 
Yet if uniformities and the assumption of causation is an 
indisputable fact, so is diversity, irrationality, randomness and the 
inexplicable. In social theory causation is much more complex; 
combinations of causes, hidden causes (not yet understood), the will of 
particular individuals, chance events, and the welter of contradictory 
data in the ceaseless flow of history, all make general principles more 
difficult to achieve and hardly predictive. 35 He gave as an example, 
the Harrington thesis which postulated that since the balance of 
property had shifted to commons by the time of the Civil War, there 
would never be a monarchy in England again, which prediction was no 
sooner off the press than the king was restored. 36 From this, Hume 
concluded that while property interest had a strong effect on power in 
government, opinion of the right to sovereignty (based in habit and 
tradition) was an even stronger effect. 37 
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Opinion of right, as well as other speculative principles, learning, 
wit and taste are dependent on education and environment, and thus are 
subject to change from one period of history to the next. These more 
complex behaviors are affected by such factors as historical accident, 
type of government and other institutions, economic conditions and the 
influence of neighboring countries. 38 
The general and universal principles of passion, habit, sympathy, 
sociability and utility, combine with particular historical experience 
to make culture the variable thing it is -- part fixed and part 
changeable. Probability is a way to separate cause from chance. Those 
events that depend on the actions of only one or a few persons can be 
ascribed to chance, those that occur in many cases may be said to result 
from causes. Therefore, the causes of a characteristic in a population 
will be noticeable in many cases, even though not in every case. 39 
"Of all sciences, there is none where first appearances are more 
deceitful than politics." 40 Perhaps, Hume speculated, the world is too 
young to have collected enough experience to establish the general 
truths of politics. Machiavelli, for instance, was a genius, but his 
principles of politics were only applicable to unstable Italian states. 
They did not necessarily generalize to conditions in other places. 41 
That political opinion and behavior changed as economic and social and 
intellectual conditions changed was a major theme through Hume's 
political essays and the History. The evolving character of manners and 
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opinions made finding general laws difficult. Prediction is 
particularly difficult because there are so many variables. Hume 
decided that it was easier to account for events after they happen·, 
"from springs and principles of which every one has, within himself", or 
from observations of the general course of events. But, it is nearly 
impossible to predict which variables will have a greater effect in a 
. 't t' 42 g1ven s1 ua 1on. 
After struggling with the issue repeatedly in his political essays, 
Hume wrote "A Dialogue" as an appendix to the Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals. In it he used the dialectical device of a two-
party debate to present the issues involved in the consideration of 
uniformities and variations in culture. A traveler named Palamedes 
described the ancient Greeks in a way that seemed to make them morally 
alien to eighteenth century Europeans. He adopted the attitude of a 
relativist, that "fashion, vogue, custom and law" were the chief 
foundations of moral differences. How then, he asked, would it be 
43 possible to fix a standard of judgment suitable to all cultures? 
Would you try a Greek or a Roman by the common law of 
England? ... There are no manners so innocent or reasonable, 
but may be rendered odious or ri~!culous, if measured by a 
standard unknown to the persons. 
The narrator, who was not given a name and may be presumed to be 
Hume, replied that the answer for the philosopher was to look beyond the 
confusing first appearances and find the underlying standard of 
coherence. Trace matters a little higher, he recommended, by examining 
the first principles on which the culture places its approval or 
disapproval. 
The Rhine flows north, the Rhone south; yet both spring from 
the same mountain, and are also actuated, in their opposite 
directions, by the same principle of gravity. The different 
inclinations of the ground, ~g which they run, cause all the 
difference of their courses. 
The ancient Greeks and the modern French, for example, put very 
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different emphasis on the virtue of fidelity. The Greeks laid priority 
on domestic life, the French on social life, which affected the way that 
each gave expression to fidelity. Their priorities, domestic and 
social, represent two ends of a scale. Both ends are good but also 
difficult to reconcile. The customs of some countries incline very far 
to one extreme, and others to the opposite, but" .. the principles 
upon which men reason in morals are always the same; though the 
conclusions which they draw are often very different."46 It is not 
necessary to show that each culture has the right moral solution, but 
only to show that it reasons from the same basic principles. 
Though there have been many changes in religion, law, language and 
custom since Classical Greek and Roman times, there has been very little 
change in primary moral sentiments, Hume thought. The ancient Greeks 
and the modern French hold many values in common: good sense, wit, 
eloquence, humanity, truth, justice, courage and constancy. These are 
universal sentiments but may be expressed differently in different 
places and times. The "one general foundation" of all moral sentiments, 
Hume thought, is its usefulness to self and others. When the usefulness 
is the standard of judgment of the virtue or the institution, then it 
may be put to the test and corrected if necessary by sounder reasoning 
or further experience. 47 Those moral values which are thought of as 
universal have endured because time has proven them useful to the needs 
of social living. 
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It is the details of circumstances (the contours of the land in the 
river analogy) -- location, kinds of laws, the ever changing historical 
situation-- that account for the variations in moral sentiments. 
Circumstances that pertain in a particular place and time may make some 
virtues easier or more difficult to attain. For example, magnanimity 
or integrity are more difficult in war or other hard times. War or 
peace is the source of the greatest variation in circumstances that 
affect morals. The degree of wealth also affects what virtues will more 
likely have expression. Other sources of variation are the degree to 
which a culture separates women from public life, the form of 
government, the degree of ignorance or learning and even the age of the 
population (an older population has a more nearly similar list of 
virtues based on the lessons that long experiences in life teach). 
Historical accident is an important source of cultural variety. 
Particular occurrences acting alone or in combination may make one or 
another factor more decisive in determining the way a culture 
48 develops. 
Hume's mind was particularly adept at looking behind confusing 
surface appearances and abstracting standards of coherence, though even 
he sometimes sounded doubtful that social science could be made very 
exact. He recognized that in human nature and history the great number 
of variables made finding causes a very complicated undertaking. Hume's 
assertions that this was so and his willingness to find flaws in his own 
proposed principles, made his science too indeterminate for the 
mechanical and atomistic models of the later English empiricists such as 
John Stuart Mill's mental chemistry. In their optimism that a rigorous 
science was possible which would then solve all mysteries, they tried 
applying rigidly reductionist standards. Positivism, behaviorism, 
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economic determinism, various statistical and computer models repeatedly 
have demonstrated that too much rigor and reduction fails to account for 
the variety of human experience. As Carlo Ginzberg observed two 
centuries later. the dilemma for the social sciences is that adopting a 
strict scientific standard yields very limited results, whereas 
attaining significant results requires adopting a weak scientific 
standard. 49 Hume adopted the weak standard, and mixing positive 
observation with his powers of penetration and intuition, made many 
generalizations about psychology, sociology and history. Some now sound 
quaint, some historically inaccurate, but many of them are observations 
that still ring true, or suggest possible lines of inquiry. This may be 
one reason why Hume studies are thriving in the wake of declining 
optimism that social science can be made into a strict Newtonian 
science. 
The psychological uniformities he found in passion and reasoning 
have already been mentioned. The main standards governing human social 
evolution, Hume identified as sympathy, the self/other duality and 
utility. These are the subject of the following section. 
Of Morals, The Social Philosophy 
Morality. therefore,_js more properly 
felt than judg'd of. 0 
Parallel to the question "what is the criterion for true knowledge", 
is the related question "what is the criterion for knowing the right 
things to do?'' This is the realm of ethics, or moral philosophy in 
Hume's eighteenth century usage. Moral philosophy encompasses the whole 
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field of human action: politics, economics and history. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the same controversies 
that shook the foundations of knowledge also affected ethics. Since the 
church was no longer accepted as the sole arbiter of what was right to 
do, the question of how to tell good from evil became important in 
philosophy. The rationalist solution was to shift the foundation from 
authority to reason. The English rational moral philosophers, Samuel 
Clark, William Wollaston, and Ralph Cudworth, felt that just as it was 
possible for reason to discover the natural laws of motion, so was it 
possible to find natural laws as precise as mathematics to be the basis 
for a human moral sense. 51 Reason, and the natural law of morality, 
would provide the criteria against which the confusing array of moral 
claims made by church and sect or king and Parliament could be 
evaluated. 
Such questions were not idle speculations, but held immediate social 
significance appearing as they did in the context of the English Civil 
War and Revolution. The flaw in the logic was revealed when rational 
religion and rational morality failed to settle any of the century•s 
practical disputes over orthodox vs. dissenting religion and 
authoritarian vs. libertarian politics. There were too many conflicting 
opinions about what was right. As much as the natural law theorists 
hoped to find a science of morality in nature, without recourse to 
special revelation, their conclusions usually reflected their own 
theological and political opinions. Bishop Butler, for instance, 
asserted that the purpose of the human conscience was to remind one of 
the duty of passive obedience to authority. 52 Teleological assumptions 




There was another contender, besides reason, to explain how people 
form their moral judgments - passion. An early expression of the non-
rational, passionate nature of humanity was found in Thomas Hobbes' 
social philosophy. Hobbes political views were shaped in the historical 
context of the highly passion-laden political ferment surrounding the 
Civil War period when self-interest versus social order were starkly 
contrasted. His theory was based on the premise of unmoderated self-
love and need for self-preservation which required strict outer controls 
in the form of a social contract and strong authority in order to hold 
society together. From this there followed a school of thought which 
reduced all expressions of virtue and altruism to selfish motives. 54 
A different form of passion-based social theory was the 
sentimentalist theory of Francis Hutcheson, professor of moral 
philosophy at Aberdeen. Hutcheson's Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue (1725) postulated that human nature possessed a naturally 
benevolent moral sense whose effects were evenly distributed in all 
social relationships. The natural laws of morality were derived by 
reflecting on what "our hearts naturally must approve" since benevolent 
action is the end purpose for which humanity was created. He recommended 
that the empirical method of observing human nature be the method of 
moral philosophy, though that goal was inconsistent with his 
teleological conclusions. 55 
Hutcheson's theory of moral sentiment made an early impression on 
Hume's moral philosophy. Kemp Smith demonstrated persuasively that 
reading Hutcheson was the stimulant for Hume's breaking into "a new 
scene of thought" when he was eighteen. Their two theories were very 
. "1 56 s1m1 ar. They approached empirical inquiry the same way by an 
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introspective examination of their own consciousnesses as well as by 
observations of the behavior of others. They disagreed on whether an 
institution such as justice was natural or of human construction, on how 
far human benevolence extended itself (Hume thought it weakened as 
social relationships grew more distant from the individual), and the 
teleological assumption. When the two corresponded after the Treatise 
was published, Hutcheson criticised Hume's moral philosophy for calling 
justice unnatural. InHume's reply, he defended it by saying that 
justice wasn't unnatural, only artificial. By this he meant that the 
concept of justice was not found in original human nature, but was a 
human convention which gradually evolved to meet the needs of social 
living. He added that he disagreed with Hutcheson's definition of 
natural as resting in final causes. For Hume, the knowledge of ultimate 
things was beyond the reach of human understanding. 
For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for 
Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or the Next? For 
himself or his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends on 
Solving 59ese Questions, which are endless and quite wide of my 
Purpose. 
Hume's purpose was to put ethics on a consistently empirical 
ground. He wished to describe human nature as though he were a moral 
anatomist observing internal structure of people as they are, not as a 
moral painter depleting how they ought to be. 58 To limit inquiry to 
observable human traits was job enough for the scientist of man; to 
59 attempt more was to be presumptuous. The empirical moralist made his 
judgments the same way as the natural scientist, by making causal 
inferences based on experience, not only of the outer social 
world, but also on the experience of the inner world of our feeling-
based structuring minds. 
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In Book III of the Treatise, which he later rewrote as the Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume addressed the question of 
whether there are empirically demonstrable standards for making ethical 
judgements. He definitely believed that there are norms for ethical 
behavior. The very idea of morals implies a sentiment common to all 
humanity. 60 As with the belief in cause-effect, the question is not 
whether moral standards are real, but how they are derived. What he 
disputed was how earlier moral theorists explained the origins of 
ethical standards. He first argued against the rationalist position, 
and then against the "selfish system" of Hobbes and Locke, before 
defining his own position that the moral sense like most of the rest of 
our practical thinking is a function of the passions.61 
One of the superb qualities of the human mind is that it is able to 
imagine metaphysical perfections such as pure reason and perfect virtue 
of which it has no experience. The disadvantage is that moral 
philosophers have taken these imagined perfections as a standard in 
devising their utopian schemes of virtue. They fail to understand the 
emotional substructure of their minds that constructs beliefs and 
judgments. Hume proposes to demonstrate how this may be done by 
reference to feelings people can recognize in themselves, and by 
62 language. 
One method which Hume recommends for discovering the foundations for 
ethical thinking is an introspective self examination, an analysis of 
that "complication of mental qualities", that are called meritorious. 
It is a technique which Hume used often. The inquirer who wonders about 
the origins of ethical judgments has all the certainty needed by 
consulting that "quick sensibility ... universal among mankind. 
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(The reader) need only enter into his own breast for a moment, and 
consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality 
ascribed to him. ,63 
Hume's second technique is to examine languages, by which people 
communicate and compare their inner understandings. Every language has 
a set of terms for the good qualities and another for the bad. The 
inquirer should list these words, then use inductive reasoning to find 
what those words have in common. This is the standard of evaluation in 
ethical questions. It is inductively inferred from experience and is a 
matter of fact, not abstract speculation. 64 
Utility is the standard that Hume abstracts as the general law 
underlying all terms and feelings denoting virtue. All such qualities 
are beneficial to self and others. Discretion, industry, prudence, 
temperance, cheerfulness, wit, dignity, benevolence and others are 
approved because of their tendency to beneficial ends: "the happiness of 
mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual 
support of friends". 65 The more social the virtue, the more it benefits 
the whole species, the more highly it is regarded. 
Social utility is an important foundation for ethical judgments, but 
it is not the only one. The real source of morality is in the 
instinctive good feelings that arise when virtuous qualities are 
exercised. Distinctions of vice and virtue are natural sentiments of 
h . d 66 t e m1n . 
"Utility is only a tendency to a certain end and were the end 
totally indifferent we should feel the same indifference toward the 
means."67 Reason may be enough to inform us of the beneficial or 
harmful consequences of a quality or action but it cannot produce the 
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feeling of approval or disapproval. Human emotion tells us whether it 
is right or wrong. There is a preconscious propensity of human minds to 
perceive good actions as pleasure and vice as pain. If there were no 
antecedent appetite, there would be no pleasure felt. 
For Hume, pleasure/pain is not the sole end of action as it was for 
the later utilitarians. Instead, it is the mechanism that informs 
people via emotions which qualities and actions feel right or wrong. 
The final sentence, it is probable ... which renders 
morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue our 
happiness, and vice our misery: ... depends on some internal 
sense or ~geling, which nature has made universal in the whole 
species." 
With this Hume pronounced the same final cause that he faulted Hutcheson 
for -- that humans were created for the end purpose of benevolent 
action. Hume would undoubtedly argue that he expressed it tentatively 
and modestly as a probability, and after exploring many corroborating 
instances of human attitudes and actions expressed in history, language 
and common life. 
Selfishness is an undeniable fact of human nature, but Hume refused 
to reduce all ethical judgments to one source in self-interest, as did 
the Hobbists• "selfish system". This way of thinking tended to view 
individuals as social isolates, knowing only their personally 
experienced subjective realities, and who, when they found it necessary 
to live together, had to have recourse to the legalistic mechanism of a 
social contract. 
It is true that people often can conceal their self interested 
motives from themselves and imagine that they are more selfless than 
they are. But to reduce every social virtue to an underlying selfish 
motive is carrying the argument too far. It is contrary to to common 
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feeling, common language, and obser-vation. It is against common sense 
to argue that the selfish person and the benevolent person are motivaled 
at heart by the same self-love. Furthermore people bestow praise on 
virtuous actions in distant times and places in which they have no 
personal interest. It is even common to praise the brave and noble acts 
of an opponent. The convolution of argument necessary to explain every 
virtue in terms of selfishness also violates the principle of parsimony 
(economy of cause, known as Ockham's razor and also number one of 
Newton's rules of reasoninR). The simplest, most obvious cause for a 
phenomenon is probably the true one. A hypothesis of natural sympathy 
or fellow feeling is simpler. 69 It i~ also consistent with Hume's 
perception that many questions pursued to their limits end in paradox in 
which two apparently opposite conclusions both seem true some of the 
time. Just as human reason consists of both logic and passion, so are 
ethics influenced both by selfishness and sociability. 
Sociability is, for Hume, a fact of human nature nearly as 
influential as selfishness. Emphasis on human selfishness can be 
carried too far. 
Though it be rare to meet with one, who loves any single 
person better than himself, yet 'tis rare to meet with one, in 
whom all the kind affecti~Bs, taken together, do not over-
balance all the selfish." 
The human heart is never entirely indifferent to the common good. One 
person's private good may not be like another's. but that person's 
humanity Js like the humanity of everyone. Moral sentiments are social 
and universal. 
No selfishness, and scarce any philosophy, have there force 
sufficient to support a total coolness and indifference; and he 
must be more or less than man, who kindles not in the common 
blaze. What wonder then, that moral sentiments are found of 
such influence in life? ... They form, in a manner, the P~ftY 
of human-kind against vice and disorder, its common enemy." 
People are born into families and live their lives in social 
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groups. "The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that 
scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed 
without some reference to the actions of others." 72 People assume that 
others will be similar to themselves with similar feelings and 
motivations. Conversely, people know themelves through reflections of 
the responses of others. "The minds of men are mirrors to one another . 
.,73 This affective social bond Hume calls symapthy. 
Through sympathy, the happiness or misery of one are felt by 
others. A person visiting in the home of a friend cannot fail to be 
touched by the emotional atmosphere. The conversation conveys a sense 
of the feelings of the other, whether happy, or troubled by small 
aggravations or assaulted by dreadful horrors. These excite in the 
listener a sympathy of feeling. These are the common emotions of 
humanity, easily shared by those around us and transmitted in 
literature. Theater, poetry and history provide entertainment by 
communicating the whole range of human passions. "History ... would be 
no entertainment at all, did not our hearts beat with correspondent 
movements to those which are described by the historian." 74 
Sympathy, not a social contract, is the glue of society. Living and 
conversing together, soon brings a "similitude of manners" through the 
imitative and sympathetic capacity of human minds. This accounts for 
the local similarity of manners in different cultures, rather than 
physical factors such as air and water which Montesquieu had proposed as 
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the cause of cultural differences. 75 People will conform their behavior 
to that of those around them, not only to receive approval, but also to 
have the advantage of order and regularity. 76 
Some sentiments of good and bad are private ones - such as my enemy, 
his rival - but others have a more generalized point of view and are 
held in common with others. Usefulness or threat to the public good is 
such a common standard, the very foundation of moral judgments. Natural 
human sympathy or fellow-feeling aided by language and communication are 
the means of generalizing the viewpoints of individuals into a common 
sentiment. The language of virtue/vice will be necessarily general 
because it is molded on the general views of many. Nevertheless, it 
will refer to the common interests of the community, and will result 
therefore in a general standard for judging approval or disapproval for 
actions or character traits. The individual may relate to this standard 
in a self-interested way, yet as a community standard, it will exert a 
f . 1 t. 77 pressure or pro-soc1a ac 1on. 
Individual interest and community interest are not fully opposite 
categories in Hume•s social thought. They are interrelated 
dialectically; each sets limits on the other. Self love is a strong 
natural passion, but so is the need for individuals to live together for 
survival and mutual benefit. The rules of social living are the 
synthesis of the two. People are continuously involved with each other 
in families and communities, for emotional as well as economic support. 
The benefits of social living are made obvious and immediate to everyone 
by the primary social unit, the family. Hume identifies as the "first 
and original principle of human society ... that natural appetite 
betwixt the sexes ... " and the resulting concern for children. 78 
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Social living, the advantage of which is to improve the individual's 
material well being, at the same time incurs a disadvantage. Those same 
material goods which make life better, are also scarce and their 
possession is unstable. They are a constant source for disagreement in 
a community. There is no original impulse for justice in human nature, 
no natural law of equity. Such generosity as people feel for those near 
them, family or friends, does not spread very much farther to 
strangers. What nature doesn't provide, humans have devised indirectly 
through reason and judgment to.make up what is lacking in our original, 
natural affections. Hence, education and habits learned in the family 
make us aware of the benefits of social living, and the need to make 
stable rules for the possession of goods. Individuals will conform 
themselves to such social conventions even when when their individual 
interest is not served, because it is even more in their interest to 
live among others who agree to the same rules. It allows people to live 
in confidence of future regularity. Thus the self-interest of possession 
is better served by the rules of social living, (i.e. justice), than by 
unlimited individual liberty. 79 Edmund Burke later neatly expressed 
this concept in the maxim, "The individual is foolish, the species 
wise." 80 
The rules of justice therefore cannot be said to be laws of nature, 
that is in original human nature, but are artificial constructs devised 
by human reason to meet human needs. "Reason is, and ought only to be, 
the slave of the passions"; 81 reason devises means to satisfy the need 
of people to live together in society. If one looks at the organization 
of Hume's Treatise in a dialectical way, (which Livingson pointed out 
82 
was a useful conceptual tool ) one can see at once, that Book III, "Of 
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Morals", is the synthesis of the first two, "Of the Understanding" and 
"Of the Passions". Social conventions and institutions such as justice 
and government developed from the synthesis of self-interested passion, 
the need for social living and reason, the deviser of means. 
Human nature being compos'd of two principle parts, which 
are requisite in all its actions, the affections and 
understanding, 'tis certain, that the blind motions of the 
former, with~~t the direction of the latter, incapacitate men 
for society. 
Because the rules for living socially are not original to human 
nature but develop slowly over time as people learn what works or dosen't 
work, Hume calls them artificial. If people had a natural affection for 
the public interest, the rules of justice would never have been dreamed 
of, because they would not have been needed. If, on the other hand, 
people only pursued their individual self-interest, their property and 
lives would be continually at risk. The need for stable, commonly agreed 
upon rules for social living, impelled the development of the social 
conventions and institutions. The rules do not pretend to change 
original selfishness, but devise ways to contain it within bounds 
acceptable to the needs of living together. Thus the public utility is 
the key standard for judgments about the conventions and institutions. 84 
Hume's distinction between artificial and natural is not so 
dissimilar. Human sociability and rationality are as natural as human 
passion. When rationality devises an invention as obvious and necessary 
as the social conventions of justice and government, 
it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that 
proceeds immediately from original principles, without the 
intervention of thought or reflexion. Tho' the rules of 
justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. ~gr is the 
expression improper to call them Laws of Nature. 
These conventions could be regarded as a sort of social contract, 
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but with a difference. Contract suggested a legal agreement at a point 
in time. Hume did not suppose that a legal agreement could be made 
before a concept of justice had evolved. His explanation of social 
conventions was given in neither metaphysical or legal, contractual 
terms but in the empirical and naturalistic terms of social-
anthropology, psychology and evolution. Conventions developed as a 
slowly accumulated set of responses to human needs and drives, which in 
time evolved into a concept of justice. As each innovation in the 
social conventions lasted long enough to become stable, it became part 
of our habitual way of reasoning, and thus accepted as natural through 
long usage. The resulting moral rules were passed along to each 
generation through the private instruction of parents and public 
h t t . t . . i d d 86 ex or a 1ons o c1v1c m n e ness. 
Language is a social convention just as the rules of justice; both 
are historically developed sets of common rules. 87 Social norms or 
conventions gradually evolved as an objective viewpoint so that 
individuals may communicate about life in the world. The conventions 
are held together by the rules of language, which developed alongside 
the norms in order to express them. Because these two conventions 
developed simultaneously and interrelatedly, it is logically impossible 
to say that justice is wrong or virtue is bad. Both conventions 
developed from an unconsciously planned trial and error process, the 
accumulation of many single instances of negotiations between 
conflicting parties with no more motive or larger principle than what 
suited the present convenience. The accumulated experience with many 
cases gradually revealed the mutual benefit of a fixed point of view 
against which claims could be compared. This settled point of view 
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became the community standard of objectivity needed in ethics, language, 
law, government, complex societies and economies and for science and 
knowledge in genera1. 88 The remaining chapters consider Hume's account 
of how the conventions of government developed through English history 
and finally fixed in the English constitution the concepts of the rule 
of law and legal institutions. 
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CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL THEORY I: BRITISH POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY 
Extremes of all kinds are to be avoided 
and tho' no one will ever please either 
faction by moderate opinions, it is there 
we are mosf likely to meet with truth and 
certainty. 
In the closing paragraph of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume 
repeated his earlier image of the scientist of man as a moral anatomist, 
who straight-forwardly records human beings as they are found. The 
moral painter, by contrast, uses imagination to enhance the depiction of 
the human subject into a more graceful object, what ought to be. Yet 
the two functions, though different, are not opposite; they have a 
natural affinity. The anatomist is in a position to advise the painter 
with exact knowledge of the subject, so that the painter's production 
may be both elegant and accurate. This is how Hume wished for his study 
of human nature to be used, as the scientific foundation underlying 
specific practical applications of ethics in common life that it may be 
"more correct in ~ts precepts and more persuasive in its exhortations." 2 
Such a practical science as Hume envisioned could not be achieved in 
controlled laboratory experiments but only extrapolated from experience 
3 in natural settings, "in the common course of the world". 
The early years of eighteenth century England were characterized by 
intense political ferment. Since the political turmoil of the previous 
century, the 1688 Revolution, and acts of Parliament such as the Bill of 
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Right (1689) and the Act of Settlement (1701), the political rules known 
collectively as the British constitution had changed. The limits to the 
power of the monarch and the rights of Parliament were now codified into 
law, "a more regular plan of government" as Hume put it. The details, 
however, of how such a limited monarchy was to be administered were 
still unsettled early in the century. The twenty-one years of Whig 
ministry (1721-1742) under Robert Walpole were a period of transition in 
which the pattern of modern British administration and politics 
gradually took form. It was also a period of great political tension 
since there was inevitably divergent opinion about what the pattern 
should be. Political issues evoked high passion and hot debate. 
Abrasive though the debate was, it polished a durable and flexible 
system, one able to keep a balance in a nation of divided opinion. 4 
As an observer of the political scene during this time of noisy 
transition, Hume was especially interested in applying his empirical 
theory to the political aspects of the science of man. The ability of 
the new constitution to hold a balance between the extremes was not at 
all so clear at the time. The vehemence and polarity of political 
debate seemed constantly to threaten instability or worse, civil 
strife. Dogmatic and intolerant theory, often hiding plain self-
interest, was what threatened the constitution, Hume felt. An objective 
standard for judging political issues was much needed. It was 
imperative to examine the theoretical positions of all sides with a 
detached scientific eye to expose the mistaken claims in the extreme 
positions and encourage a moderate coalition in support of the 
constitution. Those who write on political subjects, "free from party-
rage and party-prejudice, cultivate a science which, of all others, 
contributes most to public utility. .,5 
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Accordingly Hume turned his attention to the writing of political 
essays when he returned to the family estate at Ninewells after the 
publication of the Treatise in 1739 and 1740. The resulting Essays, 
Moral and Political, were published in 1741 and a second volume in 
1742. 6 The political context of the essays was the furious public 
debate surrounding the fall of Robert Walpole's Whig ministry in 1742 
after twenty-one years in office. The year of the Jacobite rebellion, 
1745, Hume spent in seclusion as the tutor to a non-compos marquis and 
writing more political essays. 7 "Of the Original Contract", "Of Passive 
Obedience" and "Of the Coalition of Parties" examined the theoretical 
and historical claims made by both Whig and Tory, found both to be 
partly right and partly flawed. 
Though Hume's criticism of Whig contract theory attracted the most 
attention and he was most commonly labeled a Tory, he had no interest in 
returning to old forms of authority. Far from being a backward-looking 
apology for absolute monarchy, the philosophical essays were intended, 
as Forbes pointed out, to be a progressive science of politics in post-
revolution England. 8 By close criticism of party theory and by looking 
at the facts of British constitutional history, Hume hoped to soften the 
extremes of ideology with that "tincture of skepticism" that proportions 
belief according to the evidence. He found underlying principles which 
were flexible enough to reflect current realities without falling into 
the extremes of reactionism, complacency or fearful suspicion that the 
gains made after the Glorious Revolution were constantly in danger of 
being undone. 
The political essays repeated and expounded upon themes first 
mentioned in Book III of the Treatise, which were, in turn, enlarged 
upon with more factual detail in the History of England. The first of 
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these themes, which will be the main subject for this chapter, was 
Hume's wish to identify the mistakes of political theory based on 
Cartesian rationalist forms. An incorrect theoretical foundation led to 
mistaken conclusions about human nature, politics and economics. 
Mistaken ideology, Hume felt, was responsible for much of the high 
emotion and fanatacism in the political rhetoric of the day. The 
polarization of political debate based on dogmatic adherence to false 
premises threatened the stability of that form of government which, if 
not perfect, was at least "the most entire system of liberty that was 
ever known amongst mankind" 9 
The second theme, which will be discussed in the following chapter, 
was Hume's wish to correct the mistakes of philosophy by making the 
study of politics more empirical. Hume's science examined human nature 
as it really is, and human activity as it actually operates in its 
social and historical matrix. His explanation of political institutions 
was in the form of a natural history; its two main frameworks of 
analysis were psychology and history. Human institutions were devised 
to make compromises between the extremes of human nature. Justice and 
government developed through a long process of adjustments to the 
shifting needs of a slowly changing society. The job of the political 
theorist was to examine the historical development of an institution 
such as the English constitution and then to infer the underlying 
standards with governed the process of its development. The keynotes of 
Hume's political science were naturalism and the historical and 
dialectical process of assimilation and adaption based on utilitiy. 
The specific issues in the political essays were: (1) the 
ideological nature of parties and what role they play in the mixed 
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Constitution; (2) whether the origin of the English Constitution was by 
original contract in the ancient Saxon constitution or by the gradual 
development of political consciousness and institutions; (3) the 
dualities of human nature, especially liberty vs. authority; (4) 
mercantilist vs. liberal economics; free societies produce greater 
wealth, which rather than bringing corruption and the downfall of 
republics as in classical theory, Hume reinterpreted to be the source of 
enlarged intelligence in general. and raised political consciousness in 
particular. 
In the preface to the original volume of essays Hume expressed the 
hope they would dampen "this party rage" and be found acceptable to 
moderates of either party. 10 Where there was liberty of thought there 
was sure to follow divergent opinion, and a society devoted to liberty 
must develop a more tolerant attitude toward dissent. England was not 
so far removed from the time when to be in opposition to the government 
(the king) was tantamount to treason. Just as the patterns of the new 
form of government were still in transition, so was the concept of a 
loyal opposition. The moderation Hume called for entailed the notion of 
toleration, that people of opposing views could nevertheless work 
together in a mixed form of government. 
"That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science" was not a quantitative 
methodology, but some maxims Hume had extrapolated from history to put 
the Walpole debates in perspective. He began with the general principle 
that the influence of legal and governmental institutions is so strong 
and regular that its effects on a society can form a basis for causal 
conclusions. That is, the social scientist, trying to explain the 
political events or opinions in a society may point to institutions as 
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causal factors. The new Constitution had institutionalized the rule of 
law. This had the advantage of making good administration independent 
of the will or administrative ability of rulers. If the constitution of 
a free government has been well formed, with adequate checks and 
controls, it continues to function even in the hands of bad (self-
interested) administrators. The public good does not depend on private 
virtue, but on good laws. Thus the greatest care should be given to 
'd' d t f 1 f bl' d .. t t' 11 prov1 1ng a goo sys em o aws or pu 1c a m1n1s ra 1on. 
An observer, adopting a coolly philosophical attitude, could see 
past the partisan frenzy and realize that truth, overstatement and 
hidden motivations could be found on both sides. Hume pointed out 
contradictions in their arguments. "If our Constitution be really that 
noble fabric, the pride of Britain, the envy of our neighbors ... "it 
could never have permitted a weak or wicked minister to govern for 
twenty years when opposed by the best minds of the nation who had full 
liberty of tongue and pen to mold public opinion and influence 
parliament. On the other hand, if the minister really was as wicked as 
he was represented, then the constitution must be very faulty and 
deserve collapse so that a new one could be constructed. 12 
If the opposition party found fault with the existing ministry, they 
had every right to say so and attempt to unseat it at the next election, 
but to take uncompromising stands or to fear that the lack of ability or 
virtue of a minister endangers the constitution carried the argument too 
far. True public spiritedness would better be demonstrated, not by 
zealously trying to destroy the opposition, but by understanding what is 
true and false in the theoretical foundations of both sides and coming 
to a moderate modus vivendi. The English constitution as it had 
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evolved, was a sturdy and flexible fabric, able to withstand occasional 
. t I f . . t . h · 1 · 13 m1smanagemen , or a ctange o m1n1s ry wtt out crumo 1ng. 
Through the rest of the 1740's Hume's correspondence shows he wrote 
more essays, condensed the Treatise into the two Enquiries, and began 
. 14 
notes for the projected history. He planned for the history to be a 
scientific inquiry into the origins of the English Constitution, to 
counteract the strongly ideological party histories that had been the 
norm since the constitutional turmoil of the previous century. The 
actual writing began in 1752 when he was appointed Keeper of the 
Advocates Library in Edinburgh. The same year the Political Discourses 
were published. Of these, seven of the twelve were on economics, and 
considered such topics as "Of Money", and "Of the Balance of Trade" from 
the same psychological and historical perspective as his other 
inquiries. They contained all the features of classical economics as 
Adam Smith later acknowledged in The Wealth of Nations. 15 In 1758 the 
collected essays were published together under the title. Essays. Moral. 
Political and Literar~ which form they have generally maintained since. 
The Mistakes of Ideology 
Hume's criterion for true philosophical inquiry was knowledge 
confirmable by experience in the course of ordinary life. The source of 
mistaken philosophy, he felt, was the Cartesian rational system which 
took the logic of mathematics for its criterion of reality. Cartesian 
thinking in the form of such theoretical constructs as natural law, 
natural rights and an original social contract, was influential in much 
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of the social theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. an 
influence which Hume hoped to replace with true philosophy, which is 
empirical. Natural law concepts were based on the idea that the true 
social and political order is to be found in nature, just as the orbits 
of planets, and are timeless truths to be deducted by pure reason, 
independent of any historical process. 16 The theory of both parties had 
reference to such timeless absolutes, the Tories' indefeasible right, 
and the duty of obedience as well as the Whigs' natural rights of life. 
liberty, and .property. 
History and other categories of fact knowledge were virtually 
eliminated by pure Cartesian rationalism. Mere facts must be doubted 
because they could never be as certain as the logical perfection of 
mathematics. The result for history, as with fact knowledge in general. 
was inevitably skepticism, as Hume pointed out in the Treatise. 
17 Historical skepticism was rampant. 
The result for political theory was even more dangerously 
wrongheaded. Hume regarded true political theory to be the law~like 
generalizations of principle from existing societies obtaJned by 
Newtonian induction from the facts of history. Thus existing rulers 
held authority by virtue of rules and precedents developed throughout 
the history of that society. Rationalist theory, embraced as it often 
was by those who wanted to change the rules for determining authority, 
held that established order was inauthentic. The "real'' authority is to 
be found in rational constructs like Locke's libertarjan state of nature 
which he defined as "Men living together according to reason, without a 
common superior on earth ... But though this be a state of liberty, yet 
it is not a state of license ... The state of nature has a law of 
nature to govern it." 18 In this naturally virtuous state of nature 
every person, nevertheless had to defend his own rights and property, 
and therefore found it expedient to band together to form a social 
contract to protect property. 
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Cartesianism in politics leads to what Livingston calls 
"metaphysical rebellion", that is the idea that the existing, 
historically developed order is inauthentic whereas the rationally 
perfect ideal order is the real and authentic. 19 Metaphysical rebellion 
is the ideological basis for actual political rebellion. What Descartes 
said of the philosophical order can just as well be said for the 
political order, "I know no better remedy than absolutely to raze it to 
the ground in order to raise a new one instead". 20 The new order would 
be rationally perfect, and independent of the old historically developed 
one. Descartes specifically admonished that his prescription for 
philosophy should not apply to politics, but so useful a concept was not 
by-passed by others. 
The compelling idea of replacing old philosophy with liberating new 
ideas was soon translated into English political thought during the 
tumultuous seventeenth century. Writers such as Milton, Harrington, 
Sidney and especially John Locke, defined a philosophical liberalism 
which opposed the hereditary and divine right principle of monarchy and 
all the accumulated tradition of monopolistic and mercantilist 
restrictions on commerce. Their political theory postulated that 
natural law prescribed government by consent of the governed and was 
founded on an original social contract and the natural rights of man. 
Metaphysical principles. in the form of the ideologies of liberty 
and equality did intrude violently into politics in the great 
revolutions that followed. Whether ideas caused the rebellions or 
whether the ideas were invoked because they suited the purposes of the 
rebels is a debatable issue of historical cause. Hume thought the two 
were interactive, with the greater weight put on ideas . 
. . . though men be much governed by interest; yet even 
interest itself, and all human affairs, are entirely governed 
by opinion . . . The tide has run ~~ng and with some rapidity, 
to the side of popular government. 
Besides the Lockean idea of original rationality was another 
assumption about human nature that was equally unsound -- original 
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virtue. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution of 
1776, according to the liberal or Whig view of reality, were held to be 
restorations of the natural and ancient right of liberty, understood to 
be a timeless absolute, but which had been usurped by a corrupt 
monarchy. Remove the evil of the old irrational and authoritarian order 
and the authentic, rational. virtuous and autonomous citizen would would 
be freed from his chains to create the virtuous republic. 
The notion of a revolution as the restoration of an original virtue. 
that has become lost, comes from a second source in the ideology of 
liberty. The republican theory of the Italian city-states, with roots 
back to Aristotle's res publica, and defined in the Italian Renaissance 
by Machiavelli and Guicciardini was predicated on virtue. Italian civic 
humanis,t theory required a perfect unity of all citizens in the belief 
that private interest was the same as the public interest. Unity of 
opinion was necessary to protect the republic from external despotism or 
internal corruption. To prevent conquest or corruption, each citizen 
must put the common good before his particular good as a precondition 
for all the others to do the same thing. The moral autonomy of the 
community-minded citizen was at once the source of virtue, and at the 
same time, dependent on it. 22 
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Examine the assumptions of ideology, Hume recommended, by looking at 
the reality of human nature, the way an anatomist would study it. 
People are not perfectly rational nor perfectly virtuous, so that 
ideologies that presuppose such perfection are destined to fail. 
Locke's libertarian state of nature governed only by the natural law, 
but in which property nevertheless needs defending in a social contract 
is inconsistent within itself and with reality. The republic predicated 
on virtue is likewise unreal. "All Plans of government, which suppose 
great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary" 23 
If, Hume observed, humanity were so perfectly just that they always 
"abstain from the properties of others"; if they were so wise that they 
perfectly understood what their real interests were, then there would 
never have been a need for any governmental authority other than mutual 
24 
consent. People could live in perfect liberty. But the reality is 
not like that. The mistake is to consider liberty and virtue as moral 
absolutes instead of social conventions for mediating the dualities of 
human nature. Natural humanity is made up of both selfish and social 
tendencies, reason and passion. Human government is the synthesis which 
reflects and mediates the dualities. 
When the psychological, social and historical origins of political 
concepts such as liberty, justice, and equality are not understood, Hume 
observed, it is tempting to suppose that perfect virtue and rationality 
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might write the rules differently. During the Civil War and 
Protectorate, religious enthusiasts determined to replace traditional 
social order with the theocratic principle that dominion is founded in 
grace, that is the rules of justice would insure that the greatest 
possession goes to the most virtuous. This sounds like perfection if 
only people were capable of perfect virtue. But as people really are, 
the result was dissolution of the bonds of society and the horrors of 
war and persecution. Exactly what constitutes perfect merit is obscure 
and the source of conflict, not to mention that self conceit confuses 
virtue with self-interest. 
Utopian communities, for example, in the first blush of their 
enthusiasm, often experiment with communal property. But experience of 
disguised self-interest eventually force such "unprudent fanatics" to 
reinstate the idea of property and justice. Perfect equality in the 
distribution of property looks very attractive, but is specious. It is 
impracticable and destructive to society for several reasons: the 
different abilities of individuals soon make the distribution unequal 
again; by checking the virtue of industry, the whole society will soon 
be reduced to indigence; the inquisition necessary to enforce it would 
require so much authority it would soon degenerate into a tyranny. What 
looks good at first appearance, Hume concluded, can be unworkable. 
Rationally perfect libertarian and egalitarian schemes of government are 
predicated on a rational and selfless perfection that people do not 
possess. To plan forms of government and write good laws, it is 
essential to understand human psychology and its cultural and historical 
25 
context. The less natural the supporting principles of a society are, 
the more difficulty the legislator will have in cultivating them. It is 
4 
better to "comply with the common bent of mankind; and give it all the 
improvement of which it is susceptible". 26 
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For Hume, purely rational thinking, independent of social and 
historical process is not the way people form their judgments of reality 
in their moral (social) world. Customary habits of thinking, cultural 
tradition, and ideological fashion (the climate of opinion) are taken to 
be just as authentic as mathematical propositions. The standard of 
judgment in the moral world consists of the custom of the reflective 
mind making causal judgments based in past experience. It regards the 
facts of our experience in ordinary life as legitimate knowledge; it is 
time ordered and narrative. Hume criticised rational constructs such as 
Locke's perfect state of nature, natural law and social contract, 
because they failed to understand the historical and social development 
of political institutions. False premises led to false conclusions. 
Such faulty reasoning could be found in the theoretical underpinnings of 
both political parties and produced ideologies that Hume thought could 
be and were destructive to society, either through alienation from the 
historically developed order or dogmatic extremism, which is unable to 
compromise and thus threatens civil disturbance or revolution. 
In the essay, "Of Parties in General", Hume divided parties into the 
categories of interest and principle. Parties of interest, 
traditionally allegiance to a powerful family, were the oldest type. 
Parties of principle he regarded as a modern phenomenon which had the 
potential for being dangerous. When political truths lost their 
grounding in the social and historical order, then anyone's personal 
revelation could become the ideology for some fanatical faction. 
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The road ought to be broad enough for people reusoning from opposite 
principles to pass each other without undue shock. 
But such is the nature of the human mind, that it always lays 
hold on every mind that approaches it, and as it is wonderfully 
fortified by an unanimity of ~~ntiments, so it is shocked and 
disturbed by any contrariety. 
Dogmatism and intolerance, Hume thought, were the sources of religious 
wars and persecutions throughout history, including the English civil 
disturbances of the last century. 
Hume, himself sometimes caught up in the emotionalism of factional 
debate, often expressed irritation and concern that factional fanatacism 
would be the ruin of the new Constitution. Factions are the "weeds of 
' It h . . d 28 tne state e comp1a1ne . Yet the objective Hume recognized that 
parties were not only unavoidable, but the ''causes of its [the 
constitution's) permanent life and vigor." 29 His concept of the 
socially and historically developed moral conventions required the 
abrasive of public debate to polish the social conventions into a middle 
way that could be generally accepted by most people. 
The new constitution, predicated on popular participation and a 
balance between the extremes of absolute monarchy and republic, must 
necessarily tolerate divergence of opinion. Though interest is very 
much mixed in with principle in determjning party allegiance, Hume also 
included a psychological explanation: people of mild, peace-loving 
temperaments will favor the authority of monarchy, and people of bold 
and ambitious spirits will prefer the liberties of popular government. 
The balance is delicate between what the republicans would like against 
what the monarchists want, added to the variety of human passion and 
prejudice, and makes it inevitable that there will be differences of 
opinion on the details of government among even the best of thinkers. 
30 
Thus parties of principle are necessary to a mixed government. 
Yet when it came to the ideological foundations of the actual 
parties, Hume found much illogic, historical misrepresentation and 
failure to understand human psychology. If these mistakes of theory 
could be cleared up, much of their intolerant polarization might be 
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overcome sufficiently that they could work together. The Whig and Tory 
parties had been operating for seventy years in and out of power, and 
political discussions were so pervasive that one couldn't avoid constant 
exposure. Yet Hume, who aspired to a science of politics, confessed that 
he was hard pressed to understand just what the nature and principles of 
the parties were. The difficulty "is a proof that history may contain 
questions, as uncertain as any to be found in the most abstract 
sciences." 31 Part of the difficulty was that during the long Whig 
ministry, the opposition Tories began to use the same country ideology 
that the Whigs had used when they were the minority. Thus the court and 
country divisions did not correspond to Tory and Whig. Nor did either 
party exactly fit a division based on landed versus commercial 
. t 32 1n erest. 
The conclusion he came to was that the parties were not so far apart 
in their basic assumptions. Both loved liberty and accepted monarchy 
with constitutionally defined limits. The difference was one of 
degree. The Tories placed more emphasis on monarchy, basing their 
preference for the Stuarts on divine right ideology thus showing "How 
easily does the worship of the divinity degenerate into into a worship 
of the idol." 33 The Whigs, whose divinity was Liberty, accepted 
monarchy, but preferred the Protestant line as more amenable to their 
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priority of securing liberties. Thus the fundamental difference between 
the two parties was the issue of authority versus liberty. 
If partisans of both sides examined their theoretical and historical 
claims with a scientific objectivity and gave up their inconsistent and 
inaccurate beliefs, then the two could find some common ground for 
coalition. This Hume proposed to help them do. Parties need a framework 
of principles to give meaning to their actions, but, "The people being 
commonly very rude builders, especially still, when actuated by party-
zeal, it is natural to imagine that their workmanship must be a little 
unshapely ... "34 The one party traces government to God, making it a 
sacrilege to change it in any way no matter how tyrannical it is. The 
other party imagines that government is founded entirely on the 
voluntary consent of its people to an original contract which they also 
have the right to revoke if they chose. Each of these positions 
contains some truth, but not in the extreme form in which the partisans 
. . t 35 lnSlS . The one places too much emphasis on indefeasible authority, 
the other on unlimited liberty. The true foundation of government is to 
be found in the middle way. People need some authority and some 
liberty. Good government consists of devising institutions to moderate 
and accommodate both on the middle ground. 36 
In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle 
open or secret, between Authority and Liberty; and neither of 
them can ever absolutely prevail in the contest. A great 
sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every 
government; yet even the authority, which confines liberty, can 
never, and perhaps ought never, in any39onstitution, to become 
quite entire and uncontroulable [sic]. 
Social order and government have been created by people of all 
countries and ages. That government is a part of God's universal plan 
and wise purpose cannot be denied. But God cannot be said to have 
mi~aculoulsy inte~vened to extablish pa~ticular gove~nments o~ royal 
families. A king may not claim to be His vice-regent. The same claim 
of right may be made fo~ every ju~isdiction of autho~ity in the state 
f~om the king to a constable. 38 
The popular party (Whig) on the other hand claims that voluntary 
consent is the only foundation fo~ government, not only at some 
conjectured beginning, but even in its full maturity. They further 
claim that a people's gift of sovereignty to a king is entirely 
conditional on that king providing satisfactory justice and security. 
Failure to do so breaks the contract and gives the people the ~ight of 
revolution. Kingdoms that fit this description, Hume thought, never 
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existed. What one finds in history are kings who regard their subjects 
as property, suitable for dowries and bequests, along with subjects who, 
when asked, affi~m that they are obligated to their sovereign lord 
solely because they were born in his jurisdiction. Neither expresses 
39 
any obligation based on consent. 
Granted that the origin of government in primitive groups, under 
exigency of wa~. probably involved a voluntary relinquishing of 
authority to some chieftan, it is preposterous to assume that consent to 
a contract remained the basis of sovereign authority through all 
di t . 40 succee ng genera 1ons. Modern political authority is derived from 
established gove~nment and powe~ supported by fleets and a~mies. It is 
also supported by the sense of utility people feel from the peace and 
order it provides. Once government is established, the individual 
citizen ceases to have a choice whether or not to live by the rules of 
the sove~eign authority. Submission to the social o~der is essential, 
and for most people accepted by habit. 41 
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The obligation to duty and obedience, claimed to be moral absolutes 
by Tory theory, can be carried too far. All that we know about human 
nature, history and our own experience convinces us there are exceptions 
to the rule of duty which allows resistence to the more flagrant cases 
of arbitrary power. History is full of tyrants and the general moral 
sense of mankind has always allowed for resistance from the worst cases 
f . 42 o oppress~on. In the case of the English mixed constitution, where 
the sovereign authority is divided between the king and Parliament, the 
duty of obedience does not extend to a case where the monarch tries to 
usurp the whole power of governing. The right of the people to a share 
of the power cannot be without some remedy in case of the king's 
encroachment. In such a case the constitution must be defended. 43 
The obligation to obedience rests on society's need for the peaceful 
possession of property. But this cannot be the ultimate end of 
government as property must sometimes be sacrificed in extreme emergency 
as with a scorched earth defense. Thus the more comprehensive end of 
government must be found in the Roman maxim, "The safety of the people 
is the supreme law." Resistance to lawful authority may then be 
justified in extreme cases where it is a peoples' only recourse against 
violent tyranny. Hume would rather, however, not define too closely 
just what constitutes such an emergency. It is sufficient to say that 
if enough people think that conditions are intolerable, they will rebel. 
There would never be an end to turbulence and disorder if people had the 
idea that they could rebel every time they disapprove of a ruler's 
action. In the History, in his discussion of Edward II's reign, Hume 
inserted the maxim that the discontents of the upper class and the 
volatility of the masses are just as much to be guarded against in a 
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well regulated constitution as the tyranny of princes. 44 Generally Hume 
is temperamentally conservative and prefers obedience and order since 
the social upheaval which follows in the wake of civil war is even more 
45 likely ground for violence and tyranny. 
History as well as logic fails to support the Whig concepts of 
social contract and government by the consent of the governed. Most 
governments now and in history, Hume asserted, were founded by 
conquerors or usurpers without any pretense of consent. In the 
continual changes of the map accompanying tribal migrations or the rise 
and fall of empires, there is found far more force and violence than 
mutual agreement. If there is any time when the will of the people is 
least regarded, it is at the point of establishing a new government. 
Then armed force or political skill decides the matter and the winner 
takes care to suppress any opposition until eventually the people become 
habituated to his and his successor's rule. Even where there are 
orderly elections they are commonly dominated by an elite coterie or a 
mob following a demagogue, which can hardly be regarded as the only 
46 legitimate foundation for government. 
The human need for stability and continuity forms another argument 
against government by consent of the governed as a sole source of 
legitimacy: 
Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and the 
other succeed, as in the case with silkworms and butterflies, 
the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their 
government, which surely is never the case with men, might 
voluntarily, and by general consent, establish their own form 
of civil polity, without regard to the laws or precidents which 
prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in a 
perpetual flux, one man every hour going out of the world, 
another coming into it, it is necessary, in order to preserve 
stability in government, that the new brood should conform 
themselves to the established constitution ... Some 
innovations must necessarily have place in every human 
institution, and it is happy where the enlightened genius of 
the age gives these a direction to the side of reason, liberty 
and justice: but violent innovations no individual is entitled 
to make: they are even dangerous to be attempted by the 
legislature: ... and if history affords examples to the 
contrary, they are not to be drawn into precedent, and are only 
to be regarded as proofs, that the science of politics affords 
few rules, which will not admit of some exception, and which 
may not s~~etimes be controuled [sic] by fortune and 
accident. 
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The ideology of liberty is very attractive. But Hume warned his 
readers not to be so enchanted with philosophical origins of government 
to suppose that the traditional form of sovereignty based on historical 
precedent must be illegitimate. Any ideology that romanticizes a 
revolutionary sweeping-away of the old order has little correspondence 
to the reality of human history and psychology. There is no greater 
calamity than the total dissolution of government and liberty of the 
multitudes to establish a new one. The resulting power struggle will be 
so fierce the masses will never get to choose and soon they will only 
want to see a powerful general at the head of an obedient army come and 
save them from their freedom. 48 
This is not to say that the consent of the people has no place as a 
proper foundation of government. Undoubtedly it is the best. But it 
has scarcely ever operated it history and so cannot claim the be the 
only foundation. 49 The ideology of liberty was a modern development. 
It emerged in the commercial cities of the Italian Renaissance and 
developed in the modern commercial societies of Holland and England when 
their material and intellectual conditions had evolved to the point when 
such concepts were useful. The Whigs' mistake in their historical 
interpretations was to try to read the ideology of liberty backward in 
time. To judge the past, when learning was more limited, political 
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institutions cruder and the constitution irregular and unevenly applied, 
by the present standard of the rule of law and limited monarchy was to 
misrepresent the past. 
In the essay "Of the Coalition of Parties" Hume proposed to look at 
the history of the constitutional struggle of the previous century with 
the s~me objective moderation as the critique of the ideology. In it 
were the main outlines of his historical interpretation of English 
constitutional development so that it may be read as an abstract of the 
History, or at least the political theme of the Stuart volumes. This 
essay was also an example of the dialectical structure that may 
frequently be found inHume's writing, that is, the moderating synthesis 
of the two previous essays, ~of the Original Contract" and "Of Passive 
Obedience". Hume did not mean his essays to be polemical tracts aimed 
at decimating the opposition. They were meant to enhance a spirit of 
coalition by cooling hot controversy and looking at the issues from a 
cool philosophical distance. He represented the positions of both sides 
with eloquence, and also criticised both. That is why, by selective 
attention, it was so easy to find statements that made Hume look like 
either a Whig or a Tory, and why partisans of each thought he belonged 
to the opposition. Hume was trying to find the higher philosophical 
perspective from which to judge the claims of both parties. 
Hume first summarized the viewpoint of the popular party, later 
called Whig in this way: the rights of mankind are sacred above the 
rights of authority and that the protection of liberty is worth great 
sacrifice. Kings will inevitably make every attempt to expand their 
authority and only the vigilance of people and parliament stand between 
liberty and tyranny. They also asserted that the move to restrict the 
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king's authority was not a dangerous innovation, but only the return of 
rights enjoyed in previous ages under the ancient constitution. It was 
to this noble vision that England owed its liberty and likely also its 
learning, industry, commerce and naval power. 50 Though it was more 
highly developed in the History, this condensed Hume's contention that 
the development of political consciousness and the drive for self-
determination in both religion and politics had gradually evolved as the 
the feudal economy declined and the commercial economy developed. 51 So 
that as distasteful as he found the fanatacism, turmoil, and bloodshed 
that resulted in the eventual constitutional changes, he saw them as 
elements in a longer process and justified in time because they brought 
about the rule of law and a constitution of divided power. 52 
At the onset of the Civil War the happy consequences that eventually 
developed were not known and the royalists had some equally reasonable 
arguments in support of their side. They could argue that reason is too 
uncertain and open to controversy to be a stable base for government; 
besides that the only basis traditionally known to humanity is authority 
and precedent. Dissolve these and you dissolve all social bonds and 
permit the unlicensed pursuit of self interest. Innovation is always 
dangerous, no matter how attractive the expected result appears. 53 
Hume disapproved of the rather crude and polemical way the Whigs 
represented history to justify that outcome, suggesting he observed, 
that deep down they knew that their innovation was dangerous and needed 
the idea of return to ancient practice to give it legitimacy. 54 The 
Whig historians did themselves no honor to pretend that royal 
prerogative had never had legitimacy. Hume thought that the facts of 
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English history sufficiently established that the Whig vision of legally 
limiting the royal authority was well founded, even though there were 
arguments to be made for the other side which the historian should have 
the honesty to point out. 55 
The English constitution, Hume thought, like all human institutions 
had always been in a continual process of change. He identified four 
main periods prior to the modern mixed constitution: ancient (Briton and 
Saxon), Norman feudal, the medieval charters, and the Tudors. 56 Though 
the English always had a concept of limited royal authority, there is no 
evidence that in early times the idea of limits were supported by 
regular and legal institutions. Prior to the Magna Carta there was 
little likelihood that a house of commons existed at all; it certainly 
had no check that protected the people from royal tyranny. What checks 
there were on kings were far more dependent on conditions and the 
varying political and military abilities of the kings in their struggles 
with the barons. 57 
What had been irregular excercises in prerogative by the medieval 
kings, the Tudors were able to consolidate into a very strong authority 
by expanding their administrative and legal jurisdictions. Yet it was 
precisely because of the extension of the royal system of justice 
(though it was arbitrary) which provided the measure of peace and 
·uniformity that provide the conditions necessary for commerce. 58 In 
turn, the developing the commercial economy gave strength to the 
developing commercial class which had its representation in the Commons. 
In time, the commercial interests began to feel the need for freedom 
from arbitrary practices, especially in the granting of monopolies, and 
the spirit of liberty began to rise. 59 
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The Stuarts inherited the throne, and also they thought, the same 
prerogatives the Tudors had practiced. But they were foreigners, "less 
dreaded and less beloved" and did not perceive that political skill was 
60 
a large part of the Tudors' power. They also did not perceive that 
the ideological climate was changing. The Stuarts ruled when opinion of 
what the constituion should be was changing. Had they been politically 
astute and flexable, they could have given in on some points of their 
prerogative in order to save the rest, but they thought in absolute 
th th t . t 61 ra er an pragma 1c erms. Meanwhile, the old rules that the 
Stuarts were trying to live by were not serving the needs of a growing 
portion of the populace, and the clamor for change eventually became 
overpowering. 
The utmost that could be inferred is that the constitution 
of England was, at that time, an inconsistent fabric, whose 
jarring and discordant parts must soon destroy each other and 
from the dissolution of the old, beget some ng~ form of civil 
government, more uniform and more consistent. 
While the old rules were being rejected and the new ones not yet 
established, the Stuarts had neither the wit nor temperament to 
negotiate and compromise in the formation of a new constitution. 63 
Hume's characterization of the evolution of the constitution was not as 
the Whig historians had it, a continuous battle between good and evil, 
liberty and authority as absolutes. Instead it had the character of a 
dialectic of history, each age developing it's own equlibrium between 
liberty and authority, building up one or the other until it pushed to 
an extreme and began to swing the other way. 
During the century when the old constitution was declining, and a 
new one taking form, there was discordance and discontinuity in the way 
people understood their political experience. It is little wonder that 
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parties formed, the royal party devoted to the old way of thinking about 
authority, and the popular party advocating the new. Hume himself 
thought it would have been difficult at the time to decide which was 
right. The popular party had the opinion of right on their side, based 
on the ideology of liberty and an interest in freeing the restrictions 
on their form of worship and on commerce. The other side had the 
legitimacy of established practice in its favor. The only rule of 
government known in the past was present practice, which meant that at 
the time the royal party appeared more solid and legal. 
It was experience of the consequences that made it possible for Hume 
to look back and decide that the experience of the last one hundred 
years proved the arguments of the Whigs better founded. The libertarian 
movement, first of religion and then of civil government, though it was 
an innovation at first and its legitimacy therefore questionable, had 
been justified by subsequent events. The spirit of liberty, Hume felt, 
had done much to enlarge toleration and encourage humane sentiments 
without overstepping the limit of proper respect to monarchy, nobility 
and ancient institutions. 64 
The accession of William of Orange to the throne, though it 
generated much controversy at that time, had with the succession of 
three more princes acquired sufficient authority to be accepted as 
lawful. Long possession was Hume's first rule of lawful authority, and 
success in maintaining it for long enough time, conveyed legitimacy 
65 backward. Hume concluded that now the authority of present practice 
belonged to the constitution and Settlement and that fact should be 
accepted by all. Acquiescence to the present establishment and a sprit 
of coalition between the parties would be far better served if both 
66 
parties moderated the ways they represented events of the past. 
Hume's political science was directed at what he regarded as the 
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primary practical issue of his time, the need for a stable coalition in 
support of the mixed constitution to prevent further rebellion. The 
political essays, therefore, emphasized the role of the confrontation of 
principles and parties, more than economic and social factors. In the 
later economic essays (discussed in the next chapter) and the History 
economics joined political institutions as a powerful causative force in 
civilizing the mind. The need for order in a commercial society taught 
people to curb their excessive passion and live within limits, and 
thereby determining the direction that the flow of English history took. 
A scientific and dispassionate study of history, Hume thought, was 
the antidote to party polemics and the method for abstracting the true 
science of politics from the facts of human existence. He was much 
influenced by Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique, and 
continuously worked to establish empirical criteria for historical fact 
at a time when the usual standard was prophetic revelation and Biblical 
67 truth or party apology. He revised the History throughout his 
lifetime as new documents were made available (he applied for admission 
to the British Museum reading room, two months before it opened in 
1759). 68 He also recognized that his own assumptions were Whiggish as 
he reported in a letter while making revisions that he was trying to get 
past the "plaguy prejudices of Whlggism."69 This statement was usually 
taken to mean that that Hume had turned Tory. It is more likely that 
Hume was trying to recognize, examine, and objectify his own 
assumptions. 
Hume's effort to make a moderate and dispassionate critique of 
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political issues and party doctrine were not viewed by his critics as 
objective or scientific. The doctrinaire seemed to have little concept 
of a detached philosophical viewpoint above party. Though his critique 
was directed to both parties, it was the Whigs, whose ideology had 
attained the status of unquestioned orthodoxy, who complained the 
loudest that Hume had laid hands on their sacred cows. He was known for 
little else than his critique of Whig social contract theory. He was 
labeled a Tory skeptic and for over a century thereafter his political 
theory was dismissed on the automatic assumption that it was negative 
and destructive. 70 
Attempts to categorize Hume by party label are tricky and probably 
should be avoided. The exact meanings of Whig and Tory, court and 
country, were difficult to pin down, and shifted over time. Furthermore 
Hume made statements defending some and attacking other parts of each of 
these positions. His economic theory, for example, defended a 
commercial, free market economy which could make him seem "court" but 
then he was adamant in his opposition to public credit and also spoke of 
the virtue of a house, a bit of land and a family, which made him seem 
"country." In his History, he had a sympathetic understanding (if not 
always approving) of the motives of historical figures; It was an 
understanding based on his acceptance of the realities of passion and 
self-interest and the need to balance them with their opposites, reason 
and institutional authority. For those who took liberty to be an 
absolute value, any talk of limits seemed Tory. On the other hand, 
Hume's attitude toward ideas and events was wholeheartedly in favor of 
legally secured civil liberties, freedom of inquiry, limited regal 
authority and the Protestant Settlement. He said of himself, "With 
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regard to politics and the character of princes and great men I think I 
am very moderate. My views of things are more conformable to Whig 
. . 1 t. f t T . d · " 71 pr1nc1p es; my representa 1ons o persons o ory pre]u 1ces. 
He was temperamentally very conservative and one could wonder if 
there would be a modern constitution if Hume•s sort of moderation, 
respect for precedent, and distaste for violence had prevailed in the 
previous century. There is lacking in his version of the right of 
revolution, a good analysis of just why or when a person ceases to be a 
passive follower of precedent and decides actively to change the 
conditions that no longer suit needs. He made it purposely vague 
because too much sedition was as bad as too much repression, and in his 
time, he thought conditions had gone too far in the direction of liberty 
bordering on sedition. Yet he never advocated turning back, and he 
fully supported the liberties that had taken so much trouble to 
accomplish. 
What he wanted was equilibrium, the balance between freedom and 
order. In the particular decades in which he wrote, the victory of the 
Whig ideology of liberty meant that to achieve equilibrium, he thought, 
required leaning in the direction of order and authority. A century 
before or a century after, his principle of equilibrium might have led 
him to put more emphasis on reform. In any case, his attitudes of 
moderation and pragmatism were suited to the needs of his time, rather 
than to· the issues of the previous century, and the details of his 
political theory really must be studied in that context. 
Yet while the details of his theory are historically dependent on 
the political conditions of his day, the underlying principles he used 
for making political judgments, have an ability to generalize beyond 
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his particular moment in history. Processes that he saw underlying 
constant flow of events that exert a continuous effect are: the 
dualities of human nature, the formation and evolution of institutions 
based on the dialectic of liberty and authority, and the evolution of 
the mind through assimilation and adaptation of new ideas and facts 
guided by utility. Prime among the fixed points of his social science is 
the tendency of human reasoning to be based on the narrative order of 
experience in life (because the causal inference is based on past 
experience). The power of historical precedent over human minds has 
been demonstrated at every revolution which has sought to replace custom 
with rational schemes of perfection, and found it necessary to rewrite 
history (or try to eliminate it by eliminating those who remember). 
Even Jefferson, the spokesman for enlightened toleration, when the 
French Revolution and the Terror began to stimulate a conservative 
backlash, called for censorship of Hume's History at the University of 
Virginia. He sensed the ideals of the American Revolution were in 
danger and denounced the History for spreading "toryism" in the land. 
Jefferson's belief that history was to be used to inculcate salutary 
myths in people's minds was quite different from Hume's use of history 
as a methodology to find the general political principles that people 
72 
reason by. Hume wished to be a philosopher above party, advocating 
those social and natural sentiments that formed the "party of humankind" 
against vice and disorder. 
Hume 1 s Whig critics failed to understand that the pleas for 
objective criticism and moderation of dogmatic stands were meant to 
protect the consitution and settlement from further rebellion. The 
essays were written specifically in the context of the Jacobite 
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rebellion of 1745. The ideologies of both parties were out of date, 
still enmeshed in the previous century's religious, political and 
dynastic issues. Hume's message to his readers was to quit looking 
backward to some imagined time of perfection and instead face forward. 
Accept the present constitution as the best that exists anywhere. 73 The 
present realities of Britain's political and economic development needed 
moderation, toleration, a scientific and pragmatic outlook to deal with 
the modern world. 
An appreciation of Hume's philosophical detachment in writing about 
the politics and history of the seventeenth century did not develop 
until this century and the decline in the long dominant Whig paradigm. 
Mossner, in his 1941 rehabilitation of Hume as historian, emphasized the 
forward looking aspect of his economic essays and the theme of political 
evolution and economic progress in the History. These formed an apology 
for and the first history of the rise of modern capitalism, the 
foundation upon which Adam Smith later built his Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 74 Donald Forbes wrote Hume's 
Philosophical Politics, in 1975, one year short of the bicentennial of 
Hume's death. In it he defended the novel thesis that Hume's political 
science was moderate and progressive, which had not been noticed in all 
that time, despite Hume's many statements urging moderation of extremes, 
and dealing with present realities of political and economic change. 
Forbes characterized Hume's own political position as "scientific 
Whiggism" as contrasted with the doctrinaire Whiggism of party 
h t . 75 r e or1c. 
In a letter of February 1746 to his cousin Harry Home, he wrote that 
he was working on the essay "Of the Protestant Succession", "where I 
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treat that subject as coolly and indifferently as I would a dispute 
between Caesar and Pompey. The conclusion shows me a Whig, but a very 
skeptical one." 76 One of the problems of the casual reader is that Hume 
often uses the term skeptical. Those not familiar with his philosophy 
of mitigated skepticism seem to assume that he means it in the nihilist 
sense. Hume considered pure skepticism an impossibility; the human mind 
could not support an opinion so contrary to the consciousness of 
experience. What Hume advocated was a specialized, mitigated form of 
skepticism, that suspended belief while weighing the evidence. It was 
the method of science that proportioned belief to the evidence. 
Reasoning in this way discouraged dogmatic belief and encouraged 
moderation and toleration. When Hume called himself a skeptical Whig, 
he meant a scientific one.. In the following chapter the historical, 
dialectical, and evolutionary themes of Hume's empirical science of 
politics will be considered. 
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CHAPTER VI 
POLITICAL THEORY II:. THAT POLITICS MAY BE REDUCED 
TO A SCIENCE 
The Natural History of Government 
Nor is this reasoning merely chimerical; 1 
but is founded on history and experience. 
Hume aspired to a scientific description of the reality of politics 
as it is experienced by real people in ordinary life. His account of 
the origin of government was not based on philosophical constructs such 
as social contract and natural rights. Instead his description was in 
the form of a natural history of political consciousness. The history 
of human social organization was the product of continuous adjustments 
between the two extremes of human nature: self--interest and community-
mindedness. The two were continuously held in a dialectic tension, the 
synthesis of which was the social institution of a particular community 
at a given time. The forms of governmental institutions developed 
gradually as people learned which accommodations were useful by process 
of trial and error, assimilation and adaptation to changing conditions. 
The political history of England mirrored this process of institutional 
adaptation. It was the record of progressive development of the 
constitution from an irregular and inconsistent jumble of practices to 
the present one with legal definitions of rights and limits. Social. 
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intellectua,l and economic progress made the defects of the old 
constitution apparent and a more "more enlightened age" deemed a freer 
and more regular plan of government necessary to meet the needs of a 
rapidly changing commercial society. 
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With Hume the idea that humankind is biological and culture is 
developmental and subject to naturalistic explanations, became fully 
explicit and consistently applied. His explanation of human reasoning 
was no longer religious and metaphysical, but psychological. 3 Likewise 
his description of the origins of government did not deduce it from a 
metaphysically a priori natural law like Locke's. Hume's laws of nature 
in politics were induced from observations in actual experience, present 
and past. The moral standards underlying political conventions could 
not be known without knowing their history. The social scientist was a 
historian, whose principles were discovered in the narrative order, a 
product of an ever shifting dialectic tension between interests, 
institutions, and the climate of opinion. The History of England was 
expressly written to trace the evolution of English political 
institutions through the developing awareness of the principles of civic 
living. The Constitution was not an abstract legal structure, but a 
historical one, a product of the human mind adapting to new situations 
with new ways to meet its needs. 4 
The origins of government were so far back in time that they were 
beyond the reach of the historian. Yet there was comparative 
information available about the social systems of the American tribes so 
that it was possible to guess at a naturalistic explanation. The kind 
of natural history explanation offered by Montesquieu, Hume, Adam Smith 
and Adam Ferguson for the development of government was labeled by 
~46 
Dugald Stewart, a second generation Scottish philosopher. as 
"Theoretical or Conjectural History". This was a melding of 
philosophical history and philosophical sociology which extrapolated 
ideas of social and conceptual development from known cases. This kind 
of theoretical history of social development was the beginning of 
sociology, as Peter Gay emphasized. 5 
A device like a social contract is too sophisticated a concept for 
primitive humanity to have thought of, Hume wrote. Government began 
much more "casually and imperfectly. "6 The benef.i ts of social order had 
to be learned by the experience of many generations, maintained by habit 
and changed when change was useful. The idea of a social contract in 
Hurne's theory is at most a sort of fiction, a way of describing an 
interval between very primitive small groups and the first civil 
governments. 7 In fact, it isn't necessary at all. 
The real ~eason that government was instituted was uti] ity; jt 
served human needs. Individuals are full of needs and must cooperate 
with each other to fill them. 
Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society, from 
necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same 
creature, in his farther progress is, engaged to establish 
political society, in order to administer justice; without 
which there gan be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual 
intercourse. 
A look at American tribal societies suggested how government began. 
Tribal groups had social organization and concepts of justice even 
before their groups were large or rich enough to require as complex an 
institution as civil government. Central authority in the form of a 
chief probably began in time of war. Experience in the advangage of 
established authority could then be applied when increased possessions 
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and trade made it important to have an authority to maintain internal 
peHce and justice. This process took many generations to develop and 
only the increase of riches and the need for developing conventions for 
the peaceful settlement of property claims induced people to develop 
more complex social forms. 9 
It is the weakness of human nature that it may stray away fJ'om 
justice in pursuit of a self-interest that may be very frivolous or 
immediate. Therefore it is necessary to arrange society to make up for 
this shortcoming. Laws and magistrates are instituted to make people 
immediately sensible of the need to live by the rules of equity. Tims 
from justice arises a new obligation, obedience, as people discover the 
advangage of peaceful possession that social order brings. Once the 
habit of obedience is established, magistrates can coax or require 
individuals, who are often shortsighted about what their less immediate 
interests are, to cooperate on projects of benefit to the whole: 
Thus bridges are built; harbors open'd; ramparts rais'd; 
canals form'd; fleets equiped: and armies disciplin'd; every 
where, by the care of government, which, tho' compos'd of men 
subject to all human infirmities' becomes by one of the finest 
and most subtle inventions imaginable, a composition, 1&hat is, 
in some measure. exempted from all these infirmities. 
Dialectic and Synthesis: The Harmony of the Whole 
An empirical science of politics based on the realities of human 
nature must necessarily deal with paradoxes and diversity. Many issues 
of human knowledge a~e paradoxical, they contain within them two 
contrary principles, both conceivable in the mind and neither able to 
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destroy the other. Hume's clear grasp of philosoohical issues uncovered 
several such dialectical antithesE!S. He once wrote of himself, "My 
enemies, you know, and, I own, even sometimes my friends, have 
11 
reproached me with a love of paradoxes." The mind-body issue in the 
problem of knowledge is one such,. the one Livingson identified as the 
"grand dialectic" of the Treatise. Hume's synthesis was mind ~!_t~ body: 
the philosophic mind must necessarily have a grounding in common 
. . 12 
consciousness and exper1ence. This is the kind of synthesizing 
explanation that incorporates an unreducable duality into a both/and 
explanation rather than an either/or explanation which requires ignoring 
part of experience. 
A grand di.alectic may similarly be identified in Hume' s social 
philosophy: self/other, and the related liberty/authority. This 
dialectic lies as a substructure in every discussion of human nature. 
His discussion of marriage and divorce for example contains this 
passage: 
If it be true. on the one hand, that the heart of man 
naturally delights in liberty, ... it is also true on the 
other, that the heart of man naturally submits to necessity, 
and soon loses an inclination, when there appears an absolute 
impossibility of gratifying it. These principles of human 
nature, you'll say are y~ntradictory: But what is man but a 
heap of contradictions? ~ 
Contradictory principles, he continued, do not cancel each other 
out, but are always held in a kind of tension, one or another dominating 
as circumstances allow. The same theme of liberty versus authority in 
perpetual struggle is the heart of his theory of parties and the balance 
of the constitution. It also is a major theme in the History. English 
political consciousness, reflected in the constitutions of the various 
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ages, developed through the interplay between the desire for liberty and 
submission to authority, which rose and fell in a shifting balance that 
changed as circumstances changed. 14 
It is the interaction between prosocial versus antisocial human 
nature that produced social institutions from the beginning. "The 
common situation of society is a medium between these extremes". 15 
Government is a device to convince citizens to identify their private, 
short term interests with the common, long term good; it is an edifice 
of reason built on a foundation of human passion. The moderation of 
extremes and the creation of working coalitions such as he recommended 
for the parties, was more than a plea for political calm, it was his way 
of doing philosophy. The moderate compromise was the solution to 
antitheses that could not otherwise be reasoned away. It is also the 
only way a plural ·society of individuals each wanting self-determination 
can live together. 
How to form a stable government balancing republican liberty with 
monarchical authority was the political problem of the age in England. 
The received theory of republics made two mistakes. It took liberty to 
be an absolute, rather than relational quality derived from human nature 
and history. It also predicated the success of republican government on 
the utopian virtue of its citizens to give up their own interests for a 
perfectly homogenous public interest (c.f.Rousseau's General Will). The 
history of real republics, however, added to observed political behavior 
during the century of English constitutional turmoil, created a more 
pessimistic impression on some social philosophers. Much of the 
century's debate over virtue and corruption was the expression of 
anxiety, over how the darker side of human nature could be reconciled 
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with the wish for liberty and self-determination. 
The solution to this paradox was found in two concepts which were 
beginning to be be seen in the eighteenth century in the works of 
Montesquieu, Bernard Mandeville and Pope•s "Essay on Man". One was that 
it was possible to form a good government without presupposing perfect 
individuals. The second was that the method of counterpoise, the 
balance of competing interests, was the way to accomplish this. 16 Hume 
made use of the counterpoise of interest when he discussed the issue of 
whether Parliament has lost its independence. In judging forms of 
government where power is distributed, one must look at whether the 
division of power carefully balances the interest of each power-holding 
group. Hume argued that the the crown, which had lost much of its 
prerogative, needed to have some influence with Parliament to keep the 
balance. This influence could be called whatever one pleased, including 
corruption and dependence, but some degree of interdependence was 
essential to the everyday working of mixed government. Total 
independence was not possible. Parliamentary dependence was not in every 
degree an infringement on liberty. 17 
The counterbalance of opposites appeared in several forms in Hume•s 
theory of republics. He began the "Idea of the Perfect Commonwealth" 
with the contrast between change and continuity. The wise magistrate 
"will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age: and though he 
may attempt some improvements for the public good, yet will he adjust 
his innovations as much as possible to the ancient fabric. ,18 In 
planing a republic, it was necessary to expect that people will behave 
in a self interested way and devise a structure that will balance out 
the diversity of interest. His most startling assertion, contrary to 
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the classical theo~y. was that a large state will form a more stable 
republic than a small one, since there will be wider diversity of 
competing interests, thus making it more difficult for any one group to 
predominate. The ideal republic will be governed by Senators and 
magistrates filtered through several layers of assembly, (parish, county 
and district) each to elect from their number the representative to the 
next highes~. This distributed power widely and on several levels which 
worked to produce a more refined voice of the people and the necessity 
of compromise to produce a centering balance. 19 
All free governments must consist of two councils, a lesser and 
a greater; or, in other words a senate and people. If the 
people debate, all is confusion: If they do not debate, they 
can only resolve; and then the senate carves for them. Divide 
the people into many separate bodies; and then they may deb~be 
with safety, and every inconvenience seems to be prevented. 
Progress and Refinement in the Arts 
Half of each of the main dualities that Hume sought to unite into 
holistic explanations, mind/body and self/other, were considered by a 
largely Christian society to be morally inferior. The result was a 
tendency to repress and deny those stigmatized aspects of the sensory, 
self-interested body, and to emphasize ~ational and vi~tuous other-
mindedness. This was also true of another set of opposites, luxury 
versus auste~ity. Rapid comme~cial development was giving rise to 
public anxieties that revealed themselves in the debate over agrarian 
values (community-mindedness) versus commercial values (individualism) 
represented respectively in the country and court viewpoints. 
152 
The classical Italian model of statecraft, which was incorporated 
into Whig/Country political theory, held that luxury was the enemy of 
civil society, making the citizen too indolent to fight, too soft and 
selfish to work for the public good. That classical/Whig ethical 
corollary, the Protestant work ethic, contained within it a moral 
quandary and a dialectical process; the very virtues of industry and 
thrift that created good republican citizens also created the wealth and 
luxury that led to their destruction. The dread of corruption expressed 
so frequently in the eighteenth century contained an element of 
existential fear of individualism. Because the Country advocates 
thought that the morally autonomous citizen required a land-based 
society, they tended to see history as moving away from the virtue of 
agrarian independence toward the corruption of commerce which only 
heroic intervention could reverse. In its vocabulary of corruption and 
return to first principle (i.e. the ancient constitution), the language 
of the Country 'outlook was that of the Italian Civic Renaissance. 21 
Hume, then Adam Smith, Adam Furguson and others of the Scottish 
school, helped to bring the repressed passion of self interest, the 
sensory love of luxury and the need for commerce into consciousness and 
re-evaluate them in more positive terms. Instead of seeing economic 
growth in terms of an inevitable apocalypse of corruption and decay, 
they thought in terms of a dialectic. Societies are always in a process 
of progress or decay, always in transition, never in perfect balance. 
The Scots were not dismally apocalyptic, nor unrealistically utopian. 
They accepted duality and creative tension between reason and passion, 
authority and liberty, land and commerce, conservation and progress. 
These contradictions of a plural world could be made to accommodate each 
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other through social institutions. Though a final harmony could not be 
achieved, they thought in terms of progress. As the human mind gathered 
and assimilated more experiences, it got smarter at coping with its 
22 
needs. Progress in commerce, intellect and social institutions 
working interactively form the thesis of the economics essays, and are 
the main interpretive framework to the History of Eng)and. 23 
In the Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Morals, Hume first 
redefined luxury, to "regulate anew our moral as well as political 
sentiments." Any luxury was long thought to be a vice, a source of 
corruption, the cause of faction, civil war and the loss of liberty. 
Rather, he proposed, that luxury be regarded as a "refinement on the 
pleasures and conveniences of life." 24 
The effects of luxury and trade were improved material and 
psychological well-being. Commerce enlarged peoples' minds by giving 
them more objects, activities, and challenges to feed upon. Intellect, 
economy, and social institutions developed interactively, each one 
contributing to the progress of the others. This development is .the 
theme of the essays "Of Commerce" and "Of Refinement in the Arts", the 
first presenting a psychology of economic activity and the second a 
natural history of the progress of manufacturing and intellect. 25 
The move from hunting and gathering to agriculture and manufacturing 
allowed the creation of surplus goods which could be used either 
privately to make life easier or publicly to maintain a military 
society. "Here therefore seems to be a kind of opposition between the 
greatness of the state and the happiness of the subject". 26 The ancient 
republics of Sparta and Rome maintained an unusually high level of 
public spirit by maintaining a constant state of alarm through frequent 
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warfare. The public and military spirit of the classical age restricted 
commerce and luxury. What caused their decline was not the gradual 
slide into luxury and sloth, it was bad institutions. 27 Modern 
sovereigns would be hard pressed to require as much self denial as the 
classical republics did. Rather than trying to deny human nature, the 
modern sovereign authority or legislator would serve public needs better 
by following the "natural course" and harnessing self interest in a 
both/and sort of synthesis. "Industry, arts and trade increase the 
power of the sovereign and the happiness of the subjects" 28 
Hume explained his psychology and sociology of economic activity in 
this way: "Everything in the world is purchased by labor; and our 
passions are the only cause of labor". 29 Give people the means for 
satisfying their passion by allowing the manufacture of goods and the 
result will be, not only more goods, but also encouragement of habits of 
industry. In peacetime the produce of labor can go to consumer goods, 
and a portion can be taxed for the common defence. Manufacturing is a 
sort of storehouse of labor some of which may be diverted to the use of 
the state, without depriving the populace of necessities, which 
increases both the power of the state and allows material comforts to 
30 the people. 
The alternative to the commercial city is the military one, such as 
ancient Sparta, in which the citizens are so full of military zeal that 
they are willing to suffer great hardship for the public good. But to 
try to govern by principles that work against self-interested passion is 
too difficult to support for long. To force the laborer to work for the 
state for anything above subsistence is a "violent method," but "furnish 
him with manufactures and comodities, and he will do it of himself." 
Then the surplus can be taxed for public needs since the worker is 
1 d d d . th f t bl 1' . 31 a rea y rewar e Wl a more com or a e lVIng. 
Hume's solution to the guns or butter dichotomy is the moderate 
compromise, the synthesis. If a society allows a little avarice, it 
serves as an incentive to industry, and as by-product, the public 
benefits from the surpluses produced. "The harmony of the whole is 
still supported; and the natural bent of the mind being more complied 
with, individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the 
observance of these maxims."32 
This is not to say that a total absorbtion in gratification of the 
senses with luxury is fine. It is not. Such excess is a vice. But to 
eliminate all luxury in preference to austere living is to invite the 
opposite vice such as prevailed under the feudal system: sloth, 
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indifference and stupidity, which diminish industry. "Let us, therefore, 
rest contented with asserting, that two opposite vices in a state may be 
more advantageous that either of them alone; but let us never pronounce 
vice in itself advantageous." 33 
Hume's economic, just like his political principles, were inferred 
from the narrative line of European history. Just as the political 
essays formed an outline of the interpretations he made in the History, 
so do the economics essays. In the political essays, political 
institutions seemed to predominate as important factor in commercial 
development. In "The Rise of the Arts and Sciences", he proposed as a 
general principle that it is "impossible for the arts and sciences to 
arise at first, among any people unless that people enjoy the blessings 
of free government" because the rule of law is necessary to secure 
property, and intellectual freedom. 34 And similarly, in "Of Civil 
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Liberty" he states a rule that commerce flourishes best in a free 
35 government. In the economics essays, it was the rise of manufacturing 
and commerce that expanded minds, and stimulated the drive for civil 
liberty. Put all together in the History, it was an interaction of 
these processes that led to the development of British liberty. 
Political and social institutions, manners, learning, morality, 
commerce, arts and technology were each included as factors accounting 
for the improvement of English society. Economic change brought new 
social behaviors (industry, civility, curiosity) that caused further 
economic development while also transforming culture, morality and 
politics. Each progressive step built on the developments of the 
others. 
From the very beginning of Hume's analysis social order and economy 
were linked; justice developed when there were sufficient surpluses of 
goods to need protecting. 36 Brought to modern times it was England and 
Scotland's economic development that had created the conditions for the 
development of political liberalism. As the feudal economy declined, 
the commercial economy rose and gradually allowed a development of 
greater personal freedom and finally civil liberty. 37 Progress in the 
arts grew alongside the civil spirit of liberty. Increased wealth 
benefited peasant as well as aristocrat, and nurtured the development of 
a middle class, "who are the best and firmest basis of public 
liberty." 38 
The increase of manufacturing and commerce produces a refinement in 
the liberal arts "The spirit of an age affects all the arts ... The 
same age which produces great philosophers and politicians, renowned 
generals and poets usually abounds in skilful weavers and ship 
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39 
carpenters'' Commercial society creates an intellectual fermentation 
that affects all parts of society. The more the arts are refined, the 
more tempers and behavior are refined, as people learn to be more social 
and humane. The market for luxuries improved social morality by 
encouraging industry and middle class civility. Better, as Stockton put 
it, an industrious merchant than the idle retainer of a lord. 40 
Industry, knowledge and humanity are linked together" ... and ex-
perience shows us, are found in the more polished and luxurious ages." 41 
The economic interpretation in Hume's primarily political history 
was cited by his good friend Adam Smith in his primarily economic 
history, The Wealth of Nations. 
Mr. Hume is the only writer who, as far as I know, has 
hitherto taken notice [of the fact that] commerce and 
manufactures gradually introduced order and good gol~rnment and 
with them, the liberty and security of individuals. 
The similarity of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, to Hume's 
moral philosophy and his principles of political economy to Hume's 
essays is not surprising considering their long friendship. Smith 
stayed with Hume on his trips to Edinburgh; they corresponded and 
exchanged manuscripts. They were both influenced by Francis Hutcheson 
who was interested in economics and power (the Harrington thesis) and 
developed an early economic liberalism. It was he who first defined 
utility as the "greatest good for the greatest number." Adam Smith was 
his student at Glasgow University, and succeded him to his chair in 
moral philosophy. 43 
In 1776, when Hume's health was in its final decline, Smith sent 
him a copy of his about to be published Wealth of Nations. Hume 
returned it with,his compliments and added, 
If you were here at my Fireside, I should dispute some of your 
Principles. I cannot think, that the Rent of Farms makes any 
part of the Price of the Produce, but that the Price is 44 
determined altogether by the Quantity and the Demand ... 
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thus anticipating Ricardo's law of supply and demand. Smith was not the 
only one who found Hume's essays a take-off point for further 
development. Malthus cited Hume, Wallace, Price and Smith as 
contributors to the ideas in his theory of populations. Hume's essay "Of 
the Populousness of Ancient Nations" noted the tendency of humans to 
proliferate, which if it were not checked by scarcity and necessity, 
ld d bl th 1 t . t. 45 wou ou e e popu a 1on every genera 1on. 
Citations to Hume's economics essays are also found in Marx's Das 
Kapital. Hume's economic mechanism of moral and political development 
is vaguely reminiscent of the dialectic of history, though Marx 
completely missed the point of basing theory on human nature not 
ideology. Hume could have told him that there was as much chance for 
the perfectibility of socialist man as for the Saints of the 
protectorate. Furthermore, the whole concept of communal property, Hume 
had criticized on the grounds that it was contrary to human nature, and 
the historically developed conventions of justice and property. Such 
experiments would either fail in a short time or require tyrannical 
coercion to maintain. 
Neither did Home's philosophy of history have the air of a 
predetermined march of progress frequently found in the French 
Enlightenment and later in Hegel and Marx. Hume's historical causation 
is much more complex; the economic and social context is an important 
determining factor, but not the only one. There are also contingent 
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factors of chance and the freedom of individuals to act rationally or 
irrationally, morally or immorally. The characters of Hume's history 
act for conscious (and unconcious) reasons which the reader may compare 
with her own understanding of human nature and what would have been 
reasonable under the circumstances. Livingston calls this a moral cause 
explanation; it is an explanation that is understandable to other minds 
but not necessarily predictably determined. 46 
The issue of chance versus cause, (or liberty and necessity as 
discussed in the Inquiry) came up again in the essay, "Of the Rise and 
Progress of the Arts and Sciences''. The finding of cause in history 
depended a lot on the ingenuity (and subjectivity) of the scholar, but 
Hume thought a general rule could, nevertheless, be applied: "What 
depends on a few persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to 
chance, or secret and unknown causes: What arises from a great number, 
may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes."47 Thus, 
those causes which operate on many people are the larger, less easily 
changed effects of institutional structure than the delicate and 
accidental effects of personal fancy. Thus the "domestic and gradual 
revolutions of a state" are more subject to causal reasoning than 
particular actions of the will of single characters. 
The history of the English constitution was such a case of gradual 
revolution (i.e. evolution). Institutional development was a long 
process of adjustments to the gradually changing needs of society. Steps 
in the process were not made in order to fulfil some predetermined grand 
plan, but were made with no further plan than what suited present 
convenience. Each decision made, however, was based learned experience, 
the assimilation and adaptation to years of trial and error learning. 
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Decisions based on utility formed a sort of "invisible hand" or a 
"natural selection" that determined the course of social, intellectual 
and institutional development. Hume used neither of these terms, but 
they show the direction that others took using the concept of utility. 
It is only afterward that the historian sees the direction that many 
small decisions were taking, for example in England, toward greater 
personal and civil liberty. In the History, Hume saw both the 
Protestant Reformation and the Puritan struggles to limit the powers of 
the king as important steps in developing civil liberties. But the long-
term consequences in the development of individual liberties and 
toleration were not foreseen nor intended at the time. The participants 
in those great events had no further thought than their immediate need 
to have their own forms of worship and church administration accepted. 
This slow, and largely unconscious evolution of a concept such as 
liberty gives the historian, looking backward, a fated sense of 
perception, as though this progress were inevitable. But history can 
also teach us to be judicious, Hume concluded, as he finished the 
writing of his long inquiry into the origins of English liberty. It 
teaches us what a "great mixture of accident which commonly concurs with 
a small ingredient of wisdom and foresight, in erecting the complicated 
48 fabric of the most perfect government." 
After Hume, British social theorists dropped social contract theory, 
and replaced it with utility as the foundation of government and the 
h . d 1 . . t t . 1 t. 49 mec an1sm un er y1ng 1 s con 1nuous eva u 1on. Utility had been 
associated with science as early as Bacon, Descartes and Locke, all of 
whom justified science on the basis of its usefulness to humanity. 
Progress and science were to. the Enlightenment the learning of ever 
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better ways of living. Soon there developed a school of thought that 
self-consciously applied utility as a criterion for judging social 
institutions and proposing reforms. Jeremy Bentham, who cited Hume as 
his inspiration, systematized utilitarian thought in England. 50 But the 
Utilitarians carried their program of democratic reform and calculations 
of the pleasure or pain of individuals to lengths that would have made 
Hume uncomfortable. Hume saw utility behind a mostly unconscious 
process operating in history, but consciously to carry it forward as a 
reform program was fraught with dangerous unintended consequences. Not 
that Hume was opposed to reforms, but that he thought that they happened 
more by gradual evolution than by rational plan. Neither did Hume 
think, as Bentham and Mill did, that the good of society was the sum of 
the pleasures of individuals; rather he felt that individuals gradually 
learned that a consideration for the good of the whole created the 
stability that made the enjoyment of their individual goods possible. 51 
The utilitarian social thought closer to Hume was better represented 
by Edmund Burke. This was the more conservative strain, which Goban 
described as "historical utilitarianism" and which was more in keeping 
with Hume's cautious temperament. Historical utility may be inferred 
from the long survival of an institution. Absolute monarchy had 
outlived its utility, and was changed, but the fact that monarchy lived 
on was proof that it had an emotional utility as well (based on the 
comfortable predictability of habit), a use that is not easily uncovered 
by rational inquiry. 52 Burke observed in the French Revolution all of 
the horrors that Hume had described in the English Civil War period: the 
dissolution of government, the breakdown of social morality, the reign 
of terror, the unsuccessful attempt to establish a republic of virtue 
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and finally the military coup. And he concluded, like Hume, that the 
popular opinion of legitimacy is deeply rooted in precedent and 
tradition. 
Where Burke parted company with Hume was over the latter's secular 
attitude. Burke reported to Boswell that he spoke to the infidel Hume 
. 53 
only to be polite. Burke felt that tradition represented God's 
"divine tactic", and that to try to make society rational was to 
interfere with Providence. Hume limited himself to the observation that 
custom is the great guide of humankind and that rational schemes of 
perfection were not likely to work out as expected. 
Exactly what Hume's influence was on the developing liberal and 
conservative lines of thought seems to be as problematic as the 
question whether he was a Whig or a Tory. He doesn't fit neatly into 
either category. From his point of view on the philosophic high ground 
he called their good and bad points as he saw them. His inquiries into 
causation, reason, moral judgement and the foundations of government, 
worked to undermine the rationalist base of Whig contract theory, 
(liberal ideology), by pointing out the fact of human passion and the 
authority of habit and tradition. Yet he resembled the developing 
liberal theory in its respect for liberty, property and the free 
market. The utilitarians who followed in the liberal line openly cited 
his influence though they carried the call for an active and rational 
program of reform further than he would have. 
On the other hand, Hume resembled the developing conservative 
attitude in its sense of community, respect for custom and distrust of 
reason. But they were uncomfortable with his religious skepticism and 
kept their borrowings from him quiet. In the wake of the French 
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Revolution, they carried custom and sentiment to a romantic extreme that 
left little room for reason, which llumc would have thought also went too 
f . h t' d. . . 54 ar 1n t e o ner 1rec~1on. 
That both lines of thought found useful ideas in Burne's philosophy 
demonstrated the success of his middle way, where he was certain that 
truth could be found. Reason and passion, authority and liberty, self 
and other; the unity that we long for is to be found in accepting that 
diversity exists, and may be held in a creative tension. The resulting 
synthesis incorporates the best points of both ways of thinking, the 
both/and solution. Britain eventually worked out the conventions of 
party government in a limited monarchy and the concept of a loyal 
opposition. The working coalition of parties that Hume had called for. 
divided on issues, but agreeing that disagreement is acceptable under 
the constitution, gradually came about in the century that followect. 55 
Moderation and the American Constitution 
In America the same issues that motivated the court and country 
debates in England, land versus commerce, authority versus liberty, self 
versus community interest, took a different course since there was no 
long established court to counterbalance the predominantly republican 
climate of opinion. In America the main issue was which vision of 
republican society should be pursued: the Lockean idealized version of 
liberty, as represented by Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence 
and the Whig paradigm, or in the moderate version represented by the 
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Constitution and the Federalist Papers. The authoritarian extreme of a 
monarch or very strong executive had fewer adherents and their more 
extreme points were moderated by compromise in the Constitutional 
debates. That the American Constitution, which represented the moderate 
synthesis between liberty and authority, was eventually accepted as the 
pattern for the American republic was the greatest monument to Scottish 
common sense social philosophy in general and Hume's in particular. 
When Hume was asked to write an appeal for tighter control of the 
American colonies in 1775, he refused, replying, " ... I am an American 
in my principles, and wish we would let them alone to govern or 
misgovern themselves as they think proper .. 
,56 He knew one American 
personally. Benjamin Franklin met with him and was a guest in Hume's 
home on several of his diplomatic tours to Briiain. 57 Their contact 
seemed to have been mutually beneficial. Hume hoped to have Franklin's 
help getting his work published in America where he hoped it would be 
better received than it was in England. Franklin had Hume's help 
getting his paper on lightning rods accepted by the Philosophical 
Society of Edinburgh and found political inspiration in their 
discussions. The two articles that Franklin proposed in the 
Constitutional convention of 1787 were both inspired by Hume's essay on 
58 
the perfect commonwealth. 
Gordon Wood, in The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 
described a sense of crisis as American political thinkers met to rework 
the Articles of Confederation in order to correct the difficulties that 
the early republican experiments had exposed. The problem was that 
these early attempts to found republics based on the ideologies of 
Lockean liberty and the classical republics of virtue pointed up how 
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unrealistic the ideologies were, just as Hume had said. The rhetoric of 
the American revolution was heavily Influenced both by Locke and natural 
rights as well as the Whig version of classical republican thought. In 
simplest terms this outlook equated king, executive power, commercial 
wealth and corruption on one side and the People, liberty and agrarian 
virtue on the other. After the revolution, when the king and corruption 
were overthrown, the expectation was, according to this view, that 
republican government would itself become an instrument of reforming 
human nature. The ideology held that virtuous citizens would know their 
common Good, who their natural leaders were, and would turn from trade, 
luxury and individualism to agriculture, frugality, and community-
interest. When this utopian vision failed to materialize, the 
discrepancy between the ideology and the reality forced the founders to 
rethink their theories of government. 
Hume's last essay, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth", seemed to be 
written for the Americans, though it had been published in the 1750's. 
He offered it circumspectly as an intellectual exercise. There was no 
talk about razing anything to the ground since "the common botched and 
inaccurate governments seem to serve the purposes of society". Who 
knows, "but, In some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of 
reducing the theory to practice, ... by the combination of men to form 
a new [government], in some distant part of the world?" The first 
constraining factor in divising a republican constitution was human 
nature. "All plans of government, which suppose a great reformation in 
the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary." 59 Hume's solution was 
to accept selfish human nature as a legitimate reality but also to 
build an institutional structure which would mediate its extremes. 
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Liberty is desirable, but must have limits. The substance of the essay, 
which was discussed earlier, dealt with self interested human nature by 
counterbalancing interests over a large territory and and dividing power 
into several levels of assembly. 
Hume was standard reading at late colonial American colleges, as 
were Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Lord Kames (Hume's cousin Har:ry 
Home) and Adam Ferguson. Their ideas as much as Locke informed the 
political thinking of the educated. James Madison in particular made 
insightful and creative use of Scottish thought, especially Hume's, in 
the Constitutional debates and in his contributions to The Federalist 
Papers. Historian Douglas Adair found a "parallel march of ideas" and a 
similarity of phrasing between Madison's writing in The Federalist and 
Hume's political essays. For example, Hume's critique of natural law: 
if men had so inflexible a regard for justice that they never touched 
the property of others, they would always have remained absolutely free 
with no political society, 60 became in Madison's Federalist 51 the 
elegant phrase, "If men were angels, no government would be necessary." 
Federalist 10 was particularly close to Hume's essays on parties and the 
"Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth." 61 
Another contributor to the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, 
found useful ideas in Hume's essays. Hamilton was the major proponenet 
of a commercial America and a strong executive, which fit well with 
Hume, though Hume was more distrustful of public credit. The closing 
page of the last Federalist, number 85, Hamilton answered citicism about 
ratifying the Constitution before it had the Bill of Rights amended to 
it with a quotation from Hume's essay "The Rise of the Arts and 
Sciences" to the effect that a constitution is never completely final. 
To balance a large state or society. whether monarchical or 
republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty 
that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the 
mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The 
judgements of many must unite in the work; experience must 
guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the 
feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistake~ which tg2Y 
inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments. 
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This century's historiographical debate on the issue of why the framers 
of the Constitution made the national government stronger and less 
purely democratic has gone through several phases of explanation. Most 
of them are predicated on the idea that the framers were an elite who 
shared in traditional hierarchical assumptions of the landed gentry and 
that the elite were less self-interested than the raucus rabble in the 
legislatures and therefore, more fit to govern in the community 
interest. This view holds the Constitution to be a victory of an elite 
over popular democracy. It also partakes of the same ideological 
mindset that assumes that if only an obstructive elite authority were 
out of the way, the people would have the liberty to govern their 
republic with thought only to the public interest. It is an assumption 
that Hume and Gordon Wood would say has been disproven by experience. 
While the attitudes of the founders, and even Hume, surely were 
shaped by pervasive elitist assumptions, the real strength of the 
Constitution was that it divided and limited all powers, on the 
assumption that everybody was subject to self interest, and that the 
interests of all classes and regions had a legitimate place in "the 
harmony of the whole". The carefully balanced institution, not the 
virtue of individuals or classes, was primary in Hume's political 
theory. The institutional balance of all interests was the cornerstone 
of his commonwealth. There was no mention that an elite was more fit to 
govern, nor is fitness to govern even a criterion. On the contrary he 
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observed that while democracies are more turbulent, aristocracies, 
though more peaceful, are also more oppressive. 63 Free governments, he 
thought must have two councils, a senate and the people. He would have 
the senate elected by "men of fortune and education", but balanced them 
by giving them "small power" and making their judgements subject to a 
court of competitors, a sort of watchdog agency over accounts and with 
. h t 64 1mpeac men powers. The common people, he thought, were good enough 
judges of their local representatives, but thought them not suitable to 
judge of candidates for high office because "their ignorance gives the 
grandees an opportunity of decieving them", hardly an idealized view of 
65 the gentry. 
In an earlier essay, Hume had more to say that cast doubt on the 
idea that eighteenth century political thought had as a primary 
assumption that elites were more suited to ruling in the public 
interest. He wrote that it was an establisted political axiom that in 
creating the "checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought 
to be supposed a knave," that is to have private interest as a primary 
purpose. To this Hume observed that men are more likely to be honest in 
their private than in their public life. "Honour is a great check upon 
mankind: But where a considerable body of men act together, this check 
is, in a great measure, removed." Because the majority interest will 
always prevail, the whole senate always "acts as if it contained not one 
member, who had any regard to public interest and liberty. "66 · 
The Federalist theory of republics, like Hume's, is predicated on 
the idea that self-seeking individuals can work for the public good, by 
structuring the constitution of government so that the many competing 
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interests balance. The Constitution is not the idealist document of 
Whig historians, nor the elitist conspiracy of the Progressive 
historians. It is a document based on a realistic human psychology 
which assumes that everyone is self interested, but that reason and 
experience can in the process of time devise institutions that moderate 
the extremes of human nature. That concept is the Constitution's 
foundational strength. The Constitution of the United States is also 
the empirical confirmation of Hume's science of politics. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: SCIENCE AND HISTORY TWO HUNDRED YEARS AFTER HIJME: 
A PARADIGM'S PROGRESS 
Adam Smith in a letter to the publisher William Strahan wrote about 
his last conversation with David Hume. As Hume lay dying he amused 
himself with excuses he might give Charon, the ferryman of mythology who 
delivered the souls of the dead across the River Styx, why he should 
delay his journey a while: 
Have a 1 i ttle pa·ti ence good Charon; I have been endeavoring 
to open the eyes of the Public. If I live a few years longer, 
I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of 
the prevailing systems of superstition. But Charon would then 
lose all temper and decency. You loitering rogue, that will 
not happen these many hundred years. 
Hume certainly understood that it would take a long time to 
accomplish the revolution in thinking requisite for understanding his 
philosophy. He had redefined human rationality to include not only 
formal reasoning but also informal reasoning founded on passion and 
heavily influenced by habit and experience. "Habits, more than reason, 
we find to be the governing principle of mankind", 2 he wrote in his 
History to explain why neither king nor parliament had the vision to 
change their habits to fit present needs during the conflicts of the 
first two Stuart reigns. He did not mean, however, that people cannot 
learn better ways of coping with problems. Instead he meant that such 
changes will not take place because of an intentJonal application of 
Reason, the hoped for panacea of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centu~ies. Changing habits of thinking a~e not accomplished by a sudden 
coup but by a g~adual and complex p~ocess of largely unconscious 
adaptation to the changing social and economic environment. The 
expansion of the human intellect, the evolution of social institutions 
and the development of the economy are all inter~elated in Hume's 
analysis of social change in his natural history of society. 
Developmental p~ocess, learning by acc~etion, and adaption based on 
utility, is a main theme that runs through Hume's epistemology, moral 
philosophy, his political and economic essays and all through The 
History of England. Hume's philosophy was not built on the idea of 
sudden revolutions of thinking. 
Neither did the public reception of Hume's philosophy encourage him 
to hope for a quick acceptance of his way of looking at human knowledge 
and institutions. The first reaction to the Treatise, published in 1739 
and 1740, was no reaction at all. As Hume w~ote in "My Own Life", "It 
fell deadborn from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even 
to excite a murmur among the zealots." 3 The reaction built slowly. The 
Treatise was unlikely to have a wide readership, but it was read among 
some opinion leaders -- academics and clerics who mostly missed its 
point. Its reputation, however, gradually spread mostly through 
denunciations of the skepticism it was held to advocate. 
For those who hoped that reason and science would guarantee the 
ultimate truths of the revealed religion, Hume's contention that belief 
in cause-effect is psychological, not rationally provable as "real", was 
intolerable. Thei~ aim was to disprove him which proved impossible, o~ 
at least to discredit him as a godless, nihilistic skeptic. The 
disquiet Hume caused the philosophical community was reflected in two 
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klnds of response. One was a serious effort to build a philosophy that 
would resolve the difficulty as Thomas Reid and later Kant tried to do. 
The more difficult this proved to be, the more emotional grew the 
appeals to prejudice and character assassination, most prominently, 
Beattie's Essay on Truth. William Warburton, a contemporary clergyman 
wrote to Hume's publisher, "there are vices of the mind as well as of 
the body; and I think a wickeder mind, and more obstinantly bent on 
public mischief I never knew." 4 Two centuries of writings about Hume 
were filled with both approaches but until the mid-twentieth century, 
the latter predominated. Appealing as his critics did to the popular 
prejudice, they sold far more widely. Hume's philosophy was so little 
read that it was his detractors who established his reputation. 
Adam Smith felt the sting of the public outrage when at Hume's death 
in 1776, he wrote an account of his last days containing praise of his 
character, which appeared with Hume's "My Own Life" in later editions of 
the Essays. Ten years later Smith was still upset by the reaction. "A 
single, and as I thought, a very harmless sheet of paper, which I 
happened to write concerning the death of our late friend, Mr. Hume, 
brought upon me ten times more abuse than the very violent attack I had 
made upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain."5 
It is no exaggeration to say that the one common thread of the 
Scottish philosophy was that its subject matter was Hume. Writers of 
this school were constantly quoting, interpreting and criticizing Hume, 
especially for his "skepticism". 6 While decrying Hume, the Scots 
incorporated many aspects of his philosophy: that excessive skepticism 
is "corrected by-common sense and reflection"7 , that mental experience 
8 
constitutes empirical fact , that mind makes inferences instinctively, 
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9 prior to reason, and based on experience and that facts of our mental 
experience combine to form complex ideas not randomly but through rules 
of association (resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and cause-
10 
effect). So that while statements about Hume from the mid eighteenth 
century through the nineteenth were mostly negative of the nihilist 
skeptic sort, the main lines of his philosophy lived on in their work. 
The work of Hume, especially the politics and History, and the 
others of the Scottish Enlightenment, was, furthermore, widely 
disseminated in colleges and seminaries in England and America. In 
America Hume's reputation was split in the same way it was at home. He 
was regularly decried from the pulpit, but his political and economic 
theories were were cited and discussed so that his influence was 
considerable even though his reputation wasn't. 
The Scottish philosophers, using Hume's principles of association 
and introspective approach, laid down the beginnings of modern 
psychology as an empirical science 11 , as well as adding refinements to 
H I • • 1 th • d • 1 12 ume s emp1r1ca eory, econom1cs an soc1o ogy. In 1838, Sir 
William Hamilton, one of the schools later philosophers, wrote that: 
Hume ... is author, in a sort, of all our subsequent 
philosophy. For out of Reid and Kant, mediately or immediately, 
all our subsequent philosophy is evolved; and the doctrines of 
Kant and Reid are both. . . attempts to find for philosophy 
deeper fourgations than those which he had so thoroughly 
subverted. 
Hume's great legacy has indeed been his never-surpassed analysis of 
empirical knowledge, but his legacy to science (like his legacy to 
social philosophy) took two different paths. Hamilton identified the 
two directions with two names, Reid and Kant. It would also be possible 
to identify them broadly as British and German, representing respective-
ly the phenomenalist (passive mind) and transcendental-critical (active 
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mind) approaches to knowledge. [Though it should be noted that Reid and 
the early Scottish school thought in terms of the common sense of an 
active mind. After Hartley British psychology took an increasingly 
physiological and mechanistic, passive emphasis] This paper has defended 
the thesis that Hume's philosophy of science is most meaningful from the 
Kantian perspective in which the phenomena of experience are given their 
order and meaning by the structuring mind which operates by informal 
rules in passional and historical contexts. So that while the phenomena 
of experience and the formal rules of mathematics and logic are 
important parts of human knowledge, knowledge is not reducable to either 
of those. The constructing mind actively creates order and intelligi-
bility in the ceaseless flow of events. Such order, though subjectively 
experienced, is also objectified in the public world of language, 
literature, education, discussion, professional societies, etc. where 
the conventions of the theoretical explanations, whether scientific, 
political or historical, are continually polished and adjusted in a 
dialectical process. But for a very long time it was only the Germans 
who read Hume in this light. The Anglo-American tradition, having its 
roots in Locke and Newton, long tried to interpret Hume, either 
approvingly or disapprovingly. as a strict phenomenalist. 
By the time John Stuart Mill wrote A System of Logic (1843), nine-
teenth century Britain's great empirical theory, British thought had 
moved progressively, through David Hartley and Thomas Brown, in the 
direction of a science that reduced knowledge solely to the material, 
and mechanical sensation of phenomena. Mill was educated by his father 
in the Scottish philosophy, and published a review at the age of 
eighteen which included this assessment of Hume. 
Hume possessed powers of a very high order; but regard for 
truth formed no part of his character. He reasoned with 
surprising acuteness, but the object of his reasonings ffS not 
to obtain truth, but to show that it was unobtainable." 
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This statement has been quoted by several contemporary authors as an 
indication of the nineteenth century's perception of Hume. It was 
certainly true of the common perception, but Mill himself changed his 
mind. By the time he began to formulate his great exposition of 
empirical theory, he concluded that his father's reasoning was too 
rational/deductive. 15 In A System of Logic, Mill built on Hume's 
empirical foundation 16 with its subsequent Scottish refinements, 
especially Thomas Brown's statement of cause as invariable sequence 
(which had its roots in Hume). 17 
But British empirical thought had become increasingly materialist in 
that it shared the Newtonian and naive assumption that in science the 
hypothesis or meaning of the facts was a function of the phenomena and 
not of the mind. Mill. for example, engaged in a debate with William 
Whewell, a follower of Kant, on the question of whether Kepler had 
formulated the hypothesis of elliptical planetary orbits before he "saw" 
it in the data or not. Whewell and Kant maintained that the mind forms 
the hypothesis first, and looks for confirmation second. 18 Current 
philosophies of science concur with the hypothesis-first conception as 
being more consistent with what scientists actually do as opposed to 
what classical inductive theory calls for. 
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were optimistic about 
science in the same way that the seventeenth had been naively optimistic 
about reason. Encouraged by the many and useful discoveries which made 
life easier and conveyed a sense of progress, scientists were optimistic 
that their theories explained, or were on the verge of explaining all 
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reality. But philosophers had a more difficult time pinning down a 
theory of science that explained what it was that scientists were doing. 
This was especially true the farther removed science got from actual 
observation. 
Por over two centuries, Newtonian mechanics based in physics and 
mathematics was the supreme paradigm for science. Even social science 
strove for results as rigorous and deterministic as physical laws, with 
results not nearly so satisfyingly regular and predictable, as Hume and 
many others have since discovered. One of the reasons that Hume 
disturbed the scientific community was his readiness to point out the 
weaknesses of his own attempted science of man, and by extension, other 
science as well. The more science emphasised knowledge as reduction to 
phenomena, the more unsatisfactory Hume and his structuring mind 
seemed. David Fate Norton, for example, writing from the perspective of 
the scientific historians pronounced Hume's Newtonian program a failure 
because his science of history contained an unsatisfactory element of 
b . t• "t 19 su )ec lVl y. Subsequent developments in physics suggest, however, 
that it was the Newtonian and Lockean paradigms that were faulty and 
that Hume had pointed the way beyond them to a more inclusive empiricism 
precisely by his belief in the active structuring mind. 
Meanwhile by this century, new things happened in the theory of 
science which began to shake faith in those two pillars of objective and 
certain truth, Newtonian physics and mathematics. Modern, post-
relativity physics, exploring a theoretical world of quantums, quarks, 
etc. has stayed far from Newton's rules of induction from the data and 
toward imaginative hypotheses. Einstein, for instance, cited Hume as an 
inspiration in his break-through thinking on the relative rather than 
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absolute character of time. 20 
Newtonian mechanics, the most deterministic of the models for 
physics, now has two new rivals that are less deterministic. The more 
recent is called deterministic chaos after a book of the same name 
written by Heinz Georg Schuster. 21 According to this model, many 
complex systems, such as physiological, chemical, laser (and certainly 
human psychological and cultural ones, though not mentioned in the book) 
are determined in a chaotic way, that is their behavior forms complex 
patterns. Small changes in the initial conditions lead to small changes 
in outcome. That is in many repetitions over time, what appears to be 
chaotic is actually determined by the small variations in conditions. 
But predicting what comes next in the pattern is not possible unless the 
observer knows exactly which conditions predominate at a given point and 
where in the pattern the observation has taken place. 
The great rival in this century, however, is quantum theory in which 
light has two fundamentally opposite characters both a wave and a 
particle. This is especially interesting in light of Hume's both/and 
strategy for explaining opposites which both seem true. Quantum theory 
has two correlaries which also have interesting implications for 
knowledge in general. One is the uncertainty principle in which there 
is an intrinsic physical limit to how much can be known because to gain 
information along one dimension is to loose it in the other. The other 
is the role of the observer, in which the observer's choice of what to 
look at affects what he/she sees. 
In these developments, one can look back to Hume and see that his 
reservations about inductive science as an ultimate answer, made by 
simply observing the workings of his own mind, seem to forshadow the 
decline of Newtonian paradigm. At the close of his History, he 
described some of the important people at the time of the Glorious 
Revolution. Of Newton, he wrote, 
In Newton, this island may boast of having produced the 
greatest and rarest genious that ever rose for the ornament and 
instruction of the species ... While Newton seemed to draw off 
the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he showed at the 
same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and 
thereby restored her ultimate secrets to ~~at obscurity in 
which they ever did and ever will remain. 
Mathematics has experienced a similar shake-up since the discovery 
that there are other logically consistent geometries than Euclid's. 
From the time of the Greeks Euclid's geometry had reigned as the 
foundation of metaphysical, timeless and nonmaterial philosophy, the 
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bedrock of the concept "eternal truth". After the shocking discovery of 
other geometries, there followed a search for some other absolute 
foundation for mathematics. Bertrand Russell's Principia Mathematica, 
and others attempted to find formal rules of mathematics, based not on 
whether a proposition was true or not, but whether its terms were 
consistent and contradiction free, (i.e.logical, a new rationalism). 
Mathematical Formalism, like logical atomism, attempted to express 
itself in formal symbolic statements which could be mechanically 
proven. This proved to be an unattainable ideal (as is was for logical 
atomism in language), which did not correspond to how mathemeticians 
actually proceed. Instead, the creative frontiers of mathematics have 
been expanded through creative hypothesizing, guesswork, and intuitions 
just as it has in other fields of knowledge. 
One recently published answer to the question of whether mathematics 
corresponds to an objective reality proposed that Euclidian geometry 
exists, but neither in the Platonic nor material sense. It exists in 
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the same way that Homer's Illiad exists in our common historical and 
cultural inheritance. Mathematics is a part of our consciousness and 
our accumulated knowledge and thus is one of the humanities. The 
mathematician (like the physicist, psychologist or historian) creates 
the object of study which, like other human studies is neither 
infallible nor inviolable, but is both correctible and meaningful in the 
common culture. 23 This view turns the traditional view of mathematics 
as eternal truth on its head and makes it a dialectical and historical 
science as well. No wonder Carl Becker could say of the modern paradigm 
of knowledge that we no longer ask what something is in itself, but only 
how it developed. 
Hume's revolutionary concept of a science of man (which was bedrock 
to all knowledge because everything humans can know is "judged of by 
[human) powers and faculties"), 24 founded on a paradigm of human 
psychology and history appears to have been gradually confirmed in the 
theoretical physics of this century. But less so in the social sciences 
which still seem to be striving for the Newtonian mechanical-determinist 
ideal. Just as the Newtonian inductive revolution came more slowly to 
the social sciences in the eighteenth, the new theoretical developments 
in physics have come more slowly to the social sciences in this 
century. Psychology, for example, labored through the middle years of 
this century to establish behaviorism on a rigorous material model 
which reduced human learning to a mechanical reflex to the stimuli of 
phenomena, in which mind, thought, attitude and other non-material 
concepts were eliminated altogether. Strict behaviorism however was so 
unsatisfactory as a total explanation of mental life that it has largely 
been replaced with cognitive psychology which explains more but at the 
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cost of modifying rigid determinism. 
History, which has striven for empirical objectivity since the 
Enlightenment, has never entirely agreed on a model. One model has been 
what R.G. Collingwood called the Covering Reason approach, the 
historicist concept of verstehen , or intelligibility in history (very 
similar to Hume's). But generally American historiography has aimed at 
the British ideal of deterministic, mechanical laws, the Covering Law 
approach. In history, the economic-material model as sole causative 
mechanism seems to be declining in favor of more inclusive and elusive 
ideational motivations for human action, just like behaviorism has given 
way to cognitive learning theory. 
The shift is expressed by Lawrence Stone in a historiographical 
essay, "The Revival of Narrative". 25 In it he describes the various 
phases that the search for scientific history has taken: (1) the early 
scientific Marxist model; (2) the Annales school which tended to 
emphasise geography and economic data as the independent variables that 
matter (though there were exceptions like Le Febre who was interested in 
mentalit ); (3) the American "cliometricians" who try to run the 
universe through a computer and use abstruse methodologies which they 
can't agree on, nobody else understands, and can't be replicated. Stone 
sees a trend away from such single variable attempts to base historical 
inquiry exclusively on the model of the physical sciences, with its 
tendency to insist on quantification and mathematical models; and a 
trend toward narrative history which certainly uses the results of the 
geographer and economist quantifiers but sets them into a narrative 
context which also pays attention to the part that ideas, values and 
customs plays on the course of events. 
LeRoy Ladurie's often quoted statement, "history that is not 
quantifiable cannot claim to be scientific" reveals the limits of the 
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paradigm of physics for the study of human beings. Stone contrasts the 
two paradigms as to what is the central subject of history in this way: 
Le Roy Ladurie entitled a section of his essays "History Without People" 
to symbolize the attempt to bypass the chaos of particulars by looking 
at the long term, more deterministic influences of geography and 
economic conditions; whereas 50 years earlier Lucien Febvre wrote "my 
quarry is man" symbolizing the ideological approach to history. 26 
In order to pattern itself after physics ''scientific" history has 
needed to try to eliminate variablility and irrationality in human 
action, or at least make it predictably determined by economics or 
geography. It also has had to detach history from the flow of events to 
make it timeless. Attempts to make history fit the model of physics 
have been artificial and generally correspond to the formalist fallacies 
in logic and mathematics in which the ideal is not what the 
practitioners actually do. Attempts to make history highly 
deterministic lead to an unfortunate split between the structural 
variables and the social and intellectual which are independent 
variables themselves but harder to quantify. Stone thinks that the 
ideal is a two-way interaction between these variables, not a one-way 
hierarchy. All should be woven together into a single web, in other 
words, another manifestation of a both/and solution. Historians, Stone 
concluded, "are therefore forced back upon the principle of 
indeterminacy, a recognition that the variables are so numerous that at 
best only middle-range generalizations are possible .. "27 It is the 
same conclusion that Hume came to when he concluded that human action 
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was neithe~ enti~ely chaotic no~ enti~ely dete~mined. but a little of 
both. It is also why the deterministic chaos model of science has such 
inte~esting implications to social science. David Hume whose announced 
intention was to introduce empirical analysis which was mind and time 
dependent into the science of man, and who sought to find his p~inciples 
and verify them in The History of England, would have agreed with Febvre 
that his qua~y was to unde~stand the complexity of humanity mo~e than it 
was to force it into an overly restrictive scientific model. 
That it took nea~ly two hundred years for Hume's philosophy to be 
read in more receptive light is partly that it created so uncomfortable 
a dissonance with received opinion, eithe~ ~eligious, ~ational, 
political, or scientific. The human mind, always searching for 
knowledge and meaning in the continuous flux of events, looks fo~ 
congruence between idea and experienced reality. It is constantly 
assimilating new info~mation, assimilating it into its conceptual 
scheme, and adapting old theoretical explanations to fit new experiences 
and needs. New discove~ies in the wo~ld of natu~e requi~e adjusted 
explanations, new events in the political world require revised theory, 
as Hume discovered when he tried to pin down pa~ty ideologies. "The 
heart of man is made to reconcile contradictions" said Hume in an early 
expression of what this century's psychologists call cognitive 
dissonance. 
The history of philosophy, the search for knowledge, is a record of 
continually adjusting theo~y to meet new challenges. This pape~ began 
with the medievals trying to assimilate Aristotle and nature with church 
dogma. The medieval synthesis between thought and natu~e (mind and 
body) did not succeed and the result was a polarization of religion and 
science, which lasted as long as the chu~ch t~ied to deny nature. The 
same issues, ~ever satisfactorily resolved, were, in the early modern 
period, still problems which Hume hoped to resolve with his theory of 
knowledge. Hume's solution was to incorporate. both valid and 
irreducible ways of thinking into a holistic synthesis, mind and body, 
object and subject, reason and passion, liberty and authority. 
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It took two centuries gradually to soften the prevailing paradigms, 
or superstitions as Hume called them, the Lockean, the Newtonian and the 
Whig. Each of these were mind-sets that prevented readers from 
recognizing the subtle and complex dialectical structure and historical 
meaning behind the easy facade of Hume's writing. That the re-
evaluation of Hume has taken place in this century reflects a new 
willingness to examine old assumptions. This is at least partly because 
there is now an element of pessimism or at least confusion about the 
knowledge claims of traditional science. There has been throughout the 
twentieth century a general re-evaluation of what knowledge, science and 
history are. Human knowledge, whether in the world of nature, or the 
world of human action, will always continue to strive for objective 
truth. But the seeker after knowledge, must nevertheless, attain the 
third stage of the dialectic which holds objectivity and subjectivity in 
tension, and understands that complete objectivity is not possible. The 
mind of the observer, the questions asked, the hypotheses formed, will 
always affect what is observed. 
Hume's paradigm of knowledge is empiricism with a mind and time-
dependent, narrative. It is a paradigm that the philosophy of science 
has given renewed study to in the last quarter century. It also 
deserves closer study by historians in their further quest for a method 
of scientific history, suggesting as it does that history may be its own 
paradigm of knowledge. 
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